What ate we going to do with our nuclear waste?

EU adviser on nuclear policy Jan Haverkamp said: “The only way to address the problem of nuclear waste is to not produce it in the first place. Despite the decline of nuclear power over the last decade, the industry still creates more radioactive waste than it can deal with. It has tried dumping it in the sea, attempted storage in geological formations, and in copper and clay containers, but nothing has worked. It’s time to put an end to this madness.”


The European Commission is currently preparing a directive on nuclear waste that could make

European countries think twice before they add to the problem by building new nuclear power

plants. However, the legislation could also be exploited by the nuclear industry to attempt to

overcome the stumbling block of public opposition and give politicians a false sense of security

that could open the door to new projects. This briefing illustrates why for now – and for the next

hundreds of thousands of years – the nuclear waste problem is here to stay and why we should

stop wasting our time with nuclear power.

Timeline

April-May: public consultation on the nuclear waste directive:


http://ec.europa.eu/energy/nuclear/consultations/2010_05_31_fuel_waste_en.htm

July: Commission publishes draft proposal

Summer: first reading by the European Parliament

Autumn: Council debate

End of 2010 / early 2011: adoption of the directive



For over 50 years the nuclear industry has produced large volumes of hazardous radioactive

waste, not just from the operation and decommissioning of nuclear power plants, but also from

uranium mining and enrichment. Today, nuclear energy is being sold to politicians and

consumers as one of the solutions to climate change that will also deliver energy security for

Europe. However, nuclear energy is a dangerous obstacle on the road to a clean energy future.1

On top of other substantial problems related to safety and costs, nuclear waste remains a

major flaw of nuclear energy.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) estimates that the industry annually produces

one million barrels (200 000 m3) of what it considers ‘low and intermediate-level waste’ and

about 50 000 barrels (10 000 m3) of the even more dangerous ‘high-level waste’.2 These

numbers do not include spent nuclear fuel, which is also high-level waste.

It takes 240 000 years for radioactive plutonium to decay to a level that is safe for human

exposure, which is longer than modern humans have been on the Earth (200 000 years). There

is no way to guarantee to keep these substances safe for this long. It does not make sense to

allow the nuclear industry to continue producing more nuclear waste.

1 In its ‘Energy [R]evolution’ scenario, Greenpeace shows that renewables (like wind, solar, biomass, geo-thermal, tidal and

wave energy) and energy efficiency deliver faster, cheaper and cleaner solutions. Sven Teske, e.a., Energy [R]evolution –

A Sustainable Global Energy Outlook, Amsterdam (2008), Greenpeace/EREC,

www.greenpeace.org/international/press/reports/energyrevolutionreport

2 IAEA Factsheet: Managing Radioactive Waste, 1998, www.iaea.org/Publications/Factsheets/English/manradwa.html

Greenpeace European Unit, vzw-asbl

Belliardstraat 199 Rue Belliard, 1040 Brussels, Belgium

Tel.: +32 2 274 1900 Fax: +32 2 274 1910

european.unit@greenpeace.org www.greenpeace.eu

Ond.Nr./Num. D’entreprise: 0457563648

FAILED SOLUTIONS

Billions of euros have been spent over the past half-century on finding a solution to the nuclear

waste problem. Without success.

Russia, USA, France, UK, Netherlands, Japan and others – waste dumping at sea banned

For years, low level radioactive waste was dumped at sea, 'out of sight and out of mind'.

Disintegrating barrels brought the waste back into the environment, and dangerous substances

accumulated in the bodies of animals. After 15 years of campaigning by Greenpeace, in 1993 an

international treaty was signed banning all dumping of radioactive waste at sea.

USA – seismic fault line compromises bedrock storage

Construction of the Yucca Mountain nuclear waste site in Nevada, USA, began in 1982. The US

Geological Survey has found a seismic fault line under the site and there are serious doubts about

the long-term movements of underground water that can transport deadly contamination into the

environment. As a result of these problems, the US government stopped funding the project in

early 2010.

