Trains carrying highly-radioactive used fuel rods pass though the Olympic site weekly between Stratford and Hackney Wick Stations.
A terrorist attack on these trains in the vicinity of the Olympic site which succeeded in breaking open the container of the rods drawn by the train would cause a terrorist spectacular, as it would result in the release of high-level radiation which would kill thousands of people in and around the Olympic site and for miles downwind, and require immediate mass evacuation of the area.
On July 10th 2010, the Nuclear Train Action Group is organising a major rally and march to demand this danger is ended. These trains must be cancelled or re-routed away from the Olympic site and all highly-populated areas such as East London.
DETAILS: Meet 2pm in Victoria Park, by Cadogan Gate Entrance, Cadogan Terrace E9 (near Hackney Wick station) for a rally chaired by CND Chair Kate Hudson and with eminent speakers.
2.45pm. 2-mile march from Victoria Park, passing Hackney Wick station at 3pm and then skirting the southern boundary of the Olympic site along the canal towpath and the Greenway to Stratford station. (Transport from Victoria Park to Stratford for those who aren’t able or don’t want to walk!)
4pm: Symbolic die-in in front of the Olympic Clock outside Stratford Station to represent the consequences of a terrorist attack on a nuclear train, followed by leafletting in Stratford Market and Shopping Centre to alert the public to this danger.
This demonstration is supported by the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND)
(*While the North London Line is closed for up-grading, nuclear trains are being diverted from Stratford up through South Tottenham. However they are still passing alongside the Olympic site, so the terrorist danger remains.)
Nuclear Trains Action Group, Mordechai Vanunu House, 162 Holloway Road, London N7 8DQ; tel 020-7607 2302; fax c/o 020-7700 2357
DEMONSTRATE AGAINST OLYMPIC TERRORIST DANGER!
Saturday, 29 May 2010
Thursday, 27 May 2010
The bomb wasn’t banned by Olivier Zajec
The UN Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty hasn’t prevented India, Pakistan, Israel – and potentially Iran and North Korea – from acquiring nuclear capability. But imagine a world where it hadn’t been adopted by so many other states
The idea of a Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was first proposed in the 1950s when the US, Russia and Britain had nuclear weapons, and France and China were developing them. (France exploded its first nuclear bomb in 1960, China in 1964.) Since the US was in the lead, it had the greatest interest in limiting the arms race, so from the beginning of the 1950s it pushed for nuclear containment. President Dwight Eisenhower proposed to the UN General Assembly on 8 December 1953 that an agency be set up to control the use of nuclear material (1).
For the sake of world peace and maintaining their status, the other nuclear powers, and those about to become so, assessed the situation: a mechanism that recognised their progress while halting the spread of a powerful weapon would be in their interest. The project had no shortage of allies of convenience.
Eisenhower’s idea gained ground, although for a long time it was hostage to the power struggle between the US and Russia. In October 1956, after many stormy debates, the UN created the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA. Article 3.5 of its charter defines its mission as “to establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities, and information made available by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose”. In return, Article 3.1 explains, the IAEA offers “to encourage and assist research on, and development and practical application of, atomic energy for peaceful uses throughout the world.”
Stick and carrot
The order of priorities is therefore the wrong way round in the text: in view of the balance of power at that time, paragraph 1 of Article 3 should follow on from paragraph 5, not the other way around. The IAEA’s primary role is to safeguard, and only then to assist. Article 3.5 also had an important implication: the agency could not be a guardian without legal power; if it was not to remain a weak, marginal, advisory body, it had to have powers of enforcement.
That power came with the NPT, signed on 1 July 1968 by 43 states, including North Korea. Ratified on 5 March 1970, for a period of 25 years, it has been one of the world’s most successful and universal treaties: only Israel, India and Pakistan have never signed it. Its introductory statement sets out the objective of universal access to atomic energy for civilian purposes but also (as is often forgotten) describes the ideal of a world without nuclear weapons. The signatories desired to “further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control”. When Barack Obama gave his speech last year in Prague about a “world without nuclear weapons”, he might as well have read out the NPT (2).Until that vision becomes reality, the NPT tries to contain nuclear weapons technology, through 10 articles, some flexible, some strict. Articles 8 and 10 say a signatory can propose amendments to the treaty, or withdraw “if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardised the supreme interests of its country”. But Articles 2 and 3, the heart of the text, deal with the undertaking by Non-Nuclear Weapons States (NNWS) not to acquire nuclear weapons, and describe the IAEA inspection regime they will undergo in exchange for civilian nuclear technology, guaranteed by Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) (3).
Therein lies the ambiguity of the Treaty: if NNWS are to be compensated for their sacrifice, NWS must gradually reduce their nuclear arsenals (4), while freely sharing their nuclear technology with NWS and adopting restrictive doctrines on its use, so that the NNWS will not feel threatened. While none of these three things has ever been done to the full satisfaction of NNWS, the NPT has, after many arguments (5), gained legitimacy, and in 1995 it was reaffirmed and extended indefinitely. An additional protocol in 1998 guaranteed complete freedom of movement for IAEA inspectors (6).
Three fundamental problems weaken the treaty: the increasing overlap between civilian and military nuclear technology; self-declaration of compliance (states tell the IAEA which facilities to visit, and may therefore hide some) and the lack of a clear definition of what constitutes evidence of non-compliance; and the fact that NNWS can, in the course of the long process of signature, ratification and application of the treaty (7), manoeuvre to become “threshold states” or even nuclear states.
Despite the treaty’s attempts to safeguard against proliferation, there have been many failures, but it is worth examining whether these can be attributed to the NPT. The worst may be India and Pakistan, which became nuclear powers in 1974 and 1985, and are not signatories to the NPT.
First the US (until 1965), then the Soviet Union, knowingly helped India develop weapons in the context of the cold war and geopolitical balance. This began before the NPT was ratified in 1970. By the time India detonated its first nuclear bomb in 1974, the die was already cast (8).
Several countries, including France, transferred civilian nuclear know-how to Pakistan in the belief it would sign the NPT. When it did not and those countries withdrew their help, China stepped in, until Pakistan achieved nuclear capability in 1985. China did not join the NPT until 1992.
Israel is the other major failure. Israel officially denies possessing nuclear weapons. The US knows everything there is to know about Israel’s supposed non-possession, but still backs it up.
Among the signatories, Taiwan, South Korea and Japan have all become “threshold states”. Technically Taiwan cannot violate the NPT since it is no longer recognised by the UN and so cannot be a signatory in its own right. The US blocked its plans to produce nuclear weapons anyway. South Korea and Japan (late signatories, in 1975 and 1976), both technologically advanced countries, are under the protection of the US nuclear umbrella.
Iran seems more straightforward: as a signatory to the treaty, it would be in violation if it were trying to produce nuclear weapons. No country, not even China or Russia, can claim to have enough influence over Iran to secure guarantees. North Korea is another serious case, since unlike Iran it has withdrawn from the Treaty (in 2003). North Korea’s progress towards nuclear armament has been slow, but has for a long time benefited from the benevolent attitude of China. Nonetheless, China appears to have stopped helping it directly since ratifying the NPT.
Things could be worse
The picture is not rosy. But it can be looked at another way: with the exception of North Korea, no state has withdrawn from the treaty. At present no non-nuclear signatory has the bomb. Since the birth of the NPT, the world has not known nuclear war, or an escalation comparable to the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. The number of denuclearised zones (provided for in Article 7 of the Treaty (9)) has increased: Antarctica in 1959 (before the NPT), South Pacific in 1985, Latin America in 1995. Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Belarus have dismantled their nuclear arsenals, as have South Africa and Sweden. Brazil and Argentina have given up their nuclear research programmes.
The NPT cannot take all the credit, but it did provide the legal and moral backdrop for the negotiations that led to these breakthroughs. The fact the treaty was extended indefinitely in 1995 shows the importance accorded to it. (It could have been extended for just another 25 years.)
How do we evaluate the effectiveness of the NPT? The world is far from the nuclear-free ideal, and non-proliferation remains largely dependent on dissuasion by NWS. But imagine what the world would be like without an NPT. It is easier to list what it has not managed to prevent than to imagine what it has managed to avoid. So while the controversy over Iran’s nuclear programme rages, let us concede to the treaty’s detractors that as a shield to protect us against the threat of proliferation, it is full of holes. But it is a shield, and what can be glimpsed through those holes prevents us from casting it aside.
May 2010
(1) Speech entitled “Atoms for Peace”.
(2) See Selig S Harrison, “article 1877”, Le Monde diplomatique, English edition, April 2010.
(3) Each state is expected to sign the guarantee agreement with the IAEA 180 days after joining the Treaty.
(4) Which they agree to do under article 6.
(5) The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), 118 countries, regularly calls for the NWS to share their civilian nuclear technology more openly, and for Israel to ratify the treaty.
(6) Around 60 of the 189 signatories applied the additional protocol.
(7) France only ratified the NPT in 1992.
(8) Much more serious is the nuclear cooperation agreement signed between Washington and Delhi in 2006, which appears to reward India for circumventing the NPT.
(9) “Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of states to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.”
Le Monde Diplomatique
http://mondediplo.com/2010/05/05npt
The idea of a Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was first proposed in the 1950s when the US, Russia and Britain had nuclear weapons, and France and China were developing them. (France exploded its first nuclear bomb in 1960, China in 1964.) Since the US was in the lead, it had the greatest interest in limiting the arms race, so from the beginning of the 1950s it pushed for nuclear containment. President Dwight Eisenhower proposed to the UN General Assembly on 8 December 1953 that an agency be set up to control the use of nuclear material (1).
For the sake of world peace and maintaining their status, the other nuclear powers, and those about to become so, assessed the situation: a mechanism that recognised their progress while halting the spread of a powerful weapon would be in their interest. The project had no shortage of allies of convenience.
Eisenhower’s idea gained ground, although for a long time it was hostage to the power struggle between the US and Russia. In October 1956, after many stormy debates, the UN created the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA. Article 3.5 of its charter defines its mission as “to establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities, and information made available by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose”. In return, Article 3.1 explains, the IAEA offers “to encourage and assist research on, and development and practical application of, atomic energy for peaceful uses throughout the world.”
Stick and carrot
The order of priorities is therefore the wrong way round in the text: in view of the balance of power at that time, paragraph 1 of Article 3 should follow on from paragraph 5, not the other way around. The IAEA’s primary role is to safeguard, and only then to assist. Article 3.5 also had an important implication: the agency could not be a guardian without legal power; if it was not to remain a weak, marginal, advisory body, it had to have powers of enforcement.
That power came with the NPT, signed on 1 July 1968 by 43 states, including North Korea. Ratified on 5 March 1970, for a period of 25 years, it has been one of the world’s most successful and universal treaties: only Israel, India and Pakistan have never signed it. Its introductory statement sets out the objective of universal access to atomic energy for civilian purposes but also (as is often forgotten) describes the ideal of a world without nuclear weapons. The signatories desired to “further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control”. When Barack Obama gave his speech last year in Prague about a “world without nuclear weapons”, he might as well have read out the NPT (2).Until that vision becomes reality, the NPT tries to contain nuclear weapons technology, through 10 articles, some flexible, some strict. Articles 8 and 10 say a signatory can propose amendments to the treaty, or withdraw “if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardised the supreme interests of its country”. But Articles 2 and 3, the heart of the text, deal with the undertaking by Non-Nuclear Weapons States (NNWS) not to acquire nuclear weapons, and describe the IAEA inspection regime they will undergo in exchange for civilian nuclear technology, guaranteed by Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) (3).
Therein lies the ambiguity of the Treaty: if NNWS are to be compensated for their sacrifice, NWS must gradually reduce their nuclear arsenals (4), while freely sharing their nuclear technology with NWS and adopting restrictive doctrines on its use, so that the NNWS will not feel threatened. While none of these three things has ever been done to the full satisfaction of NNWS, the NPT has, after many arguments (5), gained legitimacy, and in 1995 it was reaffirmed and extended indefinitely. An additional protocol in 1998 guaranteed complete freedom of movement for IAEA inspectors (6).
Three fundamental problems weaken the treaty: the increasing overlap between civilian and military nuclear technology; self-declaration of compliance (states tell the IAEA which facilities to visit, and may therefore hide some) and the lack of a clear definition of what constitutes evidence of non-compliance; and the fact that NNWS can, in the course of the long process of signature, ratification and application of the treaty (7), manoeuvre to become “threshold states” or even nuclear states.
Despite the treaty’s attempts to safeguard against proliferation, there have been many failures, but it is worth examining whether these can be attributed to the NPT. The worst may be India and Pakistan, which became nuclear powers in 1974 and 1985, and are not signatories to the NPT.
First the US (until 1965), then the Soviet Union, knowingly helped India develop weapons in the context of the cold war and geopolitical balance. This began before the NPT was ratified in 1970. By the time India detonated its first nuclear bomb in 1974, the die was already cast (8).
Several countries, including France, transferred civilian nuclear know-how to Pakistan in the belief it would sign the NPT. When it did not and those countries withdrew their help, China stepped in, until Pakistan achieved nuclear capability in 1985. China did not join the NPT until 1992.
Israel is the other major failure. Israel officially denies possessing nuclear weapons. The US knows everything there is to know about Israel’s supposed non-possession, but still backs it up.
Among the signatories, Taiwan, South Korea and Japan have all become “threshold states”. Technically Taiwan cannot violate the NPT since it is no longer recognised by the UN and so cannot be a signatory in its own right. The US blocked its plans to produce nuclear weapons anyway. South Korea and Japan (late signatories, in 1975 and 1976), both technologically advanced countries, are under the protection of the US nuclear umbrella.
Iran seems more straightforward: as a signatory to the treaty, it would be in violation if it were trying to produce nuclear weapons. No country, not even China or Russia, can claim to have enough influence over Iran to secure guarantees. North Korea is another serious case, since unlike Iran it has withdrawn from the Treaty (in 2003). North Korea’s progress towards nuclear armament has been slow, but has for a long time benefited from the benevolent attitude of China. Nonetheless, China appears to have stopped helping it directly since ratifying the NPT.
Things could be worse
The picture is not rosy. But it can be looked at another way: with the exception of North Korea, no state has withdrawn from the treaty. At present no non-nuclear signatory has the bomb. Since the birth of the NPT, the world has not known nuclear war, or an escalation comparable to the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. The number of denuclearised zones (provided for in Article 7 of the Treaty (9)) has increased: Antarctica in 1959 (before the NPT), South Pacific in 1985, Latin America in 1995. Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Belarus have dismantled their nuclear arsenals, as have South Africa and Sweden. Brazil and Argentina have given up their nuclear research programmes.
The NPT cannot take all the credit, but it did provide the legal and moral backdrop for the negotiations that led to these breakthroughs. The fact the treaty was extended indefinitely in 1995 shows the importance accorded to it. (It could have been extended for just another 25 years.)
How do we evaluate the effectiveness of the NPT? The world is far from the nuclear-free ideal, and non-proliferation remains largely dependent on dissuasion by NWS. But imagine what the world would be like without an NPT. It is easier to list what it has not managed to prevent than to imagine what it has managed to avoid. So while the controversy over Iran’s nuclear programme rages, let us concede to the treaty’s detractors that as a shield to protect us against the threat of proliferation, it is full of holes. But it is a shield, and what can be glimpsed through those holes prevents us from casting it aside.
May 2010
(1) Speech entitled “Atoms for Peace”.
(2) See Selig S Harrison, “article 1877”, Le Monde diplomatique, English edition, April 2010.
(3) Each state is expected to sign the guarantee agreement with the IAEA 180 days after joining the Treaty.
(4) Which they agree to do under article 6.
(5) The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), 118 countries, regularly calls for the NWS to share their civilian nuclear technology more openly, and for Israel to ratify the treaty.
(6) Around 60 of the 189 signatories applied the additional protocol.
(7) France only ratified the NPT in 1992.
(8) Much more serious is the nuclear cooperation agreement signed between Washington and Delhi in 2006, which appears to reward India for circumventing the NPT.
(9) “Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of states to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.”
Le Monde Diplomatique
http://mondediplo.com/2010/05/05npt
Thursday, 20 May 2010
Radioactive waste incineration!!!
Radioactive Waste Services
2nd Floor Apex House, London Road, Northfleet, DA11 9PD, UK -
0845 160 9292
0845 124 2020
UK's leading Low Level Waste and Very Low Level Waste incineration specialist, who say that they can incinerate all beta and gamma radionuclides from research; manufacturing; decommissioning; healthcare and many sealed sources:
Is this the solution to the long-term storage of Low Level and Very Low Level radioactive wastes?
2nd Floor Apex House, London Road, Northfleet, DA11 9PD, UK -
0845 160 9292
0845 124 2020
UK's leading Low Level Waste and Very Low Level Waste incineration specialist, who say that they can incinerate all beta and gamma radionuclides from research; manufacturing; decommissioning; healthcare and many sealed sources:
Is this the solution to the long-term storage of Low Level and Very Low Level radioactive wastes?
The UK new build programme is set to progress as planned
The UK new build programme is set to progress as planned, even though the minister now in charge is from an anti-nuclear party. Will this have any significant affect?
This year’s Nuclear Industry Forum will bring the sector together to discuss the new government and other industry issues.
Speakers include:
Keith Waller, Senior Advisor, Office for Nuclear Development, DECC
Alan Raymant, Chief Operating Officer, Horizon Nuclear Power
Alfio Vidal, Director of New Nuclear, UK, Iberdrola
Chris Bakken, Director for Operations, Safety & Licensing, EDF Energy
Greg Evans, Head of Nuclear, Centrica
Kevin Allars, Director of New Nuclear Build GDA, HSE Nuclear Directorate
Joe McHugh, Head of Radioactive Substances Regulation, Environment Agency
Prof. Steven Cowley, Chief Executive Officer, United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority
Robert Upton, Deputy Chair, Infrastructure Planning Commission
Duncan Burt, Customer Services Manager, Commercial - Transmission, National Grid
At the Nuclear New Build Webinar, which took place last week. A number of pertinent issues were tackled by our expert panel of:
Adrian Worker, Business Unit and Programme Director, AMEC
Steve Hornsby, Partner and Nuclear Industry Leader, IBM Global Business Services
Adrian Bull, Head of Stakeholder Relations, Westinghouse UK
Event information
Date: 15th & 16th June
Venue: One Whitehall Place, London
If you would like to inquire further about this event, or any of the other events in this sector, please do not hesitate to contact:
Telephone: +44 (0) 20 7760 8699
Email: conferences@marketforce.eu.com
Website: http://www.marketforce.eu.com/nuclear
David Saunders Managing Director, Marketforce
Marketforce, the business media company, mobilises knowledge through the creation of strategic, senior-level conferences across the key industry sectors of Rail, Air Transport, Retail, Utilities, Financial Services, Media & Entertainment, Public Sector and Postal Services. With over 20 years experience in creating forward thinking programmes and interactive environments, Marketforce gives business communities the valued insight they need to drive industry forward. Forthcoming conferences include:
- Smart Metering Update
- Renewables 2010
- The Energy Forum
- Water 2010
- Nuclear New Build Forum
For further information on all events please visit www.marketforce.eu.com/calendar
Follow on Twitter @ https://twitter.com/Marketforce09
Marketforce Business Media Ltd is registered in England, No: 2174487. Registered office: 3 Sutton Lane, London, EC1M 5PU
This year’s Nuclear Industry Forum will bring the sector together to discuss the new government and other industry issues.
