More Problems with the new nuke at Flammaville

Here is a translation of the article below from  Le Canard Enchainé   (20/11/2013)

EPR : the great DIY

" Damaged " on October 16 , after another and yet another technical " hazard " , the dome of the future Flamanville is perforated and must be repaired with , according to the regional head of the Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN), the " patches " ! This time it is two pieces of metal that have been " ejected " during a load test of the bridge handling the EPR. The parts in question, four pounds of gear and a key , projected as a result of an unexpected breakdown of the inner metal wall of the dome, bounced off the lid of the reactor, supposed to withstand the crash of a plane line , eventually crashing 20 meters down outside the security perimeter. No injuries, fortunately ..

Still, this new incident raises a number of questions. The security staff at the EPR site but also the intrinsic safety of the future reactor. Besides the fact that EDF is now forced to tinker with " patches " on the EPR , the metal parts out of the handling crane is a serious problem , since this is supposed to regularly lift the lid of the reactor nuclear during the half - century to come.

Our English neighbours are on the verge of signing with EDF for two EPRs . 

Have they provided enough " patches ?" .

EPR : le grand bricolage

“Endommagé”, le 16 octobre, après un nouvel et énième “aléa” technique, le dôme du futur EPR de Flamanville est troué et doit être réparé avec, selon le responsable régional de l’autorité de Sureté nucléaire (ASN), des “rustines” !  Cette fois, ce sont deux pièces de métal qui ont été “éjectées” lors d’un essai en charge du pont de manutention de l’EPR. Les pièces en question, une roue dentée de 4 kilos et une clavette, projetées à la suite d’une rupture imprévue de la paroi métallique interne du dôme, ont rebondi sur le couvercle du réacteur, censé résister à la chute d’un avion de ligne, pour finir par s’écraser 20 mètres plus bas, en dehors du périmètre de sécurité. Aucun blessé, heureusement..

Reste que ce nouvel incident soulève un certain nombre de questions. Celle de la sécurité du personnel sur le chantier EPR mais aussi celle de la sureté intrinsèque du futur réacteur. Outre le fait qu’EDF soit aujourd’hui contraint de bricoler des “rustines” sur son EPR, la rupture de pièces métalliques sur le pont de manutention pose un sérieux problème, dans la mesure où ce dernier est censé soulever régulièrement le couvercle du réacteur nucléaire pendant le demi-siècle à venir.

Nos voisins anglais, sur le point de signer avec EDF pour deux EPR, ont-ils prévu suffisamment de “rustines” ?.

EDF Signs a historic agreement with London

Nucléaire: EDF signe un accord historique avec Londres

Par Veronique Le Billon | 17/10 | 13:20 | mis à jour à 18:55

L’électricien public a scellé un accord avec le gouvernement britannique pour construire deux EPR sur le site de Hinkley Point dans le Somerset. Areva et les chinois CGN et CNNC deviennent partenaires minoritaires et Londres ouvre la voie à de futures participations majoritaires chinoises.

French Electricity provider signs an agreement with the British Government to construct two EPR nuclear power plants at Hinkley Point in Somerset. Areva and the Chinese become partners.

Nuclear Protest Causes Victoria Delays

Protestors have caused delays in Victoria as they block Grosvenor Place to campaign over nuclear energy.

The group - Boycott EDF Energy - set up outside energy firm EDF's headquarters, with signs including a banner saying "nuclear disaster area". Bella Benson from the group told LBC they had tried democratic channels but "all the doors have been closed".

"We do apologise sincerly to everybody who has been disrupted by our actions today. The truth is that no-one will listen to us. Everybody has bought the line that we have to keep the lights on and nuclear energy is the only way to do this - it's absolutely not true," she added.

 

Revelations of someone who works for EDF: The EPR nuclear reactor is not safe

The French protest organisation "Sortir du nucléaire" has had access to confidential documents. These documents demonstrate that the EPR design (which they want to build in the UK) is at risk of a serious nuclear accident - a risk that EDF are prepared to take as part of their economic calculations.

We held a press conference on the 8th March 2010 in Paris.