Germany – Water floods salt layers solution

In Asse, Germany, an experimental radioactive waste dump was set up in the 1960s in salt

formations deep underground. It started leaking water in 1988 and is currently flooding with

12 000 litres of water per day. As a result, all 126 000 barrels of waste already placed in the dump

now need to be cleared out. Asse was meant as a pilot project for a final storage solution in the

salt layers under Gorleben, but there is now serious doubt in Germany about the viability of salt

layers as storage for nuclear waste.

France – Waste inventory unknown

One of the largest nuclear dumps in the world, the Centre de Stockage de La Manche (CSM) in

northern France, was opened in 1969 to store low level waste. It was closed in 1994. It currently

stores 520 000 m3 of radioactive materials from waste reprocessing (see below) and French

nuclear reactors. A 1996 commission set up by the French government concluded that the site

also contained long-living waste and higher level waste, and that the true inventory was effectively

unknown. In 2006 it was found that contaminated water from the site had been leaking into an

underground aquifer, threatening contamination of the surrounding agricultural land.

NEW RESEARCH BRINGS NEW CHALLENGES

Forsmark, Sweden – Olkiluoto, Finland: copper corrosion

Sweden is developing a system that places nuclear waste in a copper container surrounded by

clay. Water is expected to help the copper container harden when it is stored in rock like granite,

deep underground. Finland adopted the same system and Switzerland and the UK are considering

this option. But problems have already begun to appear. The copper canisters were expected to

survive corrosion for 3 000 years, but recent research shows that they might fail in 300 years.3

There are furthermore concerns about the build-up of hydrogen produced as a result. High

temperatures from the canisters could also affect the clay covering, while groundwater flows could

bring contaminants from any compromised containers into the Baltic Sea. Furthermore, studies

predict that Nordic countries are likely to face at least one ice age in the coming 100 000 years,4

which could change the pattern of the underground and ground water streams.

Bure, France – Dessel, Belgium: uncertainties of clay as a natural barrier

Unlike Sweden and Finland, that rely on man-made barriers to prevent leakage, France and

Belgium are exploring clay as a natural barrier. The waste is to be contained in simple stainless

steel canisters, which can corrode even more easily than the Swedish copper ones, and rely on

the natural clay formation to keep in radioactivity. The crucial question is whether it can be

guaranteed – for hundreds of thousands of years – that no cracks or channels will form in the clay

layers, which would cause water to leak in and out and poison nearby aquifers.

3 Hultquist, G. et al. (2009). Water Corrodes Copper. Catalysis Letters, Volume 132, Numbers 3-4.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10562-009-0113-x

4 Matti Saarnisto, Evaluation report on the Posiva report 2006-5 (2008), STUK (Finland's nuclear regulating agency).

Available on demand.

THE HUMAN RISK OF STORAGE

Human interference

Once placed into final storage, nuclear waste needs to be monitored and not only secured from

natural events, but also from human interference. Stored civilian and military nuclear waste, such

as plutonium or uranium, are the most accessible sources of radioactive material that can be used

for the production of nuclear bombs. A few kilograms of these substances would be sufficient to

make bombs similar to the ones used on Japan by the US military during World War II. Even a very

modest amount of radioactive material from these sites (around 20 grams) would be sufficient to

make a 'dirty bomb’, which could contaminate several square kilometers. To deal with the

problem, the nuclear industry proposes to guard storage sites for 300 years. But there is no

proposal to ensure security for the other 239,700 years.

Interim storage: leakage and terrorist risk

Some countries, like the Netherlands, have set up interim storage for 100 years, effectively shifting

the problem of final storage to our grandchildren and great-grandchildren. In the meantime,

leakages and accidents need to be prevented. An additional risk is terrorism: an attack on an

interim nuclear waste storage site would be a relatively soft target for terrorists.