Speakers include:
Keith Waller, Senior Advisor, Office for Nuclear Development, DECC
Alan Raymant, Chief Operating Officer, Horizon Nuclear Power
Alfio Vidal, Director of New Nuclear, UK, Iberdrola
Chris Bakken, Director for Operations, Safety & Licensing, EDF Energy
Greg Evans, Head of Nuclear, Centrica
Kevin Allars, Director of New Nuclear Build GDA, HSE Nuclear Directorate
Joe McHugh, Head of Radioactive Substances Regulation, Environment Agency
Prof. Steven Cowley, Chief Executive Officer, United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority
Robert Upton, Deputy Chair, Infrastructure Planning Commission
Duncan Burt, Customer Services Manager, Commercial - Transmission, National Grid
At the Nuclear New Build Webinar, which took place last week. A number of pertinent issues were tackled by our expert panel of:
Adrian Worker, Business Unit and Programme Director, AMEC
Steve Hornsby, Partner and Nuclear Industry Leader, IBM Global Business Services
Adrian Bull, Head of Stakeholder Relations, Westinghouse UK
Event information
Date: 15th & 16th June
Venue: One Whitehall Place, London
If you would like to inquire further about this event, or any of the other events in this sector, please do not hesitate to contact:
Telephone: +44 (0) 20 7760 8699
Email: conferences@marketforce.eu.com
Website: http://www.marketforce.eu.com/nuclear
David Saunders Managing Director, Marketforce
Marketforce, the business media company, mobilises knowledge through the creation of strategic, senior-level conferences across the key industry sectors of Rail, Air Transport, Retail, Utilities, Financial Services, Media & Entertainment, Public Sector and Postal Services. With over 20 years experience in creating forward thinking programmes and interactive environments, Marketforce gives business communities the valued insight they need to drive industry forward. Forthcoming conferences include:
- Smart Metering Update
- Renewables 2010
- The Energy Forum
- Water 2010
- Nuclear New Build Forum
For further information on all events please visit www.marketforce.eu.com/calendar
Follow on Twitter @ https://twitter.com/Marketforce09
Marketforce Business Media Ltd is registered in England, No: 2174487. Registered office: 3 Sutton Lane, London, EC1M 5PU
Wednesday, 19 May 2010
Le triangolazioni delle ecomafie tra rifiuti e armi (Radioactive waste, illegal arms and eco-mafia)
30 maggio 2006 - Pietro Orsatti
Di seguito alcuni brani degli atti ufficiali della Commissione Bicamerale d'inchiesta sulle Ecomafie. Si parla di traffici internazionali di rifiuti illeciti, di tringolazioni con il traffico illegali di armi, di intrecci fra affari (e a volte politica) e criminalità organizzata.
Extracts from the Inquest into the Ecomafia. International traffic in toxic and radioactive waste, illegal arms, finance, politics and organised crime.
"La Commissione monocamerale d'inchiesta sul ciclo dei rifiuti istituita nella precedente legislatura si era occupata del fenomeno dei traffici internazionali di rifiuti pericolosi, anche radioattivi.
"The last inquest into the cycle of waste discovered an international traffic in toxic and radioactive waste.
Evidenti segnali di allarme si coglievano in alcune vicende giudiziarie, da cui peraltro era emersa una chiara sovrapposizione tra queste attività illegali ed il traffico di armi.
And what was even more alarming was the connection between this toxic and radioactive waste traffic and illegal arms traffic.
In particolare, l'inchiesta condotta dalla procura di Lecce aveva individuato il cosiddetto "progetto Urano", finalizzato all'illecito smaltimento in alcune aree del Sahara di rifiuti industriali tossico-nocivi e radioattivi provenienti da Paesi europei.
During the inquest the "Urano Project" came to light. This was concerned with the illegal dumping of toxic and radioactive waste from various European countries in the Sahara.
Numerosi elementi indicavano il coinvolgimento nel suddetto traffico di soggetti istituzionali di governi europei ed extraeuropei,
It soon became clear that Institutions and governments from Europe and beyond were involved in this illegal traffic.
nonché « di esponenti della criminalità organizzata e di personaggi spregiudicati,
as well as members of organised crime
tra cui il noto Giorgio Comerio, faccendiere italiano al centro di una serie di vicende legate alla Somalia
including the infamous Giorgio Comerio, Italian businessman who was involved in various business deals in Somalia
ed all'illecita gestione degli aiuti del Fai (oggi direzione generale per la cooperazione e lo sviluppo).
as well as being involved in the illegal management of aid to FAI (cooperation and development organisation)
Il progetto (già citato dalla precedente Commissione dinchiesta) prevedeva il lancio dalle navi di penetratori (cilindri metallici a forma di siluro), caricati con scorie radioattive vetrificate o cementate e racchiuse in contenitori di acciaio inossidabile che si depositavano sino a 50-80 metri al di sotto del fondale marino;
Giorgio Comerio was involved in a project to dispose of radioactive waste. The waste was to be mixed with cement or vitrified, then enclosed in steel containers, then sunk 50-80 metres deep on the sea bed.
in alternativa, si affondava la nave con l'intero carico pericoloso, simulando un affondamento accidentale e lucrando,
But instead of this entire ships were sunk "accidentally", a much cheaper way of disposing of the radioactive waste.
così, anche il premio assicurativo, il che è stato confermato dalle indagini aventi ad oggetto alcuni naufragi assai sospetti di navi assicurate dalla Lloyds di Londra,
So that he was able to claim the insurance on the ships, the inquest discovered, since they were able to trace various suspicious looking shipwrecks logged by Lloyds of London.
verificatisi nel Tirreno e nello Ionio, di cui diremo oltre.
These ships were sunk in the Tirreno and Ionian sea and beyond.
Il progetto contemplava anche la vendita di alcuni ordigni bellici (le telemine) ai Paesi del Medio oriente,
Giorgio Comerio also sold arms to various Middle East countries
da nascondere in profondita` marine mediante navi Ro-Ro - le stesse navi utilizzate per affondare le scorie radioattive - e col sistema appena descritto"(Relazione finale XIII legislatura).
These arms were hidden in the ships that he used to transport the radioactive waste, which went first to the middle east to offload the arms, then back to the coast of Italy to be sunk.
Questo tipo di traffici è stato per decenni strettamente connesso all'area ligure,
For decades this kind of arms and radioactive waste traffic was connected with the Ligurian coastline.
come riportano gli atti di una delle missioni conoscitive della commissione alla fine degli anni '90.
An inquest held towards the end of the 90s reported details of this.
Un caso emblematico il caso della discarica di Pitelli a La Spezia.
An emblematic case occurred at the Pitelli dump at La Spezia.
"L'attività illecita consisteva nella sistematica falsificazione di documenti di accompagnamento (tesi a consentire l'ingresso in discarica di materiali non autorizzati)
"the case involved the systematic falsification of documents (the documents that permit vehicles to bring non-authorised materials into the dump.)
e nella falsificazione di dichiarazioni di avvenuto smaltimento di rifiuti;
Documents declaring that toxic waste had been correctly disposed of were also falsified.
nella commissione di truffe a danno di enti pubblici e privati, ai quali venivano fatturati costi di smalti mento non affrontati;
Both public and private organisations ended up having to pay for the disposal of toxic and radioactive waste that had not been correctly disposed of.
infine, nel sistematico illecito smaltimento di rifiuti tossico-nocivi provenienti dal territorio nazionale e dall'estero.
Toxic and radioactive waste from Italy and abroad had been systematically dumped completely illegally.
Tali condotte illecite, cominciate nel 1975 (quando cioè nasce la discarica), erano agevolate dalla notevole capacità penetrativa dei soggetti coinvolti, tra cui il Duvia, negli enti pubblici di varia natura
This illegal dumping, which began in 1975 (when the dump was opened) was facilitated by various people in public administrative positions, including the Duvia.
preposti al controllo e proseguivano anche durante il periodo in cui la discarica di Pitelli era sottoposta a sequestro giudiziario. (...)
Even when there was a legal charge on the Pitelli dump, illegal dumping of toxic materials continued.
A prescindere da ogni valutazione sui profili squisitamente penali, sono innegabili alla luce dei numerosi elementi acquisiti dalla Commissione (...) le illegalità commesse dai vari organi amministrativi competenti al controllo (...)".
Clearly the admistration responsible for control of these toxic materials was corrupt.
Ma per la Liguria non si parla solo del caso Pitelli,
In Liguria people are not just talking about the Pitelli case.
anzi: "le indagini che coinvolgono la città di La Spezia, in merito ai casi delle cosiddette "navi a perdere" e delle "navi dei veleni",
The inquest was also concerned with the toxic shipwrecks.
che proprio in quel porto sarebbero state caricate di rifiuti prima di essere le une affondate deliberatamente nel Mediterraneo
Many of the ships that ended up as shipwrecks in the Mediterranean set out from the Ligurian port of La Spezia
e le altre inviate nei Paesi in via di sviluppo per smaltimenti illeciti di rifiuti pericolosi.
Ships from La Spezia also took their toxic and radioactive waste to the third world.
Per quanto riguarda tali gravi fatti, anzi, si deve registrare il nuovo allarme che l'autorità giudiziaria ha ritenuto di esplicitare nel corso del recente convegno sul "Ciclo dei rifiuti in Italia" (...) a proposito della ripresa delle spedizioni di carichi illeciti verso l'Africa e l'America latina.
The inquest registered alarm when they discovered that some of this toxic and radioactive waste had gone to Africa and Latin America.
Si tratta di denunce di particolare gravità, sulle quali questa Commissione vigilerà con la massima attenzione".
The inquest declared that it would be watching the situation like a hawk.
Le segnalazioni di nuove spedizioni illecite di cui parlava la Commissione di Inchiesta, però, non avvenivano più da Spezia ma soprattutto da Genova
Now the inquest has discovered that new illegal traffic has been setting out from Genova, rather than La Spezia.
dopo che un noto armatore aveva trasferito il suo terminal dalla prima alla seconda città, armatore già conosciuto e coinvolto con sue navi direttamente nel caso delle navi dei veleni alla fine degli anni '80.
The inquest traced an arms dealer, known to them for his traffic in toxic waste, who transferred his activities from La Spezia to Genova
I traffici internazionali, sia di rifiuti che di armi o di triangolazioni fra scorie e forniture militari come ormai è dimostrato sia avvenuto a metà degli anni '90 in particolare in Somalia, sono proseguiti e proseguono tuttora,
International traffic in toxic and radioactive waste and illegal arms have continued ever since they were discovered in Somalia, and continue today.
garantiti anche da norme internazionali assolutamente incredibili come ad esempio quelle del "doppio registro", in cui scafo e contenuto possono battere due bandiere diverse a seconda delle convenienze degli armatori in relazione a sicurezza e carico.
This illicit traffic is facilitated by incredible international laws. For example a ship can sail under two different flags. The captain of the ship can choose which flag to fly according to which one matches the cargo he is carrying.
E allo stesso tempo le autorità marittime di controllo hanno sempre meno possibilità di incidere realmente nel fermare i traffici illegali,
Maritime authorities have less and less opportunities to stop this illegal traffic
sia per mancanza di personale che per direttive politiche.
They lack personnel and they lack political backing.
Ad esempio le Capitanerie di porto sono molto più impegnate a reprimere il fenomeno dell'immigrazione clandestina che quello dei traffici illeciti di scorie industriali.
The port authorities have to use a large proportion of their resources to stop illegal immigrants. So they do not have enough left to stop this illegal traffic in arms and toxic and radioactive waste.
Un esempio per tutti, la vicenda del mercantile albanese Korabi a metà degli anni '90. La nave parte da Spalato con un carico di materiali (rottami) ferrosi. Nello Ionio la Capitaneria di Reggio Calabria effettua un'ispezione.
The Albanian ship Korabi in the middle of the 90s set out from Spalata with a cargo of scrap iron. In the Ionian sea the port authorities of Reggio Calabria decided to carry out an inspection.
Non si sa per quale ragione gli ispettori utilizzano anche un contatore geiger – probabilmente grazie a qualche "soffiata" – e riscontrano radioattività nel carico.
Then, maybe because someone tipped them off, they decided to use a geiger counter. They discovered that the cargo was radioactive.
Non succede nulla, perché non si capisce, e la nave viene lasciata proseguire per Palermo dove è diretta.
Nothing was done to stop the boat, which continued on its journey to Palermo.
L'unica iniziativa dell'autorità calabrese è quella di informare dell'anomalia la Capitaneria siciliana che, dopo aver effettuato anche lei un'ispezione con tanto di contatore geiger, non autorizza la nave ad entrare in porto.
The Calabrian port authority informed the Sicilian port authority who went out with a geiger counter to inspect the ship. They too found that the cargo was radioactive, so they stopped the ship from entering the port.
Tre giorni dopo, al largo delle coste calabresi, la nave viene ispezionata dalla Capitaneria di Reggio e, sorpresa, non c'è più traccia di radioattività a bordo.
Three days later, off the coast of Calabria, the Reggio port authority inspected the ship again. This time, amazingly, they did not find any trace of radioactivity.
Quindi, o nelle due precedenti ispezioni le autorità italiane si sono sbagliate oppure il carico fra Palermo alla Calabria (e la nave ricordo avrebbe impiegato tre giorni per fare un tragitto di poche ore) è finito tranquillamente in mare.
Three days had passed between the ship setting out from Palermo and it reaching Reggio. This was a journey that should have taken a few hours. What had happened to the cargo during those three days?
Quello della Korabi non è un caso isolato.
And this is not an isolated case.
Si ipotizza (sempre la commissione bicamerale) che davanti a Capo Spartivento (la zona presenta una fossa marina fra le più profonde del Mediterraneo) fra gli anni '80 e '90 sarebbero state affondate almeno 40 navi cariche di scorie.
The inquest thinks that off the coast of Capo Spartivento (where there is a deep marine ditch) between the 80s and the 90s at least 40 ships full of toxic and radioactive waste were sunk.
Più che nave carrette, contenitori di scorie per lo smaltimento illecito. Una di queste, la Rigel, è stata anche individuata grazie a un'indagine promossa dalla stessa Commissione e dalla magistratura competente. La ricerca è stata possibile grazie alle coordinate esatte (riportate accanto alla dicitura "la nave è affondata") ritrovate in un'agenda del capitano di un'altra nave naufragata e arenata sempre coste calabre: la Rosso, già Jolly Rosso appartenente all'armatore Fratelli Messina è molto conosciuta negli anni '80 come una delle "navi dei veleni" insieme alla Zanoobia e alla Karin-B implicate in un traffico internazionali di rifiuti fra Africa, Libano e Genova.
Si è parlato per almeno due decenni del triangolo Genova, La Spezia e Livorno per il traffico illecito di scorie e armi. Con infiltrazioni della mafia – ricordo che secondo la stessa magistratura uno dei settori di maggior guadagno del latitante Provenzano fossero i rifiuti e il loro smaltimento illecito -, implicazioni a tutti i livelli di istituzioni e imprese. Ricordo ad esempio che a Spezia si è arrivati al coinvolgimento addirittura di alti ufficiali della Marina Militare (un ammiraglio) che a quanto pare avrebbe dato in uso come area di stoccaggio provvisorio dei rifiuti in transito strutture dell'Arsenale spezzino.
Da questo quadro non stupisce la definizione fatta alla fine degli anni '90 dai comitati locali e dalle associazioni ambientaliste (Wwf e Legambiente in prima fila) della Liguria come piattaforma di interscambio per i traffici illeciti internazionali.
E oggi? La situazione, anche se sempre meno adeguatamente monitorata, prosegue a destare preoccupazione. Come preoccupa l'opposizione inusuale da parte di alcuni settori militari al dragaggio del canale d'ingresso al porto di La Spezia, dragaggio che, sia per le attività commerciale che quelle militari nell'area dell'arsenale viene definito come indispensabile.
And today? The situation is not being properly monitored, but there is serious cause for concern. They have been dragging the canal at the entrance to the port of La Spezia.
Pietro Orsatti
Di seguito alcuni brani degli atti ufficiali della Commissione Bicamerale d'inchiesta sulle Ecomafie. Si parla di traffici internazionali di rifiuti illeciti, di tringolazioni con il traffico illegali di armi, di intrecci fra affari (e a volte politica) e criminalità organizzata.
Extracts from the Inquest into the Ecomafia. International traffic in toxic and radioactive waste, illegal arms, finance, politics and organised crime.
"La Commissione monocamerale d'inchiesta sul ciclo dei rifiuti istituita nella precedente legislatura si era occupata del fenomeno dei traffici internazionali di rifiuti pericolosi, anche radioattivi.
"The last inquest into the cycle of waste discovered an international traffic in toxic and radioactive waste.
Evidenti segnali di allarme si coglievano in alcune vicende giudiziarie, da cui peraltro era emersa una chiara sovrapposizione tra queste attività illegali ed il traffico di armi.
And what was even more alarming was the connection between this toxic and radioactive waste traffic and illegal arms traffic.
In particolare, l'inchiesta condotta dalla procura di Lecce aveva individuato il cosiddetto "progetto Urano", finalizzato all'illecito smaltimento in alcune aree del Sahara di rifiuti industriali tossico-nocivi e radioattivi provenienti da Paesi europei.
During the inquest the "Urano Project" came to light. This was concerned with the illegal dumping of toxic and radioactive waste from various European countries in the Sahara.