The reactor can be run at different rates according to the demand for electricity. But the part of the reactor that controls the rate is defective. EDF and Areva have tried to modifiy this part of the reactor without success. If this reactor design is allowed to go ahead there will be the risk of a Chernobyl-type accident.
On the 8th and 9th March 2010 there was a Nuclear Technology international conference in Paris, that representatives from 65 countries attended. Sarkozy opened the conference, which was chaired by the director of the AIEA. It is scandalous that France is continuing to promote nuclear power in general and the EPR in particular, when these reactors are so dangerous.

We must abandon the construction of the EPR in Finland and in China and put a stop to the project at Penly. The best way to avoid a nuclear accident is to get out of nuclear technology altogether.

The accident scenario in detail
(sorry if anyone else wants to continue translating this they are welcome)

Selon les calculs d’EDF et d’Areva, le pilotage du réacteur en mode RIP (retour instantané en puissance) et la disposition des grappes de commande du réacteur peuvent provoquer un accident d’éjection des grappes de commande à faible puissance et entraîner la rupture de l’enveloppe du mécanisme de commande de la grappe (i). Cette rupture provoquerait le passage du réfrigérant en-dehors de la cuve du réacteur nucléaire. La perte de réfrigérant (un type d'accident nucléaire très grave) entraînerait la rupture d’un nombre important de crayons par échauffement du combustible et des gaines (ii) et donc le relâchement de vapeur extrêmement radioactive dans l’enceinte de confinement. Il y a alors un risque important d’excursion critique qui résulterait en une explosion (iii), la puissance du réacteur EPR étant démultipliée de façon extrêmement brutale. Suite aux éjections des grappes de commande à faible puissance (EDG), le réacteur EPR pourrait ne pas se mettre en arrêt automatique (iv). Quelle que soit la configuration des grappes de commande, l’accident d’éjection de grappe de commande entraîne un taux important de rupture du combustible (NCE) et donc un risque élevé d’excursion critique (v).







Pour plus de détails, consultez les documents confidentiels que nous révélons, divulgués par une source anonyme interne à EDF (notamment le document n°1), téléchargeables sur le site : www.sortirdunucleaire.org







Contacts presse :





Marc Saint-Aroman : 05 61 35 11 06

Charlotte Mijeon - 06 75 36 20 20

Monique et Raymond Sené (physiciens nucléaires) - 01 60 10 03 49





Médias anglophones > Steven Mitchell : 09 52 49 50 22

Médias germanophones > Jean-Yvon Landrac - 06 87 30 41 10











Documents confidentiels à télécharger :







1 - Synthèse - Une technologie explosive : l'EPR (non daté non signé)







2 - Bilan de la phase préliminaire de l'étude d'EDG FA3 et perspectives (EDF SEPTEN 05.05.2009)







3 - EPR - Gestion combustible - Lot 1 - Revue de conception du schéma de grappes FA3 du 25/10/2007







4 - EPR FA3 Synthèse de l’étude de faisabilité de l’accident d’éjection de grappe (EDF SEPTEN 09.02.07)







5 - EPR FA3 Synthèse des voies de sortie de la problématique éjection de grappe (EDF SEPTEN 07.05.07)







6 - Note d’étude : Présentation synthétique de l’EPR (EDF SEPTEN 04.05.04)







7 - Note de présentation de la deuxième revue de projet radioprotection EPR (EDF, printemps 2004)







8 - Marges disponibles pour les activités d'exploitation du REP par rapport aux risques de criticité (Hourtoulle Francis. Le 7 décembre 1999)











Notes :







i cf. paragraphe 6.1.6 du document n°4







ii cf. tableau 3, document n°4







iii cf. document n°4, document n°5 partie 2, Rapport Préliminaire de Sûreté EPR 15.2.4.e







iv cf. document n°2, note 9







v cf. document n°2, note 8.2.1

Revelations from an EDF insider : EPR reactor prone to major nuclear accident risk!

The French Network for Nuclear
Phase-out (Réseau "Sortir du nucléaire") reveals confidential documents
disclosed by an anonymous insider from EDF (Electricité de France, the
main French power utility). These documents show that the design of
the EPR presents a serious risk of a major nuclear accident - a risk
deliberately taken by EDF to increase its profitability. Because it is
potentially vulnerable to a situation which could have uncontrollable
consequences, the EPR reactor is extremely dangerous.

