Italian Troops exposed to depleted uranium

It looks as if Italian troops are being sent to pick up the pieces of depleted uranium bombs dropped by the US and UK in various parts of the world. Are Italians, once again, being treated as expendible third world soldiers?
“We handle depleted uranium bombs with bare hands”. This is what Italian soldiers said in 1993.

A military document demonstrates that radioactive bombs are kept in Italian bases with little attention to health and safety.

This is a story about silence. Silence about the fact that Italian soldiers pick up the depleted uranium bombs that were fired in war zones. This certainly happened in Somalia, it could have happened in Iraq with the NBC (nuclear, bacteriological, chemical) forces, who were stationed at Bassora. The troops in Somalia collected pieces of radioactive material, together with sand, from where the bombs fell. They put this material into metal containers and transported it to Italy, where the contaminated material was dealt with by workmen, often unprotected.

And they didn’t choose to do this.

L’Unione Sarda newspaper got hold of a 2001 military document which proved that the soldiers had been handling depleted uranium bombs, without knowing that that was what they were.

This document is a request for health checks from the artificieri (whose names have been covered up to protect them) from a base in Tuscany. The document is addressed to those in command, requesting that the organization responsible for carrying out health checks should carry out these checks.

These are the key passages from the document, (the signs that appear at the beginning indicate, according to NATO codes, perforating anti tank depleted uranium bombs: the brackets are in the original).

“As far as depleted uranium is concerned the personel specified here were working with anti tank bombs from Lot 105/51 mm APFS/DS-T-DM33 (depleted uranium) and with explosive and non-explosive material (including sacks of sand and various materials). These materials were brought back from other areas (areas at risk) in containers and military vehicles to be counted and deposited in a temporary store, prior to being taken back to the deposit.

We would like to bring to your attention the fact that when the work was carried out on the sum total of the bombs returning from Somalia, the outer shells, when they returned to the munitions deposit, showed signs of having been under water and they were malformed, so that it was difficult to establish which of the bombs, or how many of them, were in good condition, without a more detailed examination.

In order to accertain whether the bombs were still usable, the workers opened the boxes and containers and took the bombs out. Then they cleaned the shells and the bombs with wire wool where they were oxidised. Then they polished the shells and bombs with vaseline oil and jute cloth, after which they put them back into their containers, now clean and perfect.

The conclusion of our request is: the personel who carried out this work did it without taking any precautions because they thought they were dealing with materials that were the same as any other materials in the store. We await a detailed response and the health checks that we requested and thank you for your attention. 12/01/2001

Yours faithfully


The artificiere personel

The Ibis Mission in Somalia began in December 1992 and ended in January 1994. Eleven Italian soldiers lost their lives there.

The work on the bombs and contaminated sand was carried out in January 2001.
The reason for this was: when questions were raised in parliament on the 21st Dec 2000 concerning the illnesses and deaths possibly caused by depleted uranium, (reported by the Unione Sarda and Libero newspapers), the minister of defence, Sergio Mattarella (Ulivo party, under the government of Giuliano Amato) admitted that 10,800 radioactive bombs were dropped in Bosnia, but denied that these munitions were used in the poligono of Teulada (Somalia?)

In a few days soldiers of the 7th Regiment NBC stationed at Civitavecchia will be in Iraq. Will they be bringing anything back to Italy? Where will it be stored?
direzione-tecnica@misteriditalia.com

SABBIA CONTAMINATA E FRAMMENTI DEI COLPI SPARATI IN SOMALIA NELLA GUERRA DEL ’93 di Marco Mostallino da: L'Unione Sarda, 29 maggio 2003

Contaminated sand and fragments of the bombs that were fired during the war in Somalia in 1993.
By Marco Mostallino. From L’Unione Sarda, 29 March 2003

The waste 'repository' at Drigg is almost full - radioactive waste is now being refused entry

Radioactive waste is now being refused entry from, for example, Chapel Cross, who want to dump the decommissioned magnox plant - contaminated soil and rubble into Cumbria.

Even the pro nuke MP Jamie Reed is opposed to nuke dump sites away from the Sellafield site in other parts of Cumbria.
The nuclear industry wants to dispose of 12 lorries a day of radioactive wastes in the former open cast coal mine of Keekle Head - near to the source of the river Keekle (recently featured on BBC Countryfile as an
important salmon river worth millions to the Cumbrian economy).