Numerosi elementi indicavano il coinvolgimento nel suddetto traffico di soggetti istituzionali di governi europei ed extraeuropei,
It soon became clear that Institutions and governments from Europe and beyond were involved in this illegal traffic.
nonché « di esponenti della criminalità organizzata e di personaggi spregiudicati,
as well as members of organised crime
tra cui il noto Giorgio Comerio, faccendiere italiano al centro di una serie di vicende legate alla Somalia
including the infamous Giorgio Comerio, Italian businessman who was involved in various business deals in Somalia
ed all'illecita gestione degli aiuti del Fai (oggi direzione generale per la cooperazione e lo sviluppo).
as well as being involved in the illegal management of aid to FAI (cooperation and development organisation)
Il progetto (già citato dalla precedente Commissione dinchiesta) prevedeva il lancio dalle navi di penetratori (cilindri metallici a forma di siluro), caricati con scorie radioattive vetrificate o cementate e racchiuse in contenitori di acciaio inossidabile che si depositavano sino a 50-80 metri al di sotto del fondale marino;
Giorgio Comerio was involved in a project to dispose of radioactive waste. The waste was to be mixed with cement or vitrified, then enclosed in steel containers, then sunk 50-80 metres deep on the sea bed.
in alternativa, si affondava la nave con l'intero carico pericoloso, simulando un affondamento accidentale e lucrando,
But instead of this entire ships were sunk "accidentally", a much cheaper way of disposing of the radioactive waste.
così, anche il premio assicurativo, il che è stato confermato dalle indagini aventi ad oggetto alcuni naufragi assai sospetti di navi assicurate dalla Lloyds di Londra,
So that he was able to claim the insurance on the ships, the inquest discovered, since they were able to trace various suspicious looking shipwrecks logged by Lloyds of London.
verificatisi nel Tirreno e nello Ionio, di cui diremo oltre.
These ships were sunk in the Tirreno and Ionian sea and beyond.
Il progetto contemplava anche la vendita di alcuni ordigni bellici (le telemine) ai Paesi del Medio oriente,
Giorgio Comerio also sold arms to various Middle East countries
da nascondere in profondita` marine mediante navi Ro-Ro - le stesse navi utilizzate per affondare le scorie radioattive - e col sistema appena descritto"(Relazione finale XIII legislatura).
These arms were hidden in the ships that he used to transport the radioactive waste, which went first to the middle east to offload the arms, then back to the coast of Italy to be sunk.
Questo tipo di traffici è stato per decenni strettamente connesso all'area ligure,
For decades this kind of arms and radioactive waste traffic was connected with the Ligurian coastline.
come riportano gli atti di una delle missioni conoscitive della commissione alla fine degli anni '90.
An inquest held towards the end of the 90s reported details of this.
Un caso emblematico il caso della discarica di Pitelli a La Spezia.
An emblematic case occurred at the Pitelli dump at La Spezia.
"L'attività illecita consisteva nella sistematica falsificazione di documenti di accompagnamento (tesi a consentire l'ingresso in discarica di materiali non autorizzati)
"the case involved the systematic falsification of documents (the documents that permit vehicles to bring non-authorised materials into the dump.)
e nella falsificazione di dichiarazioni di avvenuto smaltimento di rifiuti;
Documents declaring that toxic waste had been correctly disposed of were also falsified.
nella commissione di truffe a danno di enti pubblici e privati, ai quali venivano fatturati costi di smalti mento non affrontati;
Both public and private organisations ended up having to pay for the disposal of toxic and radioactive waste that had not been correctly disposed of.
infine, nel sistematico illecito smaltimento di rifiuti tossico-nocivi provenienti dal territorio nazionale e dall'estero.
Toxic and radioactive waste from Italy and abroad had been systematically dumped completely illegally.
Tali condotte illecite, cominciate nel 1975 (quando cioè nasce la discarica), erano agevolate dalla notevole capacità penetrativa dei soggetti coinvolti, tra cui il Duvia, negli enti pubblici di varia natura
This illegal dumping, which began in 1975 (when the dump was opened) was facilitated by various people in public administrative positions, including the Duvia.
preposti al controllo e proseguivano anche durante il periodo in cui la discarica di Pitelli era sottoposta a sequestro giudiziario. (...)
Even when there was a legal charge on the Pitelli dump, illegal dumping of toxic materials continued.
A prescindere da ogni valutazione sui profili squisitamente penali, sono innegabili alla luce dei numerosi elementi acquisiti dalla Commissione (...) le illegalità commesse dai vari organi amministrativi competenti al controllo (...)".
Clearly the admistration responsible for control of these toxic materials was corrupt.
Ma per la Liguria non si parla solo del caso Pitelli,
In Liguria people are not just talking about the Pitelli case.
anzi: "le indagini che coinvolgono la città di La Spezia, in merito ai casi delle cosiddette "navi a perdere" e delle "navi dei veleni",
The inquest was also concerned with the toxic shipwrecks.
che proprio in quel porto sarebbero state caricate di rifiuti prima di essere le une affondate deliberatamente nel Mediterraneo
Many of the ships that ended up as shipwrecks in the Mediterranean set out from the Ligurian port of La Spezia
e le altre inviate nei Paesi in via di sviluppo per smaltimenti illeciti di rifiuti pericolosi.
Ships from La Spezia also took their toxic and radioactive waste to the third world.
Per quanto riguarda tali gravi fatti, anzi, si deve registrare il nuovo allarme che l'autorità giudiziaria ha ritenuto di esplicitare nel corso del recente convegno sul "Ciclo dei rifiuti in Italia" (...) a proposito della ripresa delle spedizioni di carichi illeciti verso l'Africa e l'America latina.
The inquest registered alarm when they discovered that some of this toxic and radioactive waste had gone to Africa and Latin America.
Si tratta di denunce di particolare gravità, sulle quali questa Commissione vigilerà con la massima attenzione".
The inquest declared that it would be watching the situation like a hawk.
Le segnalazioni di nuove spedizioni illecite di cui parlava la Commissione di Inchiesta, però, non avvenivano più da Spezia ma soprattutto da Genova
Now the inquest has discovered that new illegal traffic has been setting out from Genova, rather than La Spezia.
dopo che un noto armatore aveva trasferito il suo terminal dalla prima alla seconda città, armatore già conosciuto e coinvolto con sue navi direttamente nel caso delle navi dei veleni alla fine degli anni '80.
The inquest traced an arms dealer, known to them for his traffic in toxic waste, who transferred his activities from La Spezia to Genova
I traffici internazionali, sia di rifiuti che di armi o di triangolazioni fra scorie e forniture militari come ormai è dimostrato sia avvenuto a metà degli anni '90 in particolare in Somalia, sono proseguiti e proseguono tuttora,
International traffic in toxic and radioactive waste and illegal arms have continued ever since they were discovered in Somalia, and continue today.
garantiti anche da norme internazionali assolutamente incredibili come ad esempio quelle del "doppio registro", in cui scafo e contenuto possono battere due bandiere diverse a seconda delle convenienze degli armatori in relazione a sicurezza e carico.
This illicit traffic is facilitated by incredible international laws. For example a ship can sail under two different flags. The captain of the ship can choose which flag to fly according to which one matches the cargo he is carrying.
E allo stesso tempo le autorità marittime di controllo hanno sempre meno possibilità di incidere realmente nel fermare i traffici illegali,
Maritime authorities have less and less opportunities to stop this illegal traffic
sia per mancanza di personale che per direttive politiche.
They lack personnel and they lack political backing.
Ad esempio le Capitanerie di porto sono molto più impegnate a reprimere il fenomeno dell'immigrazione clandestina che quello dei traffici illeciti di scorie industriali.
The port authorities have to use a large proportion of their resources to stop illegal immigrants. So they do not have enough left to stop this illegal traffic in arms and toxic and radioactive waste.
Un esempio per tutti, la vicenda del mercantile albanese Korabi a metà degli anni '90. La nave parte da Spalato con un carico di materiali (rottami) ferrosi. Nello Ionio la Capitaneria di Reggio Calabria effettua un'ispezione.
The Albanian ship Korabi in the middle of the 90s set out from Spalata with a cargo of scrap iron. In the Ionian sea the port authorities of Reggio Calabria decided to carry out an inspection.
Non si sa per quale ragione gli ispettori utilizzano anche un contatore geiger – probabilmente grazie a qualche "soffiata" – e riscontrano radioattività nel carico.
Then, maybe because someone tipped them off, they decided to use a geiger counter. They discovered that the cargo was radioactive.
Non succede nulla, perché non si capisce, e la nave viene lasciata proseguire per Palermo dove è diretta.
Nothing was done to stop the boat, which continued on its journey to Palermo.
L'unica iniziativa dell'autorità calabrese è quella di informare dell'anomalia la Capitaneria siciliana che, dopo aver effettuato anche lei un'ispezione con tanto di contatore geiger, non autorizza la nave ad entrare in porto.
The Calabrian port authority informed the Sicilian port authority who went out with a geiger counter to inspect the ship. They too found that the cargo was radioactive, so they stopped the ship from entering the port.
Tre giorni dopo, al largo delle coste calabresi, la nave viene ispezionata dalla Capitaneria di Reggio e, sorpresa, non c'è più traccia di radioattività a bordo.
Three days later, off the coast of Calabria, the Reggio port authority inspected the ship again. This time, amazingly, they did not find any trace of radioactivity.
Quindi, o nelle due precedenti ispezioni le autorità italiane si sono sbagliate oppure il carico fra Palermo alla Calabria (e la nave ricordo avrebbe impiegato tre giorni per fare un tragitto di poche ore) è finito tranquillamente in mare.
Three days had passed between the ship setting out from Palermo and it reaching Reggio. This was a journey that should have taken a few hours. What had happened to the cargo during those three days?
Quello della Korabi non è un caso isolato.
And this is not an isolated case.
Si ipotizza (sempre la commissione bicamerale) che davanti a Capo Spartivento (la zona presenta una fossa marina fra le più profonde del Mediterraneo) fra gli anni '80 e '90 sarebbero state affondate almeno 40 navi cariche di scorie.
The inquest thinks that off the coast of Capo Spartivento (where there is a deep marine ditch) between the 80s and the 90s at least 40 ships full of toxic and radioactive waste were sunk.
Più che nave carrette, contenitori di scorie per lo smaltimento illecito. Una di queste, la Rigel, è stata anche individuata grazie a un'indagine promossa dalla stessa Commissione e dalla magistratura competente. La ricerca è stata possibile grazie alle coordinate esatte (riportate accanto alla dicitura "la nave è affondata") ritrovate in un'agenda del capitano di un'altra nave naufragata e arenata sempre coste calabre: la Rosso, già Jolly Rosso appartenente all'armatore Fratelli Messina è molto conosciuta negli anni '80 come una delle "navi dei veleni" insieme alla Zanoobia e alla Karin-B implicate in un traffico internazionali di rifiuti fra Africa, Libano e Genova.
Si è parlato per almeno due decenni del triangolo Genova, La Spezia e Livorno per il traffico illecito di scorie e armi. Con infiltrazioni della mafia – ricordo che secondo la stessa magistratura uno dei settori di maggior guadagno del latitante Provenzano fossero i rifiuti e il loro smaltimento illecito -, implicazioni a tutti i livelli di istituzioni e imprese. Ricordo ad esempio che a Spezia si è arrivati al coinvolgimento addirittura di alti ufficiali della Marina Militare (un ammiraglio) che a quanto pare avrebbe dato in uso come area di stoccaggio provvisorio dei rifiuti in transito strutture dell'Arsenale spezzino.
Da questo quadro non stupisce la definizione fatta alla fine degli anni '90 dai comitati locali e dalle associazioni ambientaliste (Wwf e Legambiente in prima fila) della Liguria come piattaforma di interscambio per i traffici illeciti internazionali.
E oggi? La situazione, anche se sempre meno adeguatamente monitorata, prosegue a destare preoccupazione. Come preoccupa l'opposizione inusuale da parte di alcuni settori militari al dragaggio del canale d'ingresso al porto di La Spezia, dragaggio che, sia per le attività commerciale che quelle militari nell'area dell'arsenale viene definito come indispensabile.
And today? The situation is not being properly monitored, but there is serious cause for concern. They have been dragging the canal at the entrance to the port of La Spezia.
Pietro Orsatti
Tuesday, 18 May 2010 - CAMPAIGNERS from London and SE England Stop Nuclear Power protested outside the Financing Nuclear Power and Nuclear Interim Storage conferences in central London today. They invited delegates to invest in a green future instead of nuclear energy and demanded an end to nuclear waste production.
The first port of call for the three protesters, two of whom were dressed in white overalls, was the Financing Nuclear Power conference at the plush Crowne Plaza hotel near St James's Park. They held up a banner that read "Green Solutions Not Nuclear Greenwash" and leafleted delegates and passing members of the public outside the main entrance to the hotel for over an hour and a half, closely watched by hotel security staff throughout
The incoming Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government has said it will continue with the Labour government policy of allowing ten new nuclear power stations to be built in England and Wales. Ministers have said that no direct public subsidies will be offered for new nuclear build, although a carbon floor price is proposed. Nowhere in the world has a nuclear power station ever been built without public subsidy.
For five decades, the nuclear industry has failed to find a permanent solution for its radioactive waste, which remains dangerous for tens of thousands of years. [2] With current waste storage facilities at Sizewell B in Suffolk nearly full, plans are in place to build a new "temporary" store where waste from the reactor will be kept indefinitely in the absence of a permanent solution. This is before considering the waste from any new reactor(s), which would be more radioactive and remain too hot to transport for 160+ years.
Campaigner Daniel Viesnik, 35, from London, says: "Contrary to the nonsense that you hear from the nuclear spin doctors and their political mouthpieces, nuclear power is a dirty, dangerous and expensive technology that diverts essential investment from genuine green alternatives like energy efficiency and renewable and decentralised energy. It carries the risks of nuclear weapons proliferation, nuclear terrorism and a Chernobyl-type catastrophe [3,4]. Why waste money on nuclear white elephants and dump more nuclear waste on local communities when we could build a genuinely sustainable, nuclear-free, zero carbon future?"
Notes:
1. London and SE England Stop Nuclear Power is part of the Stop Nuclear Power Network, a UK-based non-hierarchical grassroots network of activists taking action against nuclear power and supporting sustainable alternatives.
http://stopnuclearpoweruk.net/
2. Nuclear Decommissioning Authority's Oxide Fuel Topic Strategy (2010) indicates that serious questions remain within the nuclear industry itself over whether any solution for permanent disposal of radioactive waste will ever be found.
http://www.nda.gov.uk/documents/upload/draft-oxide-fuel-topic-strategy-gate-0.pdf
3. EDF nuclear reactor carries 'Chernobyl-size' explosion risk - Guardian, 7 March 2010
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2010/mar/07/edf-nuclear-reactor-chernobyl-risk
4. Academics demand independent inquiry into new nuclear reactors – Guardian, 11 March 2010
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2010/mar/11/independent-inquiry-nuclear-power-stations
Monday, 17 May 2010
Around twenty activists from the Stop Nuclear Power Network have held a ceremony on the beach in front of Sizewell nuclear power station in Suffolk (England) on the 26th April 2010 to mark the 24th anniversary of the world's worst ever civil nuclear disaster, at Chernobyl (Ukraine). They are looking to highlight the risk of a similar catastrophe happening in Suffolk, due to a reactor meltdown or major radioactive waste incident.
Londoners Protest Nuclear Trains
17 April - A protest against trains taking highly toxic radioactive waste through densely populated North London was given added moment by President Obama's recent warning that nuclear terrorism is the gravest threat to global security.
World Wide Nuclear Energy Revival
On May 17th, 2010 the World Nuclear Association projected an 838% resurgence in the nuclear industry over the next few decades.
China, the United Arab Emirates, and the UK have already announced ambitious nuclear plans.
And the U.S. just authorized $54 billion in loan guarantees to help build a new generation of nuclear reactors.
Nuclear energy is gaining support on both sides of the political spectrum. And communities are more supportive of it thanks to a massive pro-nuclear campaign on the part of the governments involved in its promotion.
As the world embarks on a nuclear revival... a few companies (and their investors) stand to make a killing.
The report by Brian Hicks and Keith Kohl discusses how this revival is going to happen. It explains the politics behind the nuclear industry, who's planning on building new plants, where the fuel will come from, and how the waste issues will be dealt with.
- Brian Hicks and Keith Kohl, Founders & Managing Editors, Energy and Capital
Copyright 2010 - Energy and Capital
Energy and Capital is published by Angel Publishing, 1012 Morton St, Baltimore, MD 21201
China, the United Arab Emirates, and the UK have already announced ambitious nuclear plans.
And the U.S. just authorized $54 billion in loan guarantees to help build a new generation of nuclear reactors.
Nuclear energy is gaining support on both sides of the political spectrum. And communities are more supportive of it thanks to a massive pro-nuclear campaign on the part of the governments involved in its promotion.
As the world embarks on a nuclear revival... a few companies (and their investors) stand to make a killing.
The report by Brian Hicks and Keith Kohl discusses how this revival is going to happen. It explains the politics behind the nuclear industry, who's planning on building new plants, where the fuel will come from, and how the waste issues will be dealt with.
- Brian Hicks and Keith Kohl, Founders & Managing Editors, Energy and Capital
Copyright 2010 - Energy and Capital
Energy and Capital is published by Angel Publishing, 1012 Morton St, Baltimore, MD 21201
Decommissioning Nuclear Power Costs were hidden by Labour
From The Sunday Times May 16, 2010
Labour hid ‘scorched earth’ debts worth billionsMarie Woolf and Jonathan Oliver
Recommend? (153) THE government last night accused Labour of pursuing a “scorched earth policy” before the general election, leaving behind billions of pounds of previously hidden spending commitments.
The “black holes” that ministers have already unearthed include:
- The multi-billion-pound cost of decommissioning old nuclear power plants, which ministers claim has not been properly accounted for in Whitehall budgets.
Labour hid ‘scorched earth’ debts worth billionsMarie Woolf and Jonathan Oliver
Recommend? (153) THE government last night accused Labour of pursuing a “scorched earth policy” before the general election, leaving behind billions of pounds of previously hidden spending commitments.
The “black holes” that ministers have already unearthed include:
- The multi-billion-pound cost of decommissioning old nuclear power plants, which ministers claim has not been properly accounted for in Whitehall budgets.
Sunday, 16 May 2010
Olkiluoto Blockade 28th of August 2010
Shoulder to shoulder the nuclear industry and the Finnish government are on an offensive to push for more nuclear developments in Finland. In the middle of April, just before Chernobyl Day, the Finnish government published their proposal to build two additional nuclear reactors.
Our answer to this unbelievable statement is a blockade of the Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) at Olkiluoto on 28th of August 2010 as a signal to show peoples resistance against the rulers irresponsibility.
When corporations and governments act irresponsibly, it becomes our duty to reclaim our own lives and future. On August 28 we will blockade the roads to the Olkiluoto NPP for one day with a colourful
diversity of actions - sitting on the road we use our bodies to peacefully block nuclear power.