Download
the confidential documents (in French) from www.sortirdunucleaire.org

"Sortir
du nucléaire" has set up a group of experts to analyse these recently
received documents thoroughly. Here are the first lessons we can learn
from them, which are of the utmost importance.

Some operating
modes could cause the EPR reactor to explode because of a control rod
cluster ejection accident (these control rod clusters moderate the
nuclear reaction). These operating modes are mainly related to an
objective of economic efficiency, requiring the power of the reactor to
adapt to electricity demand. Thus, in order to find a hypothetical
economic justification for the EPR, its designers chose to take the very
real risk of a major nuclear accident. Moreover, most of the arguments
given in favour of the EPR (power, efficiency, waste reduction and
safety) have been proved to be false.

EDF and Areva (the
leader of the French nuclear industry) have tried to find a
solution to the problems related to the operating mode of the reactor:
these efforts have failed preventing those kinds of accidents. The
French Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN) has apparently been kept in the
dark about these issues.

So the EPR reactor design seems to
increase the risk of a Chernobyl-type accident, which would lead to the
destruction of the confinement and mass dispersion of radionuclides in
the atmosphere.

On March 8th and 9th, Paris hosts an
international meeting to encourage 65 countries to acquire nuclear
technology. This meeting will be opened by the French President Nicolas
Sarkozy and chaired by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
Director General Yukiya Amano. It is outrageous that France keeps on
promoting nuclear power in general and the EPR reactor in particular, as
the danger of this reactor has now been demonstrated. The construction
of the EPR in Finland, France and China must be stopped
immediately, and the planned project in Penly (France) cancelled. The
best way to prevent nuclear accidents is indeed to phase out nuclear
power and go for renewable energies.


The accident
scenario in detail:

According to calculations by EDF and
Areva, the reactor’s RIP (Instant Return to Power) control mode and the
control rod cluster configuration can induce a rod ejection accident
during low-power operation, and lead to the rupture of the control rod
drive casing (i). This rupture would cause the coolant to leak outside
the nuclear reactor vessel. Such a loss of coolant accident (LOCA - a
very serious type of nuclear accident) would damage a large number of
fuel rods by heating fuel pellets and claddings (ii), and thus cause the
release of highly radioactive steam into the containment. So there is a
great risk of a criticality accident resulting in an explosion (iii),
the reactor power being increased in an extremely
brutal way. Following the ejection of control rod clusters during
low-power operation, the reactor emergency shutdown may fail (iv).
Whatever the configuration of the control rod clusters, a rod ejection
accident induces a high rate of broken fuel rods and therefore a high
risk of a criticality accident (v).

For more details, see the
documents disclosed by an anonymous EDF source (especially document No.
1) on our website: www.sortirdunucleaire.org

Press
Contacts:

Marc Saint-Aroman, +33 (0) 5 61 35 11 06
Charlotte
Mijeon, +33 (0) 6 75 36 20 20
Nuclear physicists: Monique and
Raymond Sené, +33 (0) 1 60 10 03 49
English-speaking Media: Steven
Mitchell, + 33 (0) 9 52 49 50 22
German-speaking Media: Jean-Yvon
Landrac, + 33 (0) 6 87 30 41 10

Documents to download:
1
- Summary - “Une
technologie explosive : l'EPR” (anonymous and undated)
2 - “Bilan de
la phase préliminaire de l'étude d'EDG FA3 et perspectives”(EDF SEPTEN
May 2009)
3 - “EPR – Gestion combustible – Lot 1 – Revue de
conception du schéma de grappes FA3 du 25/10/2007”
4 –“EPR FA3 –
Synthèse de l'étude de faisabilité de l'accident d'éjection de grappe”
(EDF SEPTEN September 2007)
5 - “EPR FA3- Synthèse des voies de
sortie de la problématique éjection de grappe” (EDF SEPTEN July 2007)
6
– Working paper: “Présentation synthétique de l'EPR” (EDF SEPTEN April
2004)
7 - “Note de présentation de la deuxième revue de projet
radioprotection EPR” (EDF, Spring 2004)
8 - “Marges disponibles pour
les activités d'exploitation du REP par rapport aux risques de
criticité” (EDF SEPTEN April 2009)