Reprocessing – the myths of the ‘nuclear cycle’

The nuclear industry talks about the 'nuclear fuel cycle' and claims that after use, nuclear fuel is

recycled. In reality, with reprocessing, as this process is called, only a very small part of the spent

nuclear fuel is actually re-used: 99% of the radioactivity and 90% of the waste volume are left at

the end of the process. The process also produces large volumes of different types of radioactive

waste that are difficult to store. Liquid waste pumped into the sea from reprocessing plants in

Sellafield, in the United Kingdom, and la Hague, in France, can be traced as far as the Arctic.5 And

numerous cases of nuclear poisoning have been detected in areas surrounding the reprocessing

plant in Mayak, Russia.

Transport of nuclear waste

Nuclear waste, such as spent nuclear fuel, plutonium and other highly radioactive material, is

transported all over the planet, often passing through large inhabited areas. These deadly convoys

pose a serious risk to populations and ecosystems along the routes. If an accident were to occur,

radioactivity could contaminate several square kilometres or more. The convoys are also at risk of

terrorist attack. The annual transport of nuclear waste from France to Gorleben in Germany

therefore draws tens of thousands of demonstrators. Tons of plutonium resulting from

reprocessing are also regularly shipped from France and the UK to Japan,6 crossing the territorial

waters of many countries on the way, as well as important marine ecosystems. Depleted uranium

from France is transported to Russia, where thousands of barrels are dumped in large open-air

storage sites in the Urals.

The cost of nuclear waste

Because it is as yet unclear how nuclear waste can safely be stored for the amount of time

necessary, it is very difficult to make a full projection of costs. Nuclear energy companies in the EU

are required to reserve money for waste processing and storage in the future. But in several

countries these waste funds appear to be far too small and have in the past been used for new

risky investment. When the UK privatised nuclear utility British Energy, the State had to spend £5.3

billion (€6.6 billion) of taxpayers’ money to fill a hole in the company’s reserves for

decommissioning and waste. But British Energy’s fund would only cover a fraction of the total cost

for decommissioning and waste for all 45 existing British nuclear reactors, so far estimated to be

around £70 billion (€88 billion), the equivalent of almost €2 billion per reactor.

5 See among others: AMAP, 2002. Arctic Pollution 2002: Persistent Organic Polluatants, Heavy Metals, Radioactivity,

Human Health, Changing Pathways. Arctic monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), Oslo, Norway. xii+112 pp.

6 The most recent plutonium shipment from France to Japan took place in February 2009 and contained 1,800 kg of

plutonium. Over 20 000 kg are still stored in France and the UK awaiting shipment to Japan.

GREENPEACE DEMANDS

A nuclear phase-out – In order to manage the existing nuclear waste crisis we should first of all

stop producing more waste and develop clean energy production and energy efficiency. There

should be a ban on all new nuclear power reactors and an immediate end to all

reprocessing.

Storage for existing radioactive waste must use the best available technology to prevent

radioactivity from leaking into the environment and to protect human health. Storage should be

managed, monitored and retrievable for an indefinite time period into the future.

No export of nuclear waste – Countries should be responsible for the safe management of the

nuclear waste that they have created and transport of nuclear materials (including spent

nuclear fuel) should be avoided.

Full transparency – Some countries have chosen nuclear waste sites without consulting the local

population and without exploring alternatives. All information relevant to decisions on the

management of nuclear waste should be fully transparent and made available for public

consultation.

Radioactive material from decommissioned nuclear weapons should be treated in order

to minimise the possibility of it being used to make a ‘dirty’ or a nuclear bomb.