The Blockade includes a picnic by the road, information events and other actions to make clear that nuclear power is not an option - not in Finland and not anywhere else!
Read more: http://olkiluotoblockade.info/
Contact us: olkiluotoblockade@riseup.net
+358 41 7270620
Networks and organisations already supporting this call-out:
Nuclear Free Finland +++ Maan ystävät / Friends of the Earth
Finland +++ Kvinnor mot atomkraft/Naiset atomivoimaa vastaan
+++ Kvinnor för fred/Naiset rauhan puolesta +++ Aktionsgruppen
för ett atomkraftsfritt Åland
Stop the Nuclear Threat!
The Finnish government wants two new nuclear reactors to be built in Finland - one on the Olkiluoto NPP site and another one at an undecided site selected by the EON-led Fennovoima nuclear company, either in Simo or Pyhäjoki.
Thus even more dangerous nuclear waste will be produced, even though nowhere in the world has succeeded in building a safe final repository. Indeed, a verifiably safe final disposal of this radioactive material is simply not possible.
Choosing to base our energy infrastructure on nuclear power will prevent significant development of renewables in Finland, leaving us with a short term energy policy and a long term waste problem.
The radiation released by NPPs has been linked in several recent studies to significant increases in leukaemia, childhood cancer and other diseases. Also the likelihood of hazardous accidents would grow with the number of nuclear facilities and the associated fuel and waste transports.
To operate the nuclear power plants you need uranium. Uranium mining is usually connected to the exploitation and oppression of residents of the area and the complete destruction of their living conditions by
radioactive and highly toxic tailing ponds and uranium ore dumps.
The reliance on nuclear power (both for energy and political status) increases the militarization of these areas which are potential targets.
Nuclear zones dominate local areas and disempower the affected people.
We want to empower each other to resist the destruction of the environment, the damaging of our health and the threatening of future generations.
No new NPPs and no uranium mining in Finland or anywhere else! Shut down all nuclear facilities now! No nuclear dump beneath the Baltic Sea!
Impressum: Olkiluoto Blockade, olkiluotoblockade@riseup.net, phone:
+358 41 7270620, http://olkiluotoblockade.info/
Our answer to this unbelievable statement is a blockade of the Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) at Olkiluoto on 28th of August 2010 as a signal to show peoples resistance against the rulers irresponsibility.
When corporations and governments act irresponsibly, it becomes our duty to reclaim our own lives and future. On August 28 we will blockade the roads to the Olkiluoto NPP for one day with a colourful
diversity of actions - sitting on the road we use our bodies to peacefully block nuclear power.
The Blockade includes a picnic by the road, information events and other actions to make clear that nuclear power is not an option - not in Finland and not anywhere else!
Read more: http://olkiluotoblockade.info/
Contact us: olkiluotoblockade@riseup.net
+358 41 7270620
Networks and organisations already supporting this call-out:
Nuclear Free Finland +++ Maan ystävät / Friends of the Earth
Finland +++ Kvinnor mot atomkraft/Naiset atomivoimaa vastaan
+++ Kvinnor för fred/Naiset rauhan puolesta +++ Aktionsgruppen
för ett atomkraftsfritt Åland
Stop the Nuclear Threat!
The Finnish government wants two new nuclear reactors to be built in Finland - one on the Olkiluoto NPP site and another one at an undecided site selected by the EON-led Fennovoima nuclear company, either in Simo or Pyhäjoki.
Thus even more dangerous nuclear waste will be produced, even though nowhere in the world has succeeded in building a safe final repository. Indeed, a verifiably safe final disposal of this radioactive material is simply not possible.
Choosing to base our energy infrastructure on nuclear power will prevent significant development of renewables in Finland, leaving us with a short term energy policy and a long term waste problem.
The radiation released by NPPs has been linked in several recent studies to significant increases in leukaemia, childhood cancer and other diseases. Also the likelihood of hazardous accidents would grow with the number of nuclear facilities and the associated fuel and waste transports.
To operate the nuclear power plants you need uranium. Uranium mining is usually connected to the exploitation and oppression of residents of the area and the complete destruction of their living conditions by
radioactive and highly toxic tailing ponds and uranium ore dumps.
The reliance on nuclear power (both for energy and political status) increases the militarization of these areas which are potential targets.
Nuclear zones dominate local areas and disempower the affected people.
We want to empower each other to resist the destruction of the environment, the damaging of our health and the threatening of future generations.
No new NPPs and no uranium mining in Finland or anywhere else! Shut down all nuclear facilities now! No nuclear dump beneath the Baltic Sea!
Impressum: Olkiluoto Blockade, olkiluotoblockade@riseup.net, phone:
+358 41 7270620, http://olkiluotoblockade.info/
Russia Nuclear Renaissance encounters problems
(707.6033) WISE Russia - Two years after the Russian government approved an ambitious program of building nearly 40 nuclear reactors, mass-media in Moscow are reporting about massive cuts in number of power plants to be built until 2015. According to leading business newspaper "Vedomosti", referring to the data of the Ministry of energy, the number of new nuclear reactors will be cut by over 60%.
Russia may save about US$25 billion (18 billion euro) if it will never build units which currently were removed from the 2015-target list, Russian environmental group Ecodefense estimates. Moreover, spending this amount for construction of natural gas' power plants may bring 3 times more electricity, compared to
nuclear, said Vladimir Milov, former deputy energy minister of Russia, to the Nuclear Monitor.
According to the scheme of locations for energy facilities until 2020 (the state program outlining the plan for
construction of nuclear, coal, gas, hydro plants during next decade), "Rosatom" planned to put online 13,2 GWt of new nuclear capacity until 2015. This is equal to 13 units of the VVER-1000 design or 11 units of the VVER-1200 design. Under the reduced plan, only 5,2 GWt of new nuclear capacity is planned to be added.
But even that reduced number of reactors will be hard to build, environmental campaigners say. The scheme of locations for energy facilities until 2020 was approved by the Russian government in 2008.
Environmental groups organized protests on the day of approval in more than 20 cities, because the plan includes an increased number of nuclear and coal plants which will increase the risks for public health and environment. Campaigners also protested because government excluded environmental groups from the decision-making process, what resulted in an antienvironmental and poor-quality document.
Reducing the number of nuclear reactors to be built in next 5 years is good news but is actually just a reflection of reality. When the plans were approved in 2008, it was already clear that Russia can not afford to build dozens of reactors during the next decade. First of all, "Rosatom" doesn't have enough heavy machinery capacity to produce reactors even for domestic plans, and there are also foreign contracts in China, India and Belarus. And Russian nuclear industry said it will try to win more contracts in Asia, Latin America and Eastern Europe.
Why did the Russian government approve the program that can not be implemented? It looks like "Rosatom" just decided that.
THE END FOR RUSSIAN "NUCLEAR RENAISSANCE"?
According to the Russian government, the number of new nuclear reactors planned to be built by 2015 will be cut by 60%. But even that number of nuclear units will be hard to build. As environmental groups has been saying for years, Russian nuclear development program is far from reality.
An increasing number of reactors on paper will bring them more funds from the federal budget. But now plans and funding will be reduced, which will affect both planned and under construction reactors, Vladimir Milov said to the Nuclear Monitor.
The Russian "nuclear renaissance" may well be over, even if it did not start yet. And this is good news because reactors are expensive, inefficient and dangerous just as they were 24 years ago when Chernobyl happened.
Currently there are 31 nuclear reactors in operation in Russia producing 16% of all electricity. Several of the oldest and the most dangerous reactors -such as RBMKs and VVER-440- obtained extended licenses when planned operational lifetime was over.
THE MYTHOLOGY AND MESSY REALITY OF REPROCESSING
It is only recently that reprocessing is being promoted as a “solution” to the problem of mounting quantities of spent fuel. In this context, it is often called “recycling.” It is now explicitly being promoted as a means for greatly increasing the use of the uranium resource contained in the spent fuel. Proponents of nuclear power often state that 95 percent of spent fuel (or used fuel or irradiated fuel) can be “recycled” for recovering the energy in it.
This has become a new mantra of nuclear waste management: spent fuel is a treasuretrove of energy.
A new report ('The Mythology and Messy reality of Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing') by the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research (IEER) looks at France (often called an 'inspirational example for nuclear waste
management') and shows that for existing spent fuel the slogan belongs in the same realm of economic claims for nuclear energy that would be “too cheap to meter.”
It is worth noting at the outset that reprocessing and breeder reactors were not proposed as a solution to the problem of nuclear waste, which has so far turned out to be intractable for a host of technical, environmental,
and political reasons.
Reprocessing was also not proposed as an essential accompaniment to burner reactors, like the light water reactors, to increase the use of the uranium resource because its value in that regard is marginal.
In light water reactor systems, almost all the uranium resource winds up as depleted uranium or in spent fuel. Even with repeated reprocessing and re-enrichment, use of the natural uranium resource cannot be increased to more than one percent in such a system. The use of 90 to 95 percent of the uranium resource in the spent fuel is impossible in a light water reactor system even with reprocessing. These are technical constraints that go with the system.
Reprocessing in France Reprocessing in France is continuing mainly due to the inertia of primarilygovernment-owned electricity generation and reprocessing corporations (EDF and AREVA
respectively). It continues also due to the political and economic dislocations that closing an established large
industrial operation would cause in a largely rural area in Normandy that has scarcely any other industries. After it was clear that the breeder reactor program was not going to fulfill its theoretical promise any time soon, the decision to continue reprocessing in France was not about economics, technical suitability, waste
management, or significantly increasing the use of the uranium resource in the fresh fuel.(*1) It was driven mainly by the inertia of a system that was government-owned and had already invested a great deal of money and institutional prestige in the technology.
Light water reactors(*2) and reprocessing Uranium-238 is almost 99.3 percent of the natural uranium resource. It requires about 7.44 kilograms of natural uranium to produce one kilogram of 4 percent enriched uranium fuel, assuming 0.2 percent U-235 in the tails (depleted uranium).(*3)
This means that about 86.6 percent of the natural uranium resource winds up as depleted uranium. Even if the efficiency of enrichment improved so that only 0.1 percent of U-235 remained in.
Reprocessing in the US?
French company Areva has no immediate plans to build a reprocessing and associated MOX fabrication complex in the US. Areva spokesman Jarret Adams said the company has been discussing designs for a US reprocessing and MOX fuel fabrication complex with utilities for many years and that it is 'starting to educate President Barack Obama’s administration' on Areva’s vision for nuclear fuel recycling in the US.
But on March 25, Alan Hanson, Areva’s executive vice president of technology and used fuel management, said in Washington, that preliminary designs show that a reprocessing and associated MOX fuel fabrication complex built at one site in the US would be a US$25 billion capital expenditure. Jacques Besnainou, CEO of Areva North America, said in that Areva would be willing to invest its own money to help develop a reprocessing complex in the US. On March 25, Besnainou said that a US reprocessing complex could be a regional hub capable of reprocessing spent fuel from the Americas and small countries from other regions. “I
think we should help the [United Arab Emirates] with their used fuel 20 years from now,” he said.
It would still mean that about 84 percent of the natural uranium resource would wind up as depleted uranium when it is first enriched. (For simplicity, the authors ignore losses of uranium during milling and the series of
processing steps prior to enrichment. These are small compared to the amount of depleted uranium.)
It should also be noted that the vast majority of the uranium in the fresh fuel is still non-fissile U- 238. In the case of 4 percent enriched uranium, made from natural uranium, the other 96 percent is uranium-238. The fraction of U-238 is a little lower in fuel made from reprocessed and re-enriched uranium due to the buildup of other uranium isotopes, notably U-236. A small fraction (about two percent) of this U-238 gets converted into plutonium.
Some of this is fissioned in the course of reactor operation and therefore provides a portion of the energy output of the reactor. But the vast majority of uranium-238 will remain unused in burner reactors – that is, the
type of reactors in use today.
Commercial reprocessing using the PUREX process, the only commercial technology at present, separates the spent fuel into three streams – (i) plutonium, (ii) uranium, and (iii) fission products, plus traces of non-fission radionuclides, like neptunium.
France uses most, but not all (see below), of the separated plutonium as a mixed plutonium dioxide uranium dioxide fuel, called MOX fuel for short. It uses depleted uranium to make MOX fuel. However, of the 6.44
kilograms of depleted uranium created in the process of making fresh fuel from natural uranium, in the used example, just over a tenth of a kilogram is used as a component of MOX fuel; most of that remains unused
in spent MOX fuel.
France also uses a part of the uranium recovered from spent fuel as a fuel. But this uranium must be re-enriched to the requisite level. To get the same performance as fresh 4 percent fuel, the reprocessed uranium must (because of the degraded isotopic composition of the uranium) be enriched to about 4.4 percent, which means that about 87 percent of the recovered uranium becomes depleted uranium waste.
Further, roughly 93 percent of this re-enriched fuel is also uranium-238. When this recovered and re-enriched uranium is used as fuel only a small amount of it is converted to plutonium, while most remains unused. If repeated reprocessing and re-enrichment are carried out, the pile of depleted uranium mounts rapidly, while the amount of fissile material dwindles. Further, it should be noted that the process of
enriching reprocessed uranium also increases the concentration of uranium-236, which is not fissile; this
reduces the usefulness of re-enriched uranium as a fuel.
The flow of materials in a light water reactor scheme with reprocessing is shown in diagram in Figure 2. It
corresponds to the example the authors have been using: an initial fuel loading of 1 kilogram of fresh (4 percent) low enriched uranium fuel, 0.2 percent U-235 in the depleted uranium tails at the enrichment plant, and 8 percent plutonium in MOX fuel, and assuming that all the recovered uranium is re-enriched.
At the end of the use of the MOX fuel and re-enriched uranium fuel, only about 6 percent of the kilogram of original fresh fuel has been used to generate energy. In turn this is only about 0.8 percent of the 7.44 kilograms natural uranium resource used to make the single kilogram of 4 percent enriched uranium fuels.
Repeated reprocessing, MOX fuel use, and re-enriched reprocessing uranium fuel use does not improve the picture much. This is because most of the remaining spent fuel is left behind as depleted uranium in each round. In fact after five rounds, about 99 percent of the original uranium resource is depleted uranium. This means that the fraction of the uranium resource that can be used in a light water reactorreprocessing-
re-enrichment scheme is one percent or less. This can be raised slightly by reducing the amount of U-235 in the tails below 0.2 percent.
This is a conservative calculation, done as a simple illustration. It ignores the isotopic degradation of both the
uranium and plutonium in the second and subsequent rounds of use in a reactor. Specifically, uranium-236 and uranium-234, which are not fissile isotopes and which degrade fuel performance, build up in the fuel as the reactor operates; uranium-236 increases in concentration with re-enrichment.
Small amounts of uranium-232 also build up.(*5) This isotope has a specific activity (defined as disintegrations per second per unit mass) that is 30 million times greater than natural uranium.
Unlike fresh uranium fuel, it quickly generates decay products that emit strong gamma radiation, which creates higher worker radiation risks. Fuel quality requirements limit U-232 to a few parts per billion. As a result, re-enrichment becomes more complex and costly for each round of recycled uranium fuel use in a reactor. The interaction of uranium-236 and uranium-232 must be reduced by blending the enrichment feedstock with natural, un-reprocessed uranium or by blending the enriched uranium derived from reprocessed uranium with enriched uranium originating from fresh ore.
Similarly, the isotopic composition of MOX fuel degrades with each round of MOX fuel use and reprocessing; this makes reprocessing even more expensive and the fuel less valuable. As a result of the above considerations, technical and cost considerations limit the practical ability to reprocessing and re-enrich for more than one round past the first use of fresh fuel made from natural uranium.
Even when the initial depleted uranium is left out of the calculation (though it should not be, since it contains most of the natural uranium resource), reprocessing and repeated re-enrichment and MOX fuel use will
utilize only about six percent (rounded) of the fuel originally loaded into the reactor, with about two-thirds of that occurring in the initial irradiation and most of the rest occurring in the first round of MOX fuel use. Repeated reprocessing, re-enrichment, and MOX fuel use just does not increase resource use significantly, because most of the uranium becomes part of the depleted uranium stream at each step. Finally, it should be noted that these numbers ignore uranium losses at the uranium mill (where, typically, several percent of
the uranium is discarded into tailing ponds along with almost all the radium-226 and thorium-230 in the ore)
and in the processing steps needed to make the uranium hexafluoride feed for the enrichment plant. The actual resource utilization based on the uranium content of the ore at the mill is, in practice significantly less than one percent. Fresh fuel plus one cycle of MOX use and re-enrichment uses only about 0.8 percent of the natural uranium resource. This is reduced to about 0.7 percent when the losses of uranium in the processing at the uranium mill and the conversion to uranium hexafluoride are taken into account.
France currently only re-uses a third of the recovered uranium. This means that France uses less than six percent of the uranium resource in the original fresh fuel; about 80 percent of this is used in the first round of fresh fuel use prior to reprocessing. In other words, the expense, risk, and pollution created by French reprocessing only marginally increases the use of the underlying uranium resource. Further, the re-enrichment is not done in France but in Russia. The depleted uranium from re-enrichment, amounting to roughly 87
percent of the reprocessed uranium by weight, remains behind in Russia.
In sum, the French use only about 0.7 percent of the original uranium resource to create fission energy. The rest is mainly in depleted uranium at various locations, or is piling up as reprocessed uranium that is not being used, or is uranium left in spent fuel of various kinds (including MOX spent fuel). This figure cannot be increased significantly even with repeated reprocessing and re-enrichment so long as the fuel is used in a light water reactor system.
Notes
(*1) All calculations are based on four percent enriched fresh fuel made from natural uranium as the starting point, unless otherwise specified. The results would be similar with any starting enrichment for light water reactors, which are designed to use low enriched fuel (generally less than five percent U-235).
(*2) Light water reactors are a specific example of “burner” reactors, which have a net consumption of fissile
materials in the course of energy production from fission. Some new fissile material is created, mainly
plutonium-239, but the amount of fissile material used (or burned), mainly a combination of uranium-235 and
plutonium-239, is greater than the amount of fissile material residing in the irradiated material at the end of the
reactor operation period. This discussion is focused on light water reactors (LWRs), and specifically on
pressurized water reactors (PWRs), the design used in France. The arguments are essentially the same for boiling water reactors (BWRs). The U.S. commercial nuclear power reactor system consists entirely of PWRs and BWRs. Unless otherwise stated, the examples and figures used in this report are typical of pressurized water reactors. The exact assumptions, such as the enrichment level of the fresh fuel, make no difference to the overall conclusion about the efficiency of resource use in a light-water-reactor system with reprocessing and re-enrichment.