The radioactive wastes would leach into the land and there would be adverse impact on the environment and health of residents - cynically called "receptors" by the industry.

The planning meeting for radioactive waste in landfill will be heard on 22nd June at Kendal County Offices 11am.

The application is to put radioactive waste into Keekle Head - former open cast coal mine and near to the source of the River Keekle.

The planning application number is : 4/10/9001 Keekle Head

send a emails to: developmentcontrol@cumbriacc.gov.uk in opposition to this proposal.

or send letters to Development Control Team Cumbria County Council County Offices Kendal LA9 4RQ

Or Phone :01539 713066

http://www.facebook.com/group.php?gid=119805971373120&ref=mf
http://www.facebook.com/group.php?gid=119805971373120

useful bullet points here:

Keekle Head
'Endecom UK Ltd' are proposing to put forward a Planning Application for a Radioactive Waste dump at Keekle Head in West Cumbria (5 miles inland from Whitehaven).

One Million Cubic Metres of Waste
Endecom plan to send 12 lorry loads of radioactive waste a day to the site - in total one million cubic metres will travel through Cumbria's roads.

Endecom Describe Local People as "Receptors"
The Company accept that if their planned dump goes ahead there will be risks to local people, as radioactivity will dissolve, get into the water supply - and reach the local population.

Endecom refer to the people who would become contaminated as 'receptors' .
Endecom have no idea of likely Risk

The risk assessment for the proposal has not yet been carried out.
Thirty five radionuclides have been listed as likely to be present - but these have not been assessed.

Planning System + Fast-Tracking of Projects
Recent changes to the planning regime - brought in to speed up project development will drastically limit the opportunity for local people and councils to scrutinise proposals. Therefore - given that the risks of this project are unknown, this is just the wrong time for the project to be put forward.

Minimal Jobs
Although the project would employ 50 people during construction, after this, during operation, the project would only provide 15 jobs.

Threat to Fish
Cumbria's rivers bring in a revenue of £60M from fish stocks -the River Keekle is an important salmon migratory route.

Refs

Endecom - 'Proposed Keekle Head Waste Management Centre' - Six Page Brochure., Summer 2009
Note received from Doug Allan for Endecom - setting out answers received from Rob Scott of Nuvia (to questions sent from Dr Rachel Western - Nuclear Researcher for Friends of the Earth [Cumbria groups] ) 7th September 2009

Endecom Note - 7th Sept 2009 (See above)

NDA / DEFRA Radioactive Waste Inventory (2007) - See 'Detailed Data on Sellafield - Waste Stream 2D148 High Volume Very Low Level Waste from Final Decommissioning (HVVLLW) pp413 418 [NB - to locate this page from the 2007 Inventory CD, click 'Detailed Data' Box, then 'Waste Stream Data Sheets', then 'Nuclear Decommissioning Authority', then 'Sellafield', finally search for 2D148 - by typing this into the 'find' box in the top left hand side of the screen.

Edecom refer to the 2D148 waste stream [High Volume Very Low Level Waste from Final Decommissioning (HVVLLW) ] in their 7th Sept 2009 note Robin Pagnamenta, Energy Editor - The Times - "Infrastructure change 'will fast-track planning'" - 1st October 2009

http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/industry_sectors/utilities/article6856130.ece

£60M Cumbrian Rivers - BBC Countryfile April

French antinuclear network “Sortir du nucléaire” supports nuclear industry subcontractor and whistleblower Philippe Billard

French antinuclear network “Sortir du nucléaire” supports nuclear industry subcontractor and whistleblower Philippe Billard


Philippe Billard, trade unionist, subcontracts for the nuclear industry. He has already been exposed to radiation while working in nuclear power plants and will be heard by the industrial tribunal of Rouen on 1st June. As a spokesperson of the organisation “Santé / Sous-traitance” (“Health and Subcontracting”), he has undergone some retaliation measures after having denounced workers exposure to radiation. As a whistleblower, he’s now treated as persona non grata in nuclear power plants. His employer refuses to re-instate him at his previous job, in contradiction with the Labour Inspectorate’s recommendations.