Contacts:

Jan Haverkamp – Greenpeace EU nuclear energy policy adviser:

+32 (0)477 790 416 (mobile), jan.haverkamp@greenpeace.org

Mark Breddy – Greenpeace EU communications manager:

+32 (0)496 156229 (mobile), mark.breddy@greenpeace.org

Dinner welcome for nuclear enthusiasts

French activists block train with radioactive waste for Russia

17:0006/04/2010

Greenpeace activists tore up the train track near the Tricastin Nuclear Power Center in southeast France on Monday to stop a shipment of nuclear waste to Russia, the organization said.  Depleted uranium hexafluoride was due to be transported via rail to the port of Le Havre and on to St. Petersburg.

Activists say that shipments of nuclear waste to Russia violate French law and an EU directive banning the import and export of dangerous waste. In February, activists held several protests against nuclear waste transportation to Russia and its storage in the country.

"Today we held a protest to prevent the shipment of French spent nuclear fuel to Russia and to make officials stop trading in nuclear waste," Greenpeace France anti-nuclear program coordinator, Yannick Rousselet said.  "The French side sells this allegedly valuable material to Rosatom for a symbolic price while the real uranium costs 150 times as much," Greenpeace Russia energy program chief, Vladimir Tchouprov said.

"Formally, Rosatom sends this raw material for recycling, but after such recycling 90% of the initial volume remains in Russia forever. It is a hidden trade in nuclear waste. We want this stopped," he said.  However, he said that Greenpeace had no plans to hold similar protests in Russia.  "In Russia, taking apart rails is fraught with serious consequences," Tchouprov said referring to routinely tough response by Russian authorities to any action they deem as a security threat.

"Yet another Greenpeace protest is a clear manipulation of public consciousness. They [Greenpeace activists] demanding the halt of shipments while it was widely known in 2006 that deliveries of uranium hexafluoride expire in 2010. Each time a shipment occurs, they chain themselves to the train tracks and put their heads on the tracks pretending to fight against further deliveries which will not take place after 2010," Rosatom spokesman Sergei Novikov said, adding that the protestors are "drawing attention to an issue that doesn't exist."

Earlier in March, Greenpeace activists called on French company Areva to cease nuclear waste exports to Russia. Protestors rallied outside Areva's Moscow office and displayed a banner reading "Russia is not a dump".

Revelations of someone who works for EDF: The EPR nuclear reactor is not safe

The French protest organisation "Sortir du nucléaire" has had access to confidential documents. These documents demonstrate that the EPR design (which they want to build in the UK) is at risk of a serious nuclear accident - a risk that EDF are prepared to take as part of their economic calculations.

We held a press conference on the 8th March 2010 in Paris.

The reactor can be run at different rates according to the demand for electricity. But the part of the reactor that controls the rate is defective. EDF and Areva have tried to modifiy this part of the reactor without success. If this reactor design is allowed to go ahead there will be the risk of a Chernobyl-type accident.
On the 8th and 9th March 2010 there was a Nuclear Technology international conference in Paris, that representatives from 65 countries attended. Sarkozy opened the conference, which was chaired by the director of the AIEA. It is scandalous that France is continuing to promote nuclear power in general and the EPR in particular, when these reactors are so dangerous.

We must abandon the construction of the EPR in Finland and in China and put a stop to the project at Penly. The best way to avoid a nuclear accident is to get out of nuclear technology altogether.

The accident scenario in detail
(sorry if anyone else wants to continue translating this they are welcome)

Selon les calculs d’EDF et d’Areva, le pilotage du réacteur en mode RIP (retour instantané en puissance) et la disposition des grappes de commande du réacteur peuvent provoquer un accident d’éjection des grappes de commande à faible puissance et entraîner la rupture de l’enveloppe du mécanisme de commande de la grappe (i). Cette rupture provoquerait le passage du réfrigérant en-dehors de la cuve du réacteur nucléaire. La perte de réfrigérant (un type d'accident nucléaire très grave) entraînerait la rupture d’un nombre important de crayons par échauffement du combustible et des gaines (ii) et donc le relâchement de vapeur extrêmement radioactive dans l’enceinte de confinement. Il y a alors un risque important d’excursion critique qui résulterait en une explosion (iii), la puissance du réacteur EPR étant démultipliée de façon extrêmement brutale. Suite aux éjections des grappes de commande à faible puissance (EDG), le réacteur EPR pourrait ne pas se mettre en arrêt automatique (iv). Quelle que soit la configuration des grappes de commande, l’accident d’éjection de grappe de commande entraîne un taux important de rupture du combustible (NCE) et donc un risque élevé d’excursion critique (v).