(*3) Used is 4 percent enrichment as a typical figure. Actual enrichments in pressurized water reactors may range from 3 percent to above 4 percent. During enrichment, natural uranium is separated into two streams – the enriched stream, which is then chemically further processed to make reactor fuel, and the depleted stream, which is also called the “tails.” These tails, which consist of depleted uranium, have been accumulating at enrichment.
NUCLEAR BANK? NO THANKS!
On April 18 a global campaign against private banks supporting nuclear energy will be launched with the release of a new report and a website dedicated to make campaigning easy. The campaign is carried out by the French section of Friends of the Earth, German Urgewald, Austrian Antiatom Szene, Italian CRBM, WISE, the Banktrack-network and Greenpeace International. (707.6035) WISE Amsterdam - As the
report will be launched at press conferences in three European major cities just the week after the publication
of this Nuclear Monitor we cannot publish its findings yet.
Just go to http://www.nuclearbanks.org/ (online from April 19) and check the facts on dozens of banks and their involvement in financing the nuclear disaster.
The campaign activities itself will focus on a handful of so-called ‘dodgy deal’s’, projects which should be stopped immediately. Representatives of ngo’s working in the countries where these projects are built will be speaking at the press conferences and will have talks with representatives of the involved banks, both at public meetings and behind closed doors.
The Angra 3 Dodgy Deal
One of these dodgy deals is the Brazilian Angra 3 reactor, a typical example of a nuclear ‘hang-over’ project, where construction started decades ago and has never been finished. It is a second generation
reactor designed by Siemens in the early 1980s. Work started in 1984 but was suspended two years later. While 70% of the equipment is reportedly on site, full construction never got under way. The government announced in 2006 that it intends to finish construction, and in December 2008 the state-owned utility Electronuclear signed an agreement with the French company AREVA to complete the power plant.
Brazil’s nuclear utility Eletronuclear has been looking for 1.35 billion euro (US$1.8 billion) from a private partner to complete the project.
After everything, the expected costoverruns and the expected delays, the completion of Angra 3 would mean
nuclear power generates just 6% of Brazil’s electricity.
Facts about nuclear safety, local approvals, institutional frameworks and project economics strongly indicate the application of double standards when compared to what is common and required in European countries,
plants in the United States and elsewhere.
The authors assume a U-235 content of about 0.2 percent in the tails (i.e., in the depleted uranium). In practice, the U-235 in the tails varies and a typical range generally considered is 0.2 to 0.3 percent. The amount of natural uranium needed to produce a kilogram of fuel will vary according to the enrichment of the fuel used and the percent of U-235 in the tails. The lower the percent of U-235 in the tails, the less natural uranium is needed for a given level of enrichment.
Hence the example discussed here is a favorable practical case for maximizing resource use in a light water reactor system.
(*4) The main isotope (over 50 percent) in the separated plutonium is Pu-239, but there are also substantial amounts of higher isotopes, including Pu-240 and Pu-241. The mixture is known as reactor-grade plutonium. Pu-240 is not fissile. When used as part of MOX fuel in light water reactors some of it gets converted into Pu-241, which is fissile. Pu-240 can fission with fast neutrons and generate energy.
(*5) Uranium-233 and -237 are also formed in very small quantities and have very little radiological impact.
Uranium-233 is a fissile material which gives a tiny added benefit to the reprocessed uranium.
(IAEATECDOC-1529 2007 pp. 7-8)
Source: 'The Mythology and Messy reality of Nuclear Fuel reprocessing', Arjun Makhijani, Ph.D., April 8, 2010, available at: http://www.ieer.org/reports/reprocessing2010.pdf
Contact: Institute for Energy and Environmental Research (IEER), 6935 Laurel Ave., Suite 201, Takoma Park, Maryland, 20912 USA. Tel: +1-301-270-5500
Email: info@ieer.org
Web: http://www.ieer.org/
Basic facts:
- One PWR reactor (1,270 MWe) to be supplied by Areva/Siemens and built for Electronuclear
- Cost officially put at 1.8 billion dollars (ca 1.35 billion EUR)
- Construction to start in 2010 and operational in 2015-2016
- Location 23.00 S and 44.46 W (coastline, 130 km West of Rio de Janeiro and 220 km East of Sao Paulo)
Nuclear Safety
Being based on a 30-year-old design, and with many components already fabricated and stored for decades,
Angra 3 is a nuclear power plant that falls far behind current reactor technologies. Upgrades can only partly
address these issues and Angra 3 will never reach the same standards as, for example, the French Generation III+ European Pressurized Reactor (EPR).
Illegal and Unconstitutional Approval
The construction of Angra 3 was originally approved in 1975 by presidential decree number 75870/75.
The current government resolved in 2007 to resume construction, based on this 1975 decree. However, this original decree was repealed by a presidential decree in 1991.
More importantly, the recent decision to build the third reactor at Angra and subsequent governmental approvals have been found to be in conflict with the Brazilian constitution Adopted in 1988, Brazilian federal constitution requires that, in addition to an authorizing act of the executive power, any action to construct nuclear facilities in Brazil must be approved by Congress.
The construction of Angra 3 was neither discussed nor voted upon in Brazilian Congress. The government
is arguing that the reactor was already approved in 1975 before the constitution was adopted, again ignoring the fact that the 1975 decree was nullified by the decree of 1991.
Weak Regulatory Environment:
The Brazilian nuclear regulator CNEN is not an independent body, and has many conflicting interests including a direct commercial link to the Angra 3 project.
While CNEN, as regulator, has the authority to issue licenses to the operator of Angra 3, one of its branches, INB, is simultaneously providing fuel to power Angra’s reactors. The way in which CNEN is organized also poses a conflict of interest. For example, CNEN’s institutions are contracted to analyze the impact of
accidents occurring in INB factories.
CNEN also operates nuclear installations inside research institutes that it licenses and regulates. Nuclep, a
group that manufactures the equipment for the nuclear industry, is also part of the CNEN infrastructure. So, in Brazil, CNEN is an umbrella group with its own supplier, operator, contractor, licensor and regulator.
CNEN has a track record of showing a favorable attitude towards the Angra nuclear power plant. For example, in contradiction with legislation, it has repeatedly extended a provisionary operational license to Angra 2 unit despite the fact that satisfactory evacuation plans are not in place and that the Federal Public Ministry has required improvements to this situation since 2001. Similarly, it allows the operation of two existing units despite the fact that not even an interim repository for its radioactive waste has been licensed.
Since the 70s, some Brazilian organizations have been arguing that the CNEN should become an independent body. The Brazilian Physics Society (SBF) is one of the leading proponents of creating this separation.
In 1985, by presidential decree, the Brazilian nuclear program evaluation committee was formed. Members of this committee included scientists, engineers, managers and businessmen, whose remit was to produce
recommendations to the public administration for the nuclear industry.
Its report included a recommendation to create CNEN as an independent regulatory body, but no action has been taken to resolve the innate conflict of interest. A similar recommendation was made in 2007, but to no avail.
The governance structure of CNEN does not reflect the regulatory independence required by the international convention on nuclear safety (CNS) that was adopted more than 10 years ago by the national congress in Brazil.
Similarly, current EU legislation requires that “Member States shall ensure that the competent regulatory authority is functionally separate from any other body or organisation concerned with the promotion, or utilisation of nuclear energy, including electricity production, in order to ensure effective independence from undue influence in its regulatory decision making.“
(EU Directive 2009/71).
Economic Risks
The projected cost of 1.35 billion euro to build a 1,270 MW reactor seems to be too low. Although it may be argued this is due to some equipment having already been purchased in the 1980s, current reactor projects are nevertheless three to four times more expensive per unit of installed capacity.
Also, securing construction funding in euros increases the financial risk of the project, an aspect that is increasingly challenging to manage in a repaymentof-debt scheme. The Brazilian Real has fluctuated by 37% over a one-year period compared to the euro. This volatility will eventually impact the project’s cost.
Large-scale of upgrades and adaptations required to integrate new safety requirements into the existing Angra 3 structure may lead not only to higher construction costs, but also increase the risk of unplanned outages during its operation. For example, the Temelin nuclear power plant in the Czech Republic, which used outdated Russian technologies but was upgraded in the 1990s, struggles to achieve a 70% cumulative capacity factor. The first reactor at Angra also demonstrates this problem. Angra has a cumulative load factor as low as 44%, while Angra 2 manages to reach 78%. Angra 1 and 2 took 13 and 25 years respectively to be completed, and their total expenses have reached US$10 billion US dollars for a combined capacity of 2,000 MWe.
Not a Least-Cost Option for CO 2 Emission Reduction
Brazil has great potential for renewable energy sources that can deliver electricity at cheaper rates than new
reactors. A peer-reviewed analysis published in the journal Energy Policy in 2009 shows that power generated at Angra 3 will be more expensive than hydro, biomass and wind energies. Its production has been calculated at 113 US dollars per MWh, while co-generation with sugarcane bagasse delivers at US$74 per MWh, natural gas at US$79 per MWh, and hydroelectric at US$46 per MWh. It concludes that even wind at US$107 per MWh can deliver more affordable electricity than Angra 3.
Procel, an energy efficiency program of the Brazilian government, also identified the potential of energy efficiency measures that can save 7,000 MW of energy by investing just US$560 million in related measures.
Lack of Transparency
The Brazilian nuclear program does not appear to make any economic sense or to be driven by energy needs, but instead seems to be driven by geopolitical strategic interests. People who were previously involved in a secret program to build nuclear weapons, terminated in 1992, continue to be strongly involved – including the current chair of Electronuclear, operator of the Angra reactors, former Admiral Othon
Luiz Pinheiro da Silva. In a December 2006 interview, the former creator and coordinator of the Naval Nuclear Program between 1979 and 2004, claimed that nuclear submarines are
(707.6036) Laka Foundation - The radioactive material, left over from decades of nuclear weapons production and contaminated with reactor originated radionuclides, was stored in 15,600 drums and intended for disposal at EnergySolutions Inc.’s facility in Clive, 70 miles (110 km) west of Salt Lake City, Utah. This is a facility for the disposal of low-level radioactive waste or Class A waste. Though the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) recently
decided against reclassifying DU as
hotter than Class A waste, after the
arrival of the first shipment of 5,408
drums from Savannah River Site (SRS)
in December, Utah's governor protested
further shipments. The Department of
Energy (DOE) then idled two trainloads
that remain at the nuclear weapons
facility in South Carolina.
It wasn't immediately clear if the
radioactive waste would remain in
South Carolina or be disposed of
elsewhere. In a November presentation
given to the SRS Citizens Advisory
Board, the DOE said if shipments to
Utah were interrupted, the waste would
be diverted to the Nevada Test Site, 65
miles north of Las Vegas. The total
amount of the SRS waste covers 6,500
tons. The cleanup program was
accelerated through the Federal
Recovery & Reinvestment Act, which
allocated US$1.4 billion (1 billion euro)
to SRS, mostly to speed up
environmental-management projects.
According to the Inspector General’s
report, the newest proposal calls for
moving the material to a facility owned
by Waste Control Specialists in
Andrews, Texas, for interim storage. The
auditors note (April 9): “Clearly, this
choice carries with it a number of
significant logistical burdens, including
substantial additional costs for, among
several items, repackaging at SRS,
transportation to Texas, storage at the
interim site, and, repackaging and
transportation to the yet-to-be
determined final disposition point.” A
local newspaper, the Augusta Chronicle
is citing information from an unnamed
source within the department
suggesting that it might be better to
keep the material at SRS, where it has
been ‘safely stored for decades’, until a
permanent disposal solution is found.
Despite assertions by EnergySolutions
that the action is unnecessary, the Utah
Radiation Control Board signed off on a
new rule that imposes additional
restrictions on the disposal of DU.
EnergySolutions can take no more DU
until it shows its radioactive landfill can
contain the radioactive waste for
thousands of years. The rule, which
requires the Clive facility to conduct a
performance assessment for disposal of
the radioactive material, will be
published May 1 and go into effect by
June 1. Yet, EnergySolutions is first in
line to accept up to 1.4 million tons of
DU in coming years - about half from
uranium enrichment plants coming
online and half from government
stockpiles. DU is different from most
other Class A because it becomes most
hazardous after 1 million years. About
49,000 tons is already buried at
EnergySolutions, and DOE has put the
disposal of another 11,000 tons on hold
until the state agrees it can come to the
Clive facility.
EnergySolutions is building a processing
facility for blending more hazardous
Class B and Class C waste with Class A
waste and has proposed to dispose this
waste at its Clive facility. Members of
the Utah Radiation Control Board opted
against trying to regulate this nuclear
industry's practice of mixing low-level
radioactive waste with more hazardous
B&C waste so that reactors can dispose
of waste that now has nowhere else to
go. “At very least, DU is incompatible
with the state's ban on B&C waste,”
said board member Jenkins, “It will
present an unacceptable risk after 100
years.”
Meanwhile the NRC is studying on
options on how to dispose the DU
waste in the mid- and long-term.
The entire report by the U.S. Energy
Department's Inspector General is
available at http://www.ig.energy.gov/
documents/OAS-RA-10-07.pdf
Sources: Augusta Chronicle, The Salt
Lake Tribune, Deseret News, all 13 April
2010.
Contact: Healthy Environment Alliance
ah (HEAL): 68 S Main St, Suite 400, Salt
Lake City, UT 84101, USA.
Tel: +1 801 355-505
Email: info@healutah.org
Web: www.healutah.org
While the debate on what to do with Savannah River Site’s depleted uranium (DU) waste lingers
on, the US Energy Department’s Inspector General calls a plan to store two trainloads of this DU
waste in Texas unnecessary and wasting taxpayers' money.
INTERIM STORAGE OF DU WASTE IN UTAH
REMAINS TO RAISE QUESTIONS
critical if Brazil is to be considered a
major power. Brazil joined the Non-
Proliferation Treaty only in 1994, and to
date has not yet ratified its Additional
Protocol to safeguards. On several
occasions, it has rejected missions by
the International Atomic Energy Agency,
for instance regular site visits. This all
has implications also on existing lack of
transparency and public participation
around Angra 3.
The involved banks (check the site,
on-line from April 19 on!) know all these
facts aswell and are not too eager to
step in with loans and guarantees.
Therefor they seek public money to
back-up the risks involved. Interestingly
it is the German government who
considers to provide financial backup
with a loanguarantee by the German
export credits agency Hermes (see also
Nuclear Monitor 703, January 29, 2010
for more background on this).
Please help this campaign to be
succesfull; put the website www.
nuclearbanks.org as a link on yours, join
the campaign (see possibilities on the
site), contact your bank on their nucear
policy and join the international days of
actions that will be announced soon!
Source and contact: www.
nuclearbanks.org and www.banktrack.
org
8 Nuclear Monitor 707
(707.6037) Nuclear Heritage Network
- The Baltic Sea Info Tour is arranged by
different groups, organisations and individuals
who share the concern of radioactive
pollution. The Tour topics will be
arranged by local people. Everyone can
take part and join the Tour by informing,
arranging local action, joining the network
meetings, spreading information
about nuclear issues or just showing up
in the events. Every step counts!
The Baltic Sea is one of the most
radioactively polluted sea compared to
other water bodies in the world. This
has happened mainly because of the
radioactive releases of nuclear power
plants in the Baltic Sea area (mostly due
Swedish and Finnish power plants), the
radioactive particles distributed from
the Tschernobyl accident, nuclear bomb
tests in the atmosphere and Sellafield’s
discharges.
Also the Russian and Lithuanian reactors
increased the amount of radioactivity
in the Baltic Sea. Additionally the
proposed uranium mining projects and
final disposal sites as well as nuclear
transports are strengthening the risk
of pollution for the vital sea between
Finland, Russia, Baltic States, Poland,
Germany, Denmark and Sweden.
Including the impacts of uranium mining,
processing of the ore to produce
nuclear fuel and the disposal of the
created long-life nuclear waste, the operation
of nuclear power plants has an
immense impact to the global warming.
Nuclear power is expensive and dangerous
and the resources used in the
nuclear industry would be more beneficial
for present and future generations if
spent in renewable energy systems.
The Info Tour has started as an action
of concerned people of the Baltic Sea
community. The tour will inform people
about the facts of uranium energy and
radioactive pollution of the Baltic Sea.
The tour will activate and emancipate
people to take part in the events of the
local stops. The Tour will advance active
courage both locally and in large social
and ecological systems.
The tour is an informative event, dedicated
to the Baltic Sea, embracing the
communities surrounding the Baltic Sea.
We want to discuss the challenges with
people living across the Baltic Sea and
to give more information about certain
issues connected to radioactivity, nuclear
power and renewable alternatives.
The Baltic Sea Info Tour will consist of
different kinds of activities: street actions,
information events, workshops,
performances, discussions, local gatherings,
spreading of flyers and posters.
The Tour will include several stops in the
Baltic Sea countries. It will start from
Finland in June and end in Finland in
August 2010 visiting: Russia, Estonia,
Latvia, Belarus, Poland, Germany, Denmark
and Sweden.
Contact: Baltic Sea Info Tour.
Tel. +358 41 7243254
e-mail: contact@nuclear-heritage.net
http://baltic-tour.nuclear-heritage.net
The Baltic Sea Info Tour will inform about nuclear power and its risks as well as about the
renewable alternatives. The Tour group will travel around the Baltic Sea in summer 2010, informing
and emancipating young people and calling citizens of all ages to raise awareness of the
challenges of nuclear industry and current development surrounding the Baltic Sea area.
On April 12, the Russian environmental group Ecodefense released a major new report focused
on the use of plutonium as fuel in Russian nuclear reactors. This is the first independent research
done during the last decade that exposes the civil plutonium program and its risks for public
health and the environment, and comes as the U.S. and Russia prepare to sign an agreement for
each nation to dispose of 34 metric tons of plutonium removed from nuclear weapons by using it
to generate nuclear power.
STOP NUCLEAR POWER – JOIN THE
BALTIC SEA INFO TOUR
RUSSIA: SAFETY PROBLEMS SURPLUS
WEAPONS-GRADE PU DISPOSITION PROGRAM
(707.6038) Ecodefense! - The Ecodefense
report ('Russian Plutonium
Program: Nuclear Waste, Accidents,
and Senseless Huge Costs') finds that
the cornerstone of Russia’s program
-the BN-800 breeder reactor- has been
under construction for over 25 years,
has cost over US$6 billion, and remains
far from completion.
In the framework of the Russian-US disarmament
agreement, each country will
“dispose” of 34 tons of weapon-grade
plutonium from dismantled warheads.
Presently, the governments are planning
to use the plutonium in the form of
mixed oxide fuel (MOX) in nuclear reactors.