The French antinuclear network “Sortir du nucléaire”, which gathers about 880 organisations, firmly condemns the nuclear industry as life-threatening and opaque, and considers Philippe Billard’s ousting as a means to put pressure on whistleblower workers. “Sortir du nucléaire” decided to bring its support to the workers who, just like Philippe Billard, suffer from the unbearable working conditions imposed by the nuclear industry and undergo irradiation without even receiving appropriate health care.

To protect its corporate image, EDF chose to give subcontractors the most dangerous tasks. These people working in the shadows have insecure jobs and are mostly temporary and/or nomad workers. Every year, 25,000 to 30,000 of them are made to carry out tasks where they are exposed to radiations. This system allows EDF to cover up a huge health scandal, since these subcontractors, who get 80% of the annual collective dose from the whole French nuclear park, are not taken into account in epidemiological surveys[1] !

EDF is shamelessly multiplying talks on transparency while hushing up workers whistle blowing about the imminent catastrophe. In the ageing French nuclear park, the accident risk is increasing, all the more since maintenance periods are shortened in order to save time and money. However, the official motto remains “Nothing to report”[2]. Short-term profits are more important than common safety and security.

The nuclear industry lets a permanent accident risk hang over populations and sacrifices workers’ health. It is high time to reduce our electricity consumption and to shift towards more sustainable ways of producing energy, which threaten neither the workers nor the people and create far more jobs[3], clean, safe and spread nationwide.

In support with Philippe Billard and all the workers suffering in the nuclear industry, the network “Sortir du nucléaire” calls to join the trade union gathering on June, the 1st at 8: 30 , in front of the tribunal (2, place de la Madeleine, Rouen, Normandy)

Further information (in French) on : http://groupes.sortirdunucleaire.org/blogs/sante-et-sous-traitance/

[1] Annie Thébaud-Mony, « L’industrie nucléaire organise le non-suivi médical des travailleurs les plus exposés », Imagine, May-June 2007

[2] See the movie « R.A.S. Nucléaire : Rien à signaler » by Alain de Halleux, 2009

[3] As an example, more than 300 000 jobs have been created in Germany in renewable energy and energy efficiency since the 2000 Renewable Energy Bill.

Réseau "Sortir du nucléaire" / French Nuclear Phaseout Network

Federation gathering 876 NGOs and organizations

http://www.sortirdunucleaire.org/

JULY 10th NUCLEAR TRAINS TERRORIST DANGER DEMO

Trains carrying highly-radioactive used fuel rods pass though the Olympic site weekly between Stratford and Hackney Wick Stations.

A terrorist attack on these trains in the vicinity of the Olympic site which succeeded in breaking open the container of the rods drawn by the train would cause a terrorist spectacular, as it would result in the release of high-level radiation which would kill thousands of people in and around the Olympic site and for miles downwind, and require immediate mass evacuation of the area.

On July 10th 2010, the Nuclear Train Action Group is organising a major rally and march to demand this danger is ended. These trains must be cancelled or re-routed away from the Olympic site and all highly-populated areas such as East London.

DETAILS: Meet 2pm in Victoria Park, by Cadogan Gate Entrance, Cadogan Terrace E9 (near Hackney Wick station) for a rally chaired by CND Chair Kate Hudson and with eminent speakers.

2.45pm. 2-mile march from Victoria Park, passing Hackney Wick station at 3pm and then skirting the southern boundary of the Olympic site along the canal towpath and the Greenway to Stratford station. (Transport from Victoria Park to Stratford for those who aren’t able or don’t want to walk!)

4pm: Symbolic die-in in front of the Olympic Clock outside Stratford Station to represent the consequences of a terrorist attack on a nuclear train, followed by leafletting in Stratford Market and Shopping Centre to alert the public to this danger.

This demonstration is supported by the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND)

(*While the North London Line is closed for up-grading, nuclear trains are being diverted from Stratford up through South Tottenham. However they are still passing alongside the Olympic site, so the terrorist danger remains.)

­­­­­­­­­­­­Nuclear Trains Action Group, Mordechai Vanunu House, 162 Holloway Road, London N7 8DQ; tel 020-7607 2302; fax c/o 020-7700 2357

DEMONSTRATE AGAINST OLYMPIC