Pour plus de détails, consultez les documents confidentiels que nous révélons, divulgués par une source anonyme interne à EDF (notamment le document n°1), téléchargeables sur le site : www.sortirdunucleaire.org







Contacts presse :





Marc Saint-Aroman : 05 61 35 11 06

Charlotte Mijeon - 06 75 36 20 20

Monique et Raymond Sené (physiciens nucléaires) - 01 60 10 03 49





Médias anglophones > Steven Mitchell : 09 52 49 50 22

Médias germanophones > Jean-Yvon Landrac - 06 87 30 41 10











Documents confidentiels à télécharger :







1 - Synthèse - Une technologie explosive : l'EPR (non daté non signé)







2 - Bilan de la phase préliminaire de l'étude d'EDG FA3 et perspectives (EDF SEPTEN 05.05.2009)







3 - EPR - Gestion combustible - Lot 1 - Revue de conception du schéma de grappes FA3 du 25/10/2007







4 - EPR FA3 Synthèse de l’étude de faisabilité de l’accident d’éjection de grappe (EDF SEPTEN 09.02.07)







5 - EPR FA3 Synthèse des voies de sortie de la problématique éjection de grappe (EDF SEPTEN 07.05.07)







6 - Note d’étude : Présentation synthétique de l’EPR (EDF SEPTEN 04.05.04)







7 - Note de présentation de la deuxième revue de projet radioprotection EPR (EDF, printemps 2004)







8 - Marges disponibles pour les activités d'exploitation du REP par rapport aux risques de criticité (Hourtoulle Francis. Le 7 décembre 1999)











Notes :







i cf. paragraphe 6.1.6 du document n°4







ii cf. tableau 3, document n°4







iii cf. document n°4, document n°5 partie 2, Rapport Préliminaire de Sûreté EPR 15.2.4.e







iv cf. document n°2, note 9







v cf. document n°2, note 8.2.1

A new study by the US National Academy of Sciences (NAS) on cancer risk for people living close to nuclear power plants is likely tobegin this summer, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has announced.



World Nuclear News 8th Apr 2010





http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/RS-Study_to_focus_on_cancer_risk_near_US_nuclear_plants-0804107.html

Nuclear Regulators in Europe investigating French piping for use in construction of new nuclear power stations in UK

Paris (Platts)--8Apr2010/750 am EDT/1150 GMT





Nuclear safety authorities in four countries are assessing the significance of undocumented welding on primary circuit piping for the EPR reactor under construction at Olkiluoto-3, Petteri Tiippana, director of the
nuclear reactor regulation department at the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority STUK, told Platts in an interview Thursday.
But Tiippana said that contrary to a statement made Wednesday by Marie-Pierre Comets, a commissioner of French nuclear safety authority ASN, regulators from Finland, France, the UK and the US are not preparing a joint statement on the piping quality issue.

A spokesman for the UK Health and Safety Executive said that the HSE and the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission had observed a joint inspection of the piping made by the French company Nordon for the Olkiluoto-3 EPR. He said, "any action relating to this is for ASN and STUK, but we are not currently
planning to issue a joint statement." HSE and the NRC are currently in the process of reviewing the "next-generation" EPR reactor design, but are not overseeing construction of EPR units, unlike STUK and ASN. The HSE spokesman said the piping quality is "not a design issue, it's a quality issue."