Russian breeder reactors BN-600
(in operation) and BN-800 (under construction)
will be used for this plutonium
disposition. But breeder reactors may
be used for both burning and breeding
plutonium, which offers to the Russian
nuclear industry the possibility of actually
producing more plutonium rather
than net destruction of the element.
Later, the MOX fuel may also be used
in Russian light-water reactors (VVER-
1200 design).
Environmental groups in both Russia
and the U.S. are opposed to the use of
MOX fuel and
instead promote safer, cleaner vitrification
technology to permanently dispose
of plutonium.
Nuclear Monitor 707 9
(707.6039) WISE Amsterdam – This
new publication of the Annals of the
New York Academy of Sciences (Volume
1181), is a collection of papers translated
from Russian with some revised and
updated contributions. Written by leading
authorities from Eastern Europe, the
volume outlines the history of the health
and environmental consequences of the
Chernobyl disaster. Although there has
been discussion of the impact of nuclear
accidents and Chernobyl in particular,
never before has there been a comprehensive
presentation of all the available
information concerning the health and
environmental effects of the low dose
radioactive contaminants, especially
those emitted from the Chernobyl nuclear
power plant. Official discussions
from the International Atomic Energy
Agency and associated United Nations'
agencies (e.g. the Chernobyl Forum
reports) have largely downplayed or
ignored many of the findings reported in
the Eastern European scientific literature
and consequently have erred by not
including these assessments.
The senior author, Dr. Alexey Yablokov
was State Councilor for Environment
and Health under Yeltsin and a member
of the Russian Academy of Science –
since then he receives no support. Yablokov
is an Honorary Foreign Member of
the American Academy Art and Science
(Boston.) Dr. Vassily Nesterenko, head
of the Ukrainian Nuclear establishment
at the time of the accident, flew over the
burning reactor and measured radiation
levels. In August 2009, he died as a result
of radiation damage, but earlier, with
help from Andrei Sakarov, he was able
to establish BELRAD to help children
of the area. Dr. Alexey Nesterenko is a
biologist/ ecologist based in Minsk, Belarus.
The book was expertly translated
into readable English by Janette Sherman,
Medical Toxicologist and Adjunct
Professor in the Environmental Institute
at Western Michigan University.
The authors abstracted data from
more than 5000 published articles and
studies, mostly available only in Slavic
languages and not available to those
outside of the former Soviet Union or
Eastern bloc countries. The findings
are by those who witnessed first-hand
the effects of Chernobyl. This book
is in contrast to findings by the World
Health Organization (WHO), International
Atomic energy Agency (IAEA)
and (United Nations Scientific Committee
on the Effects of Atomic Radiation
(UNSCEAR) who based their findings on
some 300 western research papers, and
who found little of concern about the
fallout from Chernobyl.
While the most apparent human and
environmental damage occurred, and
continues to occur, in the Ukraine, Belarus
and European Russia, more than 50
percent of the total radioactivity spread
across the entire northern hemisphere,
'Chernobyl: Consequences of the Catastrophe for People and the Environment is written by
Alexey Yablokov, Vassily Nesterenko and Alexey Nesterenko. ' This book is in contrast to findings
by the World Health Organization, International Atomic energy Agency and the United Nations
Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation who based their findings on some 300
western research papers, and who found little of concern about the fallout from Chernobyl. They
are leaving out the findings of some 30,000 scientific papers prepared by scientists working and
living in the stricken territories and suffering the everyday problems of residential contamination
with nuclear debris and a contaminated food supply.
CHERNOBYL: CONSEQUENCES OF THE
CATASTROPHE FOR PEOPLE AND THE
ENVIRONMENT
The report describes the nuclear facilities
that will be used for the plutonium
program in Russia: * the Beloyarsk
nuclear plant near Ekaterinburg city, *
NIIAR (Scientific and research institute
of atomic reactors) in Dimitrovgrad city,
* GHK nuclear weapon facility near
Krasnoyarsk city, and * SHK nuclear
facility near Tomsk city. The report also
focuses on issues of safety, accidents,
nonproliferation and public opinion. A
public policy issue raised in the report
is the lack of liability coverage for a
nuclear accident in Russia. This is particularly
troubling given the more than
1,000,000 people living in very close
proximity of the proposed MOX factory
near Ekaterinburg.
On January 21, 2010, Russian government
approved a program of advanced
technologies
development worth 128 billion rubles
(US$4.3 billion or 3.1 billion euro). Most
of the funding will go to breeder reactor
development.
Fast breeder reactors operating with
MOX fuel are being promoted as "advanced
technology" in Russia. But it is
a little known fact that the BN-800 has
been under construction for over 25
years and its design, which pre-dates
the 1986 Chernobyl accident, does not
meet modern safety requirements. According
to the Russian nuclear industry,
this reactor will cost nearly US$4 billion,
but independent estimates suggest that
US$6 billion already has been spent and
construction will be finished not earlier
than 2014 and likely later.
In a detailed financial analysis, the
report concludes that the plutonium fuel
program is only
viable because of US and European
subsidy for weapons grade plutonium
disposition, but given that it may result
in a net increase in plutonium stocks,
the Russian program will undermine this
goal.
The full report in English is available
at http://anti-atom.ru/downloads/Ru-
PuApr2010.pdf
Source: Press release 12 April 2010,
Ecodefense! and NIRS
Contact: Ecodefense, Vladimir Sliviak:
+7 903 2997584
Email: ecodefense@rambler.ru
or: Mary Olson at NIRS, +1-828-252-
8409
10 Nuclear Monitor 707
IN BRIEF
New York thwarts reactor relicensing. The U.S. New York state's Environment Department has told Entergy that its Indian Point
nuclear power plant (units 2 and 3) can no longer use water from the Hudson River for direct (once-through) cooling, whereby a
large volume of water is drawn from the river and discharged back into it, a few degrees warmer. In March the Environment
Department introduced a draft policy requiring certain industrial facilities - including nuclear and other power plants - to recycle
and reuse cooling water through "closed cycle cooling" technology with large evaporative cooling towers. Water use from the river
is then much lower, to replace that evaporated and allow some discharge to maintain quality. (see Nuclear Monitor 706: 'Proposal:
cooling towers required for New York reactors')
Entergy has applied to renew the operating licences for the two reactors for 20 years from 2013 and 2015. It estimates that
building new cooling towers would cost some US$1.1 billion (805 million euro) and involve shutting down the reactors for 42
weeks.
According to Michael Mariotte of NIRS Entergy is making so much money with the 20-year lifetime extension at Indian Point,
"there is a pretty good chance they'll go ahead and
build the cooling towers".
World Nuclear news, 6 April 2010 / NIRS statement, 12 April 2010
U.K.: Higher bills for nuclear. UK energy minister Ed Miliband has confirmed the Government intends introducing a new 'carbon
levy' on consumer electricity bills. While Mr Miliband insisted the levy was to help all low-carbon forms of generation, it is widely
accepted the main reason is to help the financing of building new nuclear reactors.
The Conservative Party also wants to introduce a tax on electricity generation to encourage renewables and nuclear power. A
clear commitment to nuclear power was also given by the party's energy spokesman, Greg Clark. He said there would be "no
limit" on the growth of nuclear power and they wanted to see a new reactor completed every 18 months.
The Government has also announced it will create a new 'green bank', using private money, to finance low-carbon energy
developments.
General elections in the U.K. will take place on May 6.
N-Base Briefing 646, 1 April 2010
potentially contaminating some 400 million
people.
Based on 5000 articles, by multiple
researchers and observers, the authors
estimated that by 2004, some 985,000
deaths worldwide had been caused by
the disaster, giving lie to estimates by
the IAEA and World Health Organization.
All life systems that were studied –
humans, voles, livestock, birds, fish,
plants, mushrooms, bacteria, viruses,
etc., with few exceptions, were changed
by radioactive fallout, many irreversibly.
Increased cancer incidence is not the
only observed adverse effect from the
Chernobyl fallout – noted also are birth
defects, pregnancy losses, accelerated
aging, brain damage, heart, endocrine,
kidney, gastrointestinal and lung diseases,
and cataracts among the young.
Children have been most seriously affected
– before the radioactive Chernobyl
releases, 80% of children were
deemed healthy, now in some areas,
only 20% of children are considered
healthy. Many have poor development,
learning disabilities, and endocrine
abnormalities.
The government of the former Soviet
Union previously classified many
documents now accessible to the
authors. For example, we now know
that the number of people hospitalized
for acute radiation sickness was more
than a hundred times larger than the
number recently quoted by the IAEA,
WHO and UNSCEAR. Unmentioned
by the technocrats were the problems
of “hot particles” of burning uranium
that caused nasopharyngeal problems,
and the radioactive fallout that resulted
in general deterioration of the health
of children, wide spread blood and
lymph system diseases, reproductive
loss, premature and small infant births,
chromosomal mutations, congenital and
developmental abnormalities, multiple
endocrine diseases, mental disorders
and cancer.
The authors systematically explain the
secrecy conditions imposed by the
government, the failure of technocrats
to collect data on the number and
distribution of all of the radionuclides
of major concern, and the restrictions
placed on physicians against calling any
medical findings radiation related unless
the patient had been a certified “acute
radiation sickness” patient during the
disaster, thus assuring that only 1% of
injuries would be so reported..
Below is the New York Academy of Sciences
site for the book. Unfortunately,
its selling price is now about US$150,
which may limit its distribution:
http://www.nyas.org/Publications/Annals/
Detail.aspx?cid=f3f3bd16-51ba-
4d7b-a086-753f44b3bfc1
Source: Rosalie Bertell on Globalresearch.
ca and
http://sustainableloudoun.wordpress.
com/
Nuclear Monitor 707 11
WISE Amsterdam
P.O. Box 59636
1040 LC Amsterdam
The Netherlands
Tel: +31 20 612 6368
Fax: +31 20 689 2179
Email: wiseamster@antenna.nl
Web: www.antenna.nl/wise
NIRS
6930 Carroll Avenue, Suite 340
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Tel: +1 301-270-NIRS
(+1 301-270-6477)
Fax: +1 301-270-4291
Email: nirsnet@nirs.org
Web: www.nirs.org
NIRS Southeast
P.O. Box 7586
Asheville, NC 28802
USA
Tel: +1 828 675 1792
Email: nirs@main.nc.us
WISE Argentina
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CC 441
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Argentina
Email: wiseros@ciudad.com.ar
Web: www.taller.org.ar
WISE Austria
c/o Plattform gegen Atomgefahr
Roland Egger
Landstrasse 31
4020 Linz
Austria
Tel: +43 732 774275; +43 664 2416806
Fax: +43 732 785602
Email: post@atomstopp.at
Web: www.atomstopp.com
WISE Czech Republic
c/o Jan Beranek
Chytalky 24
594 55 Dolni Loucky
Czech Republic
Tel: +420 604 207305
Email: wisebrno@ecn.cz
Web: www.wisebrno.cz
WISE India
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Nagercoil 629 002, Tamil Nadu
India
Email: drspudayakumar@yahoo.com;
WISE Japan
P.O. Box 1, Konan Post Office
Hiroshima City 739-1491
Japan
WISE Russia
P.O. Box 1477
236000 Kaliningrad
Russia
Tel/fax: +7 95 2784642
Email: ecodefense@online.ru
Web: www.antiatom.ru
WISE Slovakia
c/o SZOPK Sirius
Katarina Bartovicova
Godrova 3/b
811 06 Bratislava
Slovak Republic
Tel: +421 905 935353
Email: wise@wise.sk
Web: www.wise.sk
WISE South Africa
c/o Earthlife Africa Cape Town
Maya Aberman
po Box 176
Observatory 7935
Cape Town
South Africa
Tel: + 27 21 447 4912
Fax: + 27 21 447 4912
Email: coordinator@earthlife-ct.org.za
Web: www.earthlife-ct.org.za
WISE Sweden
c/o FMKK
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116 41 Stockholm
Sweden
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Fax: +46 8 84 5181
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Web: www.folkkampanjen.se
WISE Ukraine
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Tel/fax: +380 362 237024
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WISE Uranium
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01477 Arnsdorf
Germany
Tel: +49 35200 20737
Email: uranium@t-online.de
Web: www.wise-uranium.org
WISE/NIRS offices and relays
WISE/NIRS NUCLEAR MONITOR
The Nuclear Information & Resource Service was founded in 1978 and is based
in Washington, US. The World Information Service on Energy was set up in the
same year and houses in Amsterdam, Netherlands. NIRS and WISE Amsterdam
joined forces in 2000, creating a worldwide network of information and resource
centers for citizens and environmental organizations concerned about nuclear
power, radioactive waste, radiation, and sustainable energy issues.
The WISE/NIRS Nuclear Monitor publishes international information in English
20 times a year. A Spanish translation of this newsletter is available on the WISE
Amsterdam website (www.antenna.nl/wise/esp). A Russian version is published
by WISE Russia and a Ukrainian version is published by WISE Ukraine. The
WISE/NIRS Nuclear Monitor can be obtained both on paper and in an email
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WISE Amsterdam homepage: www.antenna.nl/wise.
Receiving the WISE/NIRS Nuclear Monitor
US and Canada based readers should contact NIRS for details of how to
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Monitor through WISE Amsterdam.
For individuals and NGOs we ask a minimum annual donation of 100 Euros (50
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WISE AMSTERDAM/NIRS
ISSN: 1570-4629
Reproduction of this material is encouraged.
Please give credit when reprinting.
Editorial team: Dirk Bannink and Peer de Rijk
With contributions from: WISE Amsterdam,
Bankwatch, Ecodefense!, IEER, NIRS, Nuclear
Heritage Network, WISE Russia and Laka
Foundation.
Next issue of the Nuclear Monitor (#708) will be
mailed out on April 30, 2010
The “Elfi Gmachl Foundation for a Nuclear-free
Future” / PLAGE-Salzburg supports the Nuclear
Monitor financially. See: http://www.plage.cc
(not available in English (yet))
WISE/NIRS NUCLEAR
MONITOR
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Netherlands
PRINTED MATTER
MATIERE IMPRIME
Russia may save about US$25 billion (18 billion euro) if it will never build units which currently were removed from the 2015-target list, Russian environmental group Ecodefense estimates. Moreover, spending this amount for construction of natural gas' power plants may bring 3 times more electricity, compared to
nuclear, said Vladimir Milov, former deputy energy minister of Russia, to the Nuclear Monitor.
According to the scheme of locations for energy facilities until 2020 (the state program outlining the plan for
construction of nuclear, coal, gas, hydro plants during next decade), "Rosatom" planned to put online 13,2 GWt of new nuclear capacity until 2015. This is equal to 13 units of the VVER-1000 design or 11 units of the VVER-1200 design. Under the reduced plan, only 5,2 GWt of new nuclear capacity is planned to be added.
But even that reduced number of reactors will be hard to build, environmental campaigners say. The scheme of locations for energy facilities until 2020 was approved by the Russian government in 2008.
Environmental groups organized protests on the day of approval in more than 20 cities, because the plan includes an increased number of nuclear and coal plants which will increase the risks for public health and environment. Campaigners also protested because government excluded environmental groups from the decision-making process, what resulted in an antienvironmental and poor-quality document.
Reducing the number of nuclear reactors to be built in next 5 years is good news but is actually just a reflection of reality. When the plans were approved in 2008, it was already clear that Russia can not afford to build dozens of reactors during the next decade. First of all, "Rosatom" doesn't have enough heavy machinery capacity to produce reactors even for domestic plans, and there are also foreign contracts in China, India and Belarus. And Russian nuclear industry said it will try to win more contracts in Asia, Latin America and Eastern Europe.
Why did the Russian government approve the program that can not be implemented? It looks like "Rosatom" just decided that.
THE END FOR RUSSIAN "NUCLEAR RENAISSANCE"?
According to the Russian government, the number of new nuclear reactors planned to be built by 2015 will be cut by 60%. But even that number of nuclear units will be hard to build. As environmental groups has been saying for years, Russian nuclear development program is far from reality.
An increasing number of reactors on paper will bring them more funds from the federal budget. But now plans and funding will be reduced, which will affect both planned and under construction reactors, Vladimir Milov said to the Nuclear Monitor.
The Russian "nuclear renaissance" may well be over, even if it did not start yet. And this is good news because reactors are expensive, inefficient and dangerous just as they were 24 years ago when Chernobyl happened.
Currently there are 31 nuclear reactors in operation in Russia producing 16% of all electricity. Several of the oldest and the most dangerous reactors -such as RBMKs and VVER-440- obtained extended licenses when planned operational lifetime was over.
THE MYTHOLOGY AND MESSY REALITY OF REPROCESSING
It is only recently that reprocessing is being promoted as a “solution” to the problem of mounting quantities of spent fuel. In this context, it is often called “recycling.” It is now explicitly being promoted as a means for greatly increasing the use of the uranium resource contained in the spent fuel. Proponents of nuclear power often state that 95 percent of spent fuel (or used fuel or irradiated fuel) can be “recycled” for recovering the energy in it.
This has become a new mantra of nuclear waste management: spent fuel is a treasuretrove of energy.
A new report ('The Mythology and Messy reality of Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing') by the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research (IEER) looks at France (often called an 'inspirational example for nuclear waste
management') and shows that for existing spent fuel the slogan belongs in the same realm of economic claims for nuclear energy that would be “too cheap to meter.”
It is worth noting at the outset that reprocessing and breeder reactors were not proposed as a solution to the problem of nuclear waste, which has so far turned out to be intractable for a host of technical, environmental,
and political reasons.
Reprocessing was also not proposed as an essential accompaniment to burner reactors, like the light water reactors, to increase the use of the uranium resource because its value in that regard is marginal.
In light water reactor systems, almost all the uranium resource winds up as depleted uranium or in spent fuel. Even with repeated reprocessing and re-enrichment, use of the natural uranium resource cannot be increased to more than one percent in such a system. The use of 90 to 95 percent of the uranium resource in the spent fuel is impossible in a light water reactor system even with reprocessing. These are technical constraints that go with the system.
Reprocessing in France Reprocessing in France is continuing mainly due to the inertia of primarilygovernment-owned electricity generation and reprocessing corporations (EDF and AREVA
respectively). It continues also due to the political and economic dislocations that closing an established large
industrial operation would cause in a largely rural area in Normandy that has scarcely any other industries. After it was clear that the breeder reactor program was not going to fulfill its theoretical promise any time soon, the decision to continue reprocessing in France was not about economics, technical suitability, waste
management, or significantly increasing the use of the uranium resource in the fresh fuel.(*1) It was driven mainly by the inertia of a system that was government-owned and had already invested a great deal of money and institutional prestige in the technology.
Light water reactors(*2) and reprocessing Uranium-238 is almost 99.3 percent of the natural uranium resource. It requires about 7.44 kilograms of natural uranium to produce one kilogram of 4 percent enriched uranium fuel, assuming 0.2 percent U-235 in the tails (depleted uranium).(*3)
This means that about 86.6 percent of the natural uranium resource winds up as depleted uranium. Even if the efficiency of enrichment improved so that only 0.1 percent of U-235 remained in.
Reprocessing in the US?
French company Areva has no immediate plans to build a reprocessing and associated MOX fabrication complex in the US. Areva spokesman Jarret Adams said the company has been discussing designs for a US reprocessing and MOX fuel fabrication complex with utilities for many years and that it is 'starting to educate President Barack Obama’s administration' on Areva’s vision for nuclear fuel recycling in the US.
But on March 25, Alan Hanson, Areva’s executive vice president of technology and used fuel management, said in Washington, that preliminary designs show that a reprocessing and associated MOX fuel fabrication complex built at one site in the US would be a US$25 billion capital expenditure. Jacques Besnainou, CEO of Areva North America, said in that Areva would be willing to invest its own money to help develop a reprocessing complex in the US. On March 25, Besnainou said that a US reprocessing complex could be a regional hub capable of reprocessing spent fuel from the Americas and small countries from other regions. “I
think we should help the [United Arab Emirates] with their used fuel 20 years from now,” he said.
It would still mean that about 84 percent of the natural uranium resource would wind up as depleted uranium when it is first enriched. (For simplicity, the authors ignore losses of uranium during milling and the series of
processing steps prior to enrichment. These are small compared to the amount of depleted uranium.)
It should also be noted that the vast majority of the uranium in the fresh fuel is still non-fissile U- 238. In the case of 4 percent enriched uranium, made from natural uranium, the other 96 percent is uranium-238. The fraction of U-238 is a little lower in fuel made from reprocessed and re-enriched uranium due to the buildup of other uranium isotopes, notably U-236. A small fraction (about two percent) of this U-238 gets converted into plutonium.
Some of this is fissioned in the course of reactor operation and therefore provides a portion of the energy output of the reactor. But the vast majority of uranium-238 will remain unused in burner reactors – that is, the
type of reactors in use today.
Commercial reprocessing using the PUREX process, the only commercial technology at present, separates the spent fuel into three streams – (i) plutonium, (ii) uranium, and (iii) fission products, plus traces of non-fission radionuclides, like neptunium.
France uses most, but not all (see below), of the separated plutonium as a mixed plutonium dioxide uranium dioxide fuel, called MOX fuel for short. It uses depleted uranium to make MOX fuel. However, of the 6.44
kilograms of depleted uranium created in the process of making fresh fuel from natural uranium, in the used example, just over a tenth of a kilogram is used as a component of MOX fuel; most of that remains unused
in spent MOX fuel.
France also uses a part of the uranium recovered from spent fuel as a fuel. But this uranium must be re-enriched to the requisite level. To get the same performance as fresh 4 percent fuel, the reprocessed uranium must (because of the degraded isotopic composition of the uranium) be enriched to about 4.4 percent, which means that about 87 percent of the recovered uranium becomes depleted uranium waste.
Further, roughly 93 percent of this re-enriched fuel is also uranium-238. When this recovered and re-enriched uranium is used as fuel only a small amount of it is converted to plutonium, while most remains unused. If repeated reprocessing and re-enrichment are carried out, the pile of depleted uranium mounts rapidly, while the amount of fissile material dwindles. Further, it should be noted that the process of
enriching reprocessed uranium also increases the concentration of uranium-236, which is not fissile; this
reduces the usefulness of re-enriched uranium as a fuel.
The flow of materials in a light water reactor scheme with reprocessing is shown in diagram in Figure 2. It
corresponds to the example the authors have been using: an initial fuel loading of 1 kilogram of fresh (4 percent) low enriched uranium fuel, 0.2 percent U-235 in the depleted uranium tails at the enrichment plant, and 8 percent plutonium in MOX fuel, and assuming that all the recovered uranium is re-enriched.
At the end of the use of the MOX fuel and re-enriched uranium fuel, only about 6 percent of the kilogram of original fresh fuel has been used to generate energy. In turn this is only about 0.8 percent of the 7.44 kilograms natural uranium resource used to make the single kilogram of 4 percent enriched uranium fuels.
Repeated reprocessing, MOX fuel use, and re-enriched reprocessing uranium fuel use does not improve the picture much. This is because most of the remaining spent fuel is left behind as depleted uranium in each round. In fact after five rounds, about 99 percent of the original uranium resource is depleted uranium. This means that the fraction of the uranium resource that can be used in a light water reactorreprocessing-
re-enrichment scheme is one percent or less. This can be raised slightly by reducing the amount of U-235 in the tails below 0.2 percent.
This is a conservative calculation, done as a simple illustration. It ignores the isotopic degradation of both the
uranium and plutonium in the second and subsequent rounds of use in a reactor. Specifically, uranium-236 and uranium-234, which are not fissile isotopes and which degrade fuel performance, build up in the fuel as the reactor operates; uranium-236 increases in concentration with re-enrichment.
Small amounts of uranium-232 also build up.(*5) This isotope has a specific activity (defined as disintegrations per second per unit mass) that is 30 million times greater than natural uranium.
Unlike fresh uranium fuel, it quickly generates decay products that emit strong gamma radiation, which creates higher worker radiation risks. Fuel quality requirements limit U-232 to a few parts per billion. As a result, re-enrichment becomes more complex and costly for each round of recycled uranium fuel use in a reactor. The interaction of uranium-236 and uranium-232 must be reduced by blending the enrichment feedstock with natural, un-reprocessed uranium or by blending the enriched uranium derived from reprocessed uranium with enriched uranium originating from fresh ore.
Similarly, the isotopic composition of MOX fuel degrades with each round of MOX fuel use and reprocessing; this makes reprocessing even more expensive and the fuel less valuable. As a result of the above considerations, technical and cost considerations limit the practical ability to reprocessing and re-enrich for more than one round past the first use of fresh fuel made from natural uranium.
Even when the initial depleted uranium is left out of the calculation (though it should not be, since it contains most of the natural uranium resource), reprocessing and repeated re-enrichment and MOX fuel use will
utilize only about six percent (rounded) of the fuel originally loaded into the reactor, with about two-thirds of that occurring in the initial irradiation and most of the rest occurring in the first round of MOX fuel use. Repeated reprocessing, re-enrichment, and MOX fuel use just does not increase resource use significantly, because most of the uranium becomes part of the depleted uranium stream at each step. Finally, it should be noted that these numbers ignore uranium losses at the uranium mill (where, typically, several percent of
the uranium is discarded into tailing ponds along with almost all the radium-226 and thorium-230 in the ore)
and in the processing steps needed to make the uranium hexafluoride feed for the enrichment plant. The actual resource utilization based on the uranium content of the ore at the mill is, in practice significantly less than one percent. Fresh fuel plus one cycle of MOX use and re-enrichment uses only about 0.8 percent of the natural uranium resource. This is reduced to about 0.7 percent when the losses of uranium in the processing at the uranium mill and the conversion to uranium hexafluoride are taken into account.
France currently only re-uses a third of the recovered uranium. This means that France uses less than six percent of the uranium resource in the original fresh fuel; about 80 percent of this is used in the first round of fresh fuel use prior to reprocessing. In other words, the expense, risk, and pollution created by French reprocessing only marginally increases the use of the underlying uranium resource. Further, the re-enrichment is not done in France but in Russia. The depleted uranium from re-enrichment, amounting to roughly 87
percent of the reprocessed uranium by weight, remains behind in Russia.
In sum, the French use only about 0.7 percent of the original uranium resource to create fission energy. The rest is mainly in depleted uranium at various locations, or is piling up as reprocessed uranium that is not being used, or is uranium left in spent fuel of various kinds (including MOX spent fuel). This figure cannot be increased significantly even with repeated reprocessing and re-enrichment so long as the fuel is used in a light water reactor system.
Notes
(*1) All calculations are based on four percent enriched fresh fuel made from natural uranium as the starting point, unless otherwise specified. The results would be similar with any starting enrichment for light water reactors, which are designed to use low enriched fuel (generally less than five percent U-235).
(*2) Light water reactors are a specific example of “burner” reactors, which have a net consumption of fissile
materials in the course of energy production from fission. Some new fissile material is created, mainly
plutonium-239, but the amount of fissile material used (or burned), mainly a combination of uranium-235 and
plutonium-239, is greater than the amount of fissile material residing in the irradiated material at the end of the
reactor operation period. This discussion is focused on light water reactors (LWRs), and specifically on
pressurized water reactors (PWRs), the design used in France. The arguments are essentially the same for boiling water reactors (BWRs). The U.S. commercial nuclear power reactor system consists entirely of PWRs and BWRs. Unless otherwise stated, the examples and figures used in this report are typical of pressurized water reactors. The exact assumptions, such as the enrichment level of the fresh fuel, make no difference to the overall conclusion about the efficiency of resource use in a light-water-reactor system with reprocessing and re-enrichment.
(*3) Used is 4 percent enrichment as a typical figure. Actual enrichments in pressurized water reactors may range from 3 percent to above 4 percent. During enrichment, natural uranium is separated into two streams – the enriched stream, which is then chemically further processed to make reactor fuel, and the depleted stream, which is also called the “tails.” These tails, which consist of depleted uranium, have been accumulating at enrichment.
NUCLEAR BANK? NO THANKS!
On April 18 a global campaign against private banks supporting nuclear energy will be launched with the release of a new report and a website dedicated to make campaigning easy. The campaign is carried out by the French section of Friends of the Earth, German Urgewald, Austrian Antiatom Szene, Italian CRBM, WISE, the Banktrack-network and Greenpeace International. (707.6035) WISE Amsterdam - As the
report will be launched at press conferences in three European major cities just the week after the publication
of this Nuclear Monitor we cannot publish its findings yet.
Just go to http://www.nuclearbanks.org/ (online from April 19) and check the facts on dozens of banks and their involvement in financing the nuclear disaster.
The campaign activities itself will focus on a handful of so-called ‘dodgy deal’s’, projects which should be stopped immediately. Representatives of ngo’s working in the countries where these projects are built will be speaking at the press conferences and will have talks with representatives of the involved banks, both at public meetings and behind closed doors.
The Angra 3 Dodgy Deal
One of these dodgy deals is the Brazilian Angra 3 reactor, a typical example of a nuclear ‘hang-over’ project, where construction started decades ago and has never been finished. It is a second generation
reactor designed by Siemens in the early 1980s. Work started in 1984 but was suspended two years later. While 70% of the equipment is reportedly on site, full construction never got under way. The government announced in 2006 that it intends to finish construction, and in December 2008 the state-owned utility Electronuclear signed an agreement with the French company AREVA to complete the power plant.
Brazil’s nuclear utility Eletronuclear has been looking for 1.35 billion euro (US$1.8 billion) from a private partner to complete the project.
After everything, the expected costoverruns and the expected delays, the completion of Angra 3 would mean
nuclear power generates just 6% of Brazil’s electricity.
Facts about nuclear safety, local approvals, institutional frameworks and project economics strongly indicate the application of double standards when compared to what is common and required in European countries,
plants in the United States and elsewhere.
The authors assume a U-235 content of about 0.2 percent in the tails (i.e., in the depleted uranium). In practice, the U-235 in the tails varies and a typical range generally considered is 0.2 to 0.3 percent. The amount of natural uranium needed to produce a kilogram of fuel will vary according to the enrichment of the fuel used and the percent of U-235 in the tails. The lower the percent of U-235 in the tails, the less natural uranium is needed for a given level of enrichment.
Hence the example discussed here is a favorable practical case for maximizing resource use in a light water reactor system.
(*4) The main isotope (over 50 percent) in the separated plutonium is Pu-239, but there are also substantial amounts of higher isotopes, including Pu-240 and Pu-241. The mixture is known as reactor-grade plutonium. Pu-240 is not fissile. When used as part of MOX fuel in light water reactors some of it gets converted into Pu-241, which is fissile. Pu-240 can fission with fast neutrons and generate energy.
(*5) Uranium-233 and -237 are also formed in very small quantities and have very little radiological impact.
Uranium-233 is a fissile material which gives a tiny added benefit to the reprocessed uranium.
(IAEATECDOC-1529 2007 pp. 7-8)
Source: 'The Mythology and Messy reality of Nuclear Fuel reprocessing', Arjun Makhijani, Ph.D., April 8, 2010, available at: http://www.ieer.org/reports/reprocessing2010.pdf
Contact: Institute for Energy and Environmental Research (IEER), 6935 Laurel Ave., Suite 201, Takoma Park, Maryland, 20912 USA. Tel: +1-301-270-5500
Email: info@ieer.org
Web: http://www.ieer.org/
Basic facts:
- One PWR reactor (1,270 MWe) to be supplied by Areva/Siemens and built for Electronuclear
- Cost officially put at 1.8 billion dollars (ca 1.35 billion EUR)
- Construction to start in 2010 and operational in 2015-2016
- Location 23.00 S and 44.46 W (coastline, 130 km West of Rio de Janeiro and 220 km East of Sao Paulo)
Nuclear Safety
Being based on a 30-year-old design, and with many components already fabricated and stored for decades,
Angra 3 is a nuclear power plant that falls far behind current reactor technologies. Upgrades can only partly
address these issues and Angra 3 will never reach the same standards as, for example, the French Generation III+ European Pressurized Reactor (EPR).
Illegal and Unconstitutional Approval
The construction of Angra 3 was originally approved in 1975 by presidential decree number 75870/75.
The current government resolved in 2007 to resume construction, based on this 1975 decree. However, this original decree was repealed by a presidential decree in 1991.
More importantly, the recent decision to build the third reactor at Angra and subsequent governmental approvals have been found to be in conflict with the Brazilian constitution Adopted in 1988, Brazilian federal constitution requires that, in addition to an authorizing act of the executive power, any action to construct nuclear facilities in Brazil must be approved by Congress.
The construction of Angra 3 was neither discussed nor voted upon in Brazilian Congress. The government
is arguing that the reactor was already approved in 1975 before the constitution was adopted, again ignoring the fact that the 1975 decree was nullified by the decree of 1991.
Weak Regulatory Environment:
The Brazilian nuclear regulator CNEN is not an independent body, and has many conflicting interests including a direct commercial link to the Angra 3 project.
While CNEN, as regulator, has the authority to issue licenses to the operator of Angra 3, one of its branches, INB, is simultaneously providing fuel to power Angra’s reactors. The way in which CNEN is organized also poses a conflict of interest. For example, CNEN’s institutions are contracted to analyze the impact of
accidents occurring in INB factories.
CNEN also operates nuclear installations inside research institutes that it licenses and regulates. Nuclep, a
group that manufactures the equipment for the nuclear industry, is also part of the CNEN infrastructure. So, in Brazil, CNEN is an umbrella group with its own supplier, operator, contractor, licensor and regulator.
CNEN has a track record of showing a favorable attitude towards the Angra nuclear power plant. For example, in contradiction with legislation, it has repeatedly extended a provisionary operational license to Angra 2 unit despite the fact that satisfactory evacuation plans are not in place and that the Federal Public Ministry has required improvements to this situation since 2001. Similarly, it allows the operation of two existing units despite the fact that not even an interim repository for its radioactive waste has been licensed.
Since the 70s, some Brazilian organizations have been arguing that the CNEN should become an independent body. The Brazilian Physics Society (SBF) is one of the leading proponents of creating this separation.
In 1985, by presidential decree, the Brazilian nuclear program evaluation committee was formed. Members of this committee included scientists, engineers, managers and businessmen, whose remit was to produce
recommendations to the public administration for the nuclear industry.
Its report included a recommendation to create CNEN as an independent regulatory body, but no action has been taken to resolve the innate conflict of interest. A similar recommendation was made in 2007, but to no avail.
The governance structure of CNEN does not reflect the regulatory independence required by the international convention on nuclear safety (CNS) that was adopted more than 10 years ago by the national congress in Brazil.
Similarly, current EU legislation requires that “Member States shall ensure that the competent regulatory authority is functionally separate from any other body or organisation concerned with the promotion, or utilisation of nuclear energy, including electricity production, in order to ensure effective independence from undue influence in its regulatory decision making.“
(EU Directive 2009/71).
Economic Risks
The projected cost of 1.35 billion euro to build a 1,270 MW reactor seems to be too low. Although it may be argued this is due to some equipment having already been purchased in the 1980s, current reactor projects are nevertheless three to four times more expensive per unit of installed capacity.
Also, securing construction funding in euros increases the financial risk of the project, an aspect that is increasingly challenging to manage in a repaymentof-debt scheme. The Brazilian Real has fluctuated by 37% over a one-year period compared to the euro. This volatility will eventually impact the project’s cost.
Large-scale of upgrades and adaptations required to integrate new safety requirements into the existing Angra 3 structure may lead not only to higher construction costs, but also increase the risk of unplanned outages during its operation. For example, the Temelin nuclear power plant in the Czech Republic, which used outdated Russian technologies but was upgraded in the 1990s, struggles to achieve a 70% cumulative capacity factor. The first reactor at Angra also demonstrates this problem. Angra has a cumulative load factor as low as 44%, while Angra 2 manages to reach 78%. Angra 1 and 2 took 13 and 25 years respectively to be completed, and their total expenses have reached US$10 billion US dollars for a combined capacity of 2,000 MWe.
Not a Least-Cost Option for CO 2 Emission Reduction
Brazil has great potential for renewable energy sources that can deliver electricity at cheaper rates than new
reactors. A peer-reviewed analysis published in the journal Energy Policy in 2009 shows that power generated at Angra 3 will be more expensive than hydro, biomass and wind energies. Its production has been calculated at 113 US dollars per MWh, while co-generation with sugarcane bagasse delivers at US$74 per MWh, natural gas at US$79 per MWh, and hydroelectric at US$46 per MWh. It concludes that even wind at US$107 per MWh can deliver more affordable electricity than Angra 3.
Procel, an energy efficiency program of the Brazilian government, also identified the potential of energy efficiency measures that can save 7,000 MW of energy by investing just US$560 million in related measures.
Lack of Transparency
The Brazilian nuclear program does not appear to make any economic sense or to be driven by energy needs, but instead seems to be driven by geopolitical strategic interests. People who were previously involved in a secret program to build nuclear weapons, terminated in 1992, continue to be strongly involved – including the current chair of Electronuclear, operator of the Angra reactors, former Admiral Othon
Luiz Pinheiro da Silva. In a December 2006 interview, the former creator and coordinator of the Naval Nuclear Program between 1979 and 2004, claimed that nuclear submarines are
(707.6036) Laka Foundation - The radioactive material, left over from decades of nuclear weapons production and contaminated with reactor originated radionuclides, was stored in 15,600 drums and intended for disposal at EnergySolutions Inc.’s facility in Clive, 70 miles (110 km) west of Salt Lake City, Utah. This is a facility for the disposal of low-level radioactive waste or Class A waste. Though the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) recently
decided against reclassifying DU as
hotter than Class A waste, after the
arrival of the first shipment of 5,408
drums from Savannah River Site (SRS)
in December, Utah's governor protested
further shipments. The Department of
Energy (DOE) then idled two trainloads
that remain at the nuclear weapons
facility in South Carolina.
It wasn't immediately clear if the
radioactive waste would remain in
South Carolina or be disposed of
elsewhere. In a November presentation
given to the SRS Citizens Advisory
Board, the DOE said if shipments to
Utah were interrupted, the waste would
be diverted to the Nevada Test Site, 65
miles north of Las Vegas. The total
amount of the SRS waste covers 6,500
tons. The cleanup program was
accelerated through the Federal
Recovery & Reinvestment Act, which
allocated US$1.4 billion (1 billion euro)
to SRS, mostly to speed up
environmental-management projects.
According to the Inspector General’s
report, the newest proposal calls for
moving the material to a facility owned
by Waste Control Specialists in
Andrews, Texas, for interim storage. The
auditors note (April 9): “Clearly, this
choice carries with it a number of
significant logistical burdens, including
substantial additional costs for, among
several items, repackaging at SRS,
transportation to Texas, storage at the
interim site, and, repackaging and
transportation to the yet-to-be
determined final disposition point.” A
local newspaper, the Augusta Chronicle
is citing information from an unnamed
source within the department
suggesting that it might be better to
keep the material at SRS, where it has
been ‘safely stored for decades’, until a
permanent disposal solution is found.
Despite assertions by EnergySolutions
that the action is unnecessary, the Utah
Radiation Control Board signed off on a
new rule that imposes additional
restrictions on the disposal of DU.
EnergySolutions can take no more DU
until it shows its radioactive landfill can
contain the radioactive waste for
thousands of years. The rule, which
requires the Clive facility to conduct a
performance assessment for disposal of
the radioactive material, will be
published May 1 and go into effect by
June 1. Yet, EnergySolutions is first in
line to accept up to 1.4 million tons of
DU in coming years - about half from
uranium enrichment plants coming
online and half from government
stockpiles. DU is different from most
other Class A because it becomes most
hazardous after 1 million years. About
49,000 tons is already buried at
EnergySolutions, and DOE has put the
disposal of another 11,000 tons on hold
until the state agrees it can come to the
Clive facility.
EnergySolutions is building a processing
facility for blending more hazardous
Class B and Class C waste with Class A
waste and has proposed to dispose this
waste at its Clive facility. Members of
the Utah Radiation Control Board opted
against trying to regulate this nuclear
industry's practice of mixing low-level
radioactive waste with more hazardous
B&C waste so that reactors can dispose
of waste that now has nowhere else to
go. “At very least, DU is incompatible
with the state's ban on B&C waste,”
said board member Jenkins, “It will
present an unacceptable risk after 100
years.”
Meanwhile the NRC is studying on
options on how to dispose the DU
waste in the mid- and long-term.
The entire report by the U.S. Energy
Department's Inspector General is
available at http://www.ig.energy.gov/
documents/OAS-RA-10-07.pdf
Sources: Augusta Chronicle, The Salt
Lake Tribune, Deseret News, all 13 April
2010.
Contact: Healthy Environment Alliance
ah (HEAL): 68 S Main St, Suite 400, Salt
Lake City, UT 84101, USA.
Tel: +1 801 355-505
Email: info@healutah.org
Web: www.healutah.org
While the debate on what to do with Savannah River Site’s depleted uranium (DU) waste lingers
on, the US Energy Department’s Inspector General calls a plan to store two trainloads of this DU
waste in Texas unnecessary and wasting taxpayers' money.
INTERIM STORAGE OF DU WASTE IN UTAH
REMAINS TO RAISE QUESTIONS
critical if Brazil is to be considered a
major power. Brazil joined the Non-
Proliferation Treaty only in 1994, and to
date has not yet ratified its Additional
Protocol to safeguards. On several
occasions, it has rejected missions by
the International Atomic Energy Agency,
for instance regular site visits. This all
has implications also on existing lack of
transparency and public participation
around Angra 3.
The involved banks (check the site,
on-line from April 19 on!) know all these
facts aswell and are not too eager to
step in with loans and guarantees.
Therefor they seek public money to
back-up the risks involved. Interestingly
it is the German government who
considers to provide financial backup
with a loanguarantee by the German
export credits agency Hermes (see also
Nuclear Monitor 703, January 29, 2010
for more background on this).
Please help this campaign to be
succesfull; put the website www.
nuclearbanks.org as a link on yours, join
the campaign (see possibilities on the
site), contact your bank on their nucear
policy and join the international days of
actions that will be announced soon!
Source and contact: www.
nuclearbanks.org and www.banktrack.
org
8 Nuclear Monitor 707
(707.6037) Nuclear Heritage Network
- The Baltic Sea Info Tour is arranged by
different groups, organisations and individuals
who share the concern of radioactive
pollution. The Tour topics will be
arranged by local people. Everyone can
take part and join the Tour by informing,
arranging local action, joining the network
meetings, spreading information
about nuclear issues or just showing up
in the events. Every step counts!
The Baltic Sea is one of the most
radioactively polluted sea compared to
other water bodies in the world. This
has happened mainly because of the
radioactive releases of nuclear power
plants in the Baltic Sea area (mostly due
Swedish and Finnish power plants), the
radioactive particles distributed from
the Tschernobyl accident, nuclear bomb
tests in the atmosphere and Sellafield’s
discharges.
Also the Russian and Lithuanian reactors
increased the amount of radioactivity
in the Baltic Sea. Additionally the
proposed uranium mining projects and
final disposal sites as well as nuclear
transports are strengthening the risk
of pollution for the vital sea between
Finland, Russia, Baltic States, Poland,
Germany, Denmark and Sweden.
Including the impacts of uranium mining,
processing of the ore to produce
nuclear fuel and the disposal of the
created long-life nuclear waste, the operation
of nuclear power plants has an
immense impact to the global warming.
Nuclear power is expensive and dangerous
and the resources used in the
nuclear industry would be more beneficial
for present and future generations if
spent in renewable energy systems.
The Info Tour has started as an action
of concerned people of the Baltic Sea
community. The tour will inform people
about the facts of uranium energy and
radioactive pollution of the Baltic Sea.
The tour will activate and emancipate
people to take part in the events of the
local stops. The Tour will advance active
courage both locally and in large social
and ecological systems.
The tour is an informative event, dedicated
to the Baltic Sea, embracing the
communities surrounding the Baltic Sea.
We want to discuss the challenges with
people living across the Baltic Sea and
to give more information about certain
issues connected to radioactivity, nuclear
power and renewable alternatives.
The Baltic Sea Info Tour will consist of
different kinds of activities: street actions,
information events, workshops,
performances, discussions, local gatherings,
spreading of flyers and posters.
The Tour will include several stops in the
Baltic Sea countries. It will start from
Finland in June and end in Finland in
August 2010 visiting: Russia, Estonia,
Latvia, Belarus, Poland, Germany, Denmark
and Sweden.
Contact: Baltic Sea Info Tour.
Tel. +358 41 7243254
e-mail: contact@nuclear-heritage.net
http://baltic-tour.nuclear-heritage.net
The Baltic Sea Info Tour will inform about nuclear power and its risks as well as about the
renewable alternatives. The Tour group will travel around the Baltic Sea in summer 2010, informing
and emancipating young people and calling citizens of all ages to raise awareness of the
challenges of nuclear industry and current development surrounding the Baltic Sea area.
On April 12, the Russian environmental group Ecodefense released a major new report focused
on the use of plutonium as fuel in Russian nuclear reactors. This is the first independent research
done during the last decade that exposes the civil plutonium program and its risks for public
health and the environment, and comes as the U.S. and Russia prepare to sign an agreement for
each nation to dispose of 34 metric tons of plutonium removed from nuclear weapons by using it
to generate nuclear power.
STOP NUCLEAR POWER – JOIN THE
BALTIC SEA INFO TOUR
RUSSIA: SAFETY PROBLEMS SURPLUS
WEAPONS-GRADE PU DISPOSITION PROGRAM
(707.6038) Ecodefense! - The Ecodefense
report ('Russian Plutonium
Program: Nuclear Waste, Accidents,
and Senseless Huge Costs') finds that
the cornerstone of Russia’s program
-the BN-800 breeder reactor- has been
under construction for over 25 years,
has cost over US$6 billion, and remains
far from completion.
In the framework of the Russian-US disarmament
agreement, each country will
“dispose” of 34 tons of weapon-grade
plutonium from dismantled warheads.
Presently, the governments are planning
to use the plutonium in the form of
mixed oxide fuel (MOX) in nuclear reactors.
Russian breeder reactors BN-600
(in operation) and BN-800 (under construction)
will be used for this plutonium
disposition. But breeder reactors may
be used for both burning and breeding
plutonium, which offers to the Russian
nuclear industry the possibility of actually
producing more plutonium rather
than net destruction of the element.
Later, the MOX fuel may also be used
in Russian light-water reactors (VVER-
1200 design).
Environmental groups in both Russia
and the U.S. are opposed to the use of
MOX fuel and
instead promote safer, cleaner vitrification
technology to permanently dispose
of plutonium.
Nuclear Monitor 707 9
(707.6039) WISE Amsterdam – This
new publication of the Annals of the
New York Academy of Sciences (Volume
1181), is a collection of papers translated
from Russian with some revised and
updated contributions. Written by leading
authorities from Eastern Europe, the
volume outlines the history of the health
and environmental consequences of the
Chernobyl disaster. Although there has
been discussion of the impact of nuclear
accidents and Chernobyl in particular,
never before has there been a comprehensive
presentation of all the available
information concerning the health and
environmental effects of the low dose
radioactive contaminants, especially
those emitted from the Chernobyl nuclear
power plant. Official discussions
from the International Atomic Energy
Agency and associated United Nations'
agencies (e.g. the Chernobyl Forum
reports) have largely downplayed or
ignored many of the findings reported in
the Eastern European scientific literature
and consequently have erred by not
including these assessments.
The senior author, Dr. Alexey Yablokov
was State Councilor for Environment
and Health under Yeltsin and a member
of the Russian Academy of Science –
since then he receives no support. Yablokov
is an Honorary Foreign Member of
the American Academy Art and Science
(Boston.) Dr. Vassily Nesterenko, head
of the Ukrainian Nuclear establishment
at the time of the accident, flew over the
burning reactor and measured radiation
levels. In August 2009, he died as a result
of radiation damage, but earlier, with
help from Andrei Sakarov, he was able
to establish BELRAD to help children
of the area. Dr. Alexey Nesterenko is a
biologist/ ecologist based in Minsk, Belarus.
The book was expertly translated
into readable English by Janette Sherman,
Medical Toxicologist and Adjunct
Professor in the Environmental Institute
at Western Michigan University.
The authors abstracted data from
more than 5000 published articles and
studies, mostly available only in Slavic
languages and not available to those
outside of the former Soviet Union or
Eastern bloc countries. The findings
are by those who witnessed first-hand
the effects of Chernobyl. This book
is in contrast to findings by the World
Health Organization (WHO), International
Atomic energy Agency (IAEA)
and (United Nations Scientific Committee
on the Effects of Atomic Radiation
(UNSCEAR) who based their findings on
some 300 western research papers, and
who found little of concern about the
fallout from Chernobyl.
While the most apparent human and
environmental damage occurred, and
continues to occur, in the Ukraine, Belarus
and European Russia, more than 50
percent of the total radioactivity spread
across the entire northern hemisphere,
'Chernobyl: Consequences of the Catastrophe for People and the Environment is written by
Alexey Yablokov, Vassily Nesterenko and Alexey Nesterenko. ' This book is in contrast to findings
by the World Health Organization, International Atomic energy Agency and the United Nations
Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation who based their findings on some 300
western research papers, and who found little of concern about the fallout from Chernobyl. They
are leaving out the findings of some 30,000 scientific papers prepared by scientists working and
living in the stricken territories and suffering the everyday problems of residential contamination
with nuclear debris and a contaminated food supply.
CHERNOBYL: CONSEQUENCES OF THE
CATASTROPHE FOR PEOPLE AND THE
ENVIRONMENT
The report describes the nuclear facilities
that will be used for the plutonium
program in Russia: * the Beloyarsk
nuclear plant near Ekaterinburg city, *
NIIAR (Scientific and research institute
of atomic reactors) in Dimitrovgrad city,
* GHK nuclear weapon facility near
Krasnoyarsk city, and * SHK nuclear
facility near Tomsk city. The report also
focuses on issues of safety, accidents,
nonproliferation and public opinion. A
public policy issue raised in the report
is the lack of liability coverage for a
nuclear accident in Russia. This is particularly
troubling given the more than
1,000,000 people living in very close
proximity of the proposed MOX factory
near Ekaterinburg.
On January 21, 2010, Russian government
approved a program of advanced
technologies
development worth 128 billion rubles
(US$4.3 billion or 3.1 billion euro). Most
of the funding will go to breeder reactor
development.
Fast breeder reactors operating with
MOX fuel are being promoted as "advanced
technology" in Russia. But it is
a little known fact that the BN-800 has
been under construction for over 25
years and its design, which pre-dates
the 1986 Chernobyl accident, does not
meet modern safety requirements. According
to the Russian nuclear industry,
this reactor will cost nearly US$4 billion,
but independent estimates suggest that
US$6 billion already has been spent and
construction will be finished not earlier
than 2014 and likely later.
In a detailed financial analysis, the
report concludes that the plutonium fuel
program is only
viable because of US and European
subsidy for weapons grade plutonium
disposition, but given that it may result
in a net increase in plutonium stocks,
the Russian program will undermine this
goal.
The full report in English is available
at http://anti-atom.ru/downloads/Ru-
PuApr2010.pdf
Source: Press release 12 April 2010,
Ecodefense! and NIRS
Contact: Ecodefense, Vladimir Sliviak:
+7 903 2997584
Email: ecodefense@rambler.ru
or: Mary Olson at NIRS, +1-828-252-
8409
10 Nuclear Monitor 707
IN BRIEF
New York thwarts reactor relicensing. The U.S. New York state's Environment Department has told Entergy that its Indian Point
nuclear power plant (units 2 and 3) can no longer use water from the Hudson River for direct (once-through) cooling, whereby a
large volume of water is drawn from the river and discharged back into it, a few degrees warmer. In March the Environment
Department introduced a draft policy requiring certain industrial facilities - including nuclear and other power plants - to recycle
and reuse cooling water through "closed cycle cooling" technology with large evaporative cooling towers. Water use from the river
is then much lower, to replace that evaporated and allow some discharge to maintain quality. (see Nuclear Monitor 706: 'Proposal:
cooling towers required for New York reactors')
Entergy has applied to renew the operating licences for the two reactors for 20 years from 2013 and 2015. It estimates that
building new cooling towers would cost some US$1.1 billion (805 million euro) and involve shutting down the reactors for 42
weeks.
According to Michael Mariotte of NIRS Entergy is making so much money with the 20-year lifetime extension at Indian Point,
"there is a pretty good chance they'll go ahead and
build the cooling towers".
World Nuclear news, 6 April 2010 / NIRS statement, 12 April 2010
U.K.: Higher bills for nuclear. UK energy minister Ed Miliband has confirmed the Government intends introducing a new 'carbon
levy' on consumer electricity bills. While Mr Miliband insisted the levy was to help all low-carbon forms of generation, it is widely
accepted the main reason is to help the financing of building new nuclear reactors.
The Conservative Party also wants to introduce a tax on electricity generation to encourage renewables and nuclear power. A
clear commitment to nuclear power was also given by the party's energy spokesman, Greg Clark. He said there would be "no
limit" on the growth of nuclear power and they wanted to see a new reactor completed every 18 months.
The Government has also announced it will create a new 'green bank', using private money, to finance low-carbon energy
developments.
General elections in the U.K. will take place on May 6.
N-Base Briefing 646, 1 April 2010
potentially contaminating some 400 million
people.
Based on 5000 articles, by multiple
researchers and observers, the authors
estimated that by 2004, some 985,000
deaths worldwide had been caused by
the disaster, giving lie to estimates by
the IAEA and World Health Organization.
All life systems that were studied –
humans, voles, livestock, birds, fish,
plants, mushrooms, bacteria, viruses,
etc., with few exceptions, were changed
by radioactive fallout, many irreversibly.
Increased cancer incidence is not the
only observed adverse effect from the
Chernobyl fallout – noted also are birth
defects, pregnancy losses, accelerated
aging, brain damage, heart, endocrine,
kidney, gastrointestinal and lung diseases,
and cataracts among the young.
Children have been most seriously affected
– before the radioactive Chernobyl
releases, 80% of children were
deemed healthy, now in some areas,
only 20% of children are considered
healthy. Many have poor development,
learning disabilities, and endocrine
abnormalities.
The government of the former Soviet
Union previously classified many
documents now accessible to the
authors. For example, we now know
that the number of people hospitalized
for acute radiation sickness was more
than a hundred times larger than the
number recently quoted by the IAEA,
WHO and UNSCEAR. Unmentioned
by the technocrats were the problems
of “hot particles” of burning uranium
that caused nasopharyngeal problems,
and the radioactive fallout that resulted
in general deterioration of the health
of children, wide spread blood and
lymph system diseases, reproductive
loss, premature and small infant births,
chromosomal mutations, congenital and
developmental abnormalities, multiple
endocrine diseases, mental disorders
and cancer.
The authors systematically explain the
secrecy conditions imposed by the
government, the failure of technocrats
to collect data on the number and
distribution of all of the radionuclides
of major concern, and the restrictions
placed on physicians against calling any
medical findings radiation related unless
the patient had been a certified “acute
radiation sickness” patient during the
disaster, thus assuring that only 1% of
injuries would be so reported..
Below is the New York Academy of Sciences
site for the book. Unfortunately,
its selling price is now about US$150,
which may limit its distribution:
http://www.nyas.org/Publications/Annals/
Detail.aspx?cid=f3f3bd16-51ba-
4d7b-a086-753f44b3bfc1
Source: Rosalie Bertell on Globalresearch.
ca and
http://sustainableloudoun.wordpress.
com/
Nuclear Monitor 707 11
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WISE/NIRS NUCLEAR MONITOR
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