Olivier Gupta, ASN's director for power reactor regulation, said through a spokeswoman Thursday that "there will be no joint statement" on the piping issue. He said Comets had meant to refer to the "joint inspection" of the Nordon facilities by STUK and ASN, which was observed by representatives of NRC and HSE. The spokeswoman said Comets had "made a mistake."

The piping was manufactured by Nordon, a subcontractor to Areva, the French vendor which is supplying the nuclear part of the Olkiluoto-3 unit under a turnkey contract to utility Teollisuuden Voima Oy. Nordon, based in Nancy in eastern France, is a unit of the Fives group and has long been a major supplier of piping for nuclear power plants.

In October 2009, STUK found that small cracks in piping made for the main coolant lines of Olkiluoto-3 had been repaired with welding procedures that were not documented.

Tiippana said the piping is still in France and that analysis of the significance of the undocumented welding could be finished within several weeks. STUK will then do final inspections, probably before summer, he said. Until the piping is approved by STUK, it cannot be transported to Olkiluoto.

The main coolant lines for the EPR must be manufactured to very high quality standards and documentation must substantiate that quality, because the safety case for those high-pressure lines assumes they will not rupture suddenly.

In an unprecedented initiative, STUK, ASN and HSE issued a tripartite regulatory statement last November expressing concern about the instrumentation and control system architecture proposed for the EPR in their
three countries.

Areva's 1,600- to 1,700 MW-class EPR reactor is under construction at Olkiluoto-3 in Finland and Flamanville-3 in France, and the design is under regulatory review for construction in the UK and the US.

--Ann MacLachlan, ann_macLachlan@platts.com
--Ariane Sains, newsdesk@platts.com
--David Stellfox, david_stellfox@platts.com

Similar stories appear in Nucleonics Week. See more information at
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Sellafield fined £75,000 for exposing staff to nuclear contamination

Contractors at nuclear plant received radiation dose while drilling through floor

Terry Macalister guardian.co.uk, Friday 4 December 2009

Sellafield nuclear power plant in West Cumbria. where workers were exposed to radiation. Photograph: Christopher Furlong/Getty Images

The operator of Sellafield, Britain's biggest nuclear complex, was today handed a fine and legal costs totalling more than £100,000 following safety lapses which led to the radioactive contamination of staff. The successful prosecution of Sellafield Ltd by the Health and Safety Executive will tarnish the reputation of an industry trying to win public confidence for a new generation of power plants.

The business, controlled by state-owned British Nuclear Group when the incident occurred in July 2007, has since been taken over by three private contractors, Amec, Areva and URS Washington, who work under the Nuclear Management Partners banner.

Carlisle crown court fined Sellafield Ltd £75,000 with a further £26,000 costs. The Nuclear Decommissioning Authority, which owns the Sellafield site which the consortium manages, said the fine would be paid by insurers.
Mark Bassett, the HSE's superintending nuclear inspector, said he was satisfied with the "relatively high" penalty imposed. "Although the radiation doses in this case were below the statutory dose limits, they could potentially have been higher. They should have been zero," he said.

"The incident highlights the importance of Sellafield Ltd following its own arrangements for protecting workers, when undertaking potentially hazardous work with the risk of exposure to radiation. Sellafield Ltd should have properly assessed those risks, and then appropriately planned, organised and carried out the work."

Two contractors were drilling an area of floor, under Sellafield Ltd's supervision, when they were contaminated with plutonium by the dust produced from the drilling, some of which they inhaled. There was no immediate impact on their health although they received a significant radiation dose.

A spokesman for Sellafield Ltd said last night: "This incident happened more than a year before Nuclear Management Partners (NMP) took over control of Sellafield Ltd, bringing with them a wealth of experience and expertise from around the globe.
"Since arriving on site, the new management team has introduced a range of initiatives aimed at improving safety and performance and has focussed on ensuring disciplined professionalism in all that we do."
In the past Sellafield Ltd has been fined up to £500,000 for more serious safety lapses and the HSE recently warned that the chances of a major incident were still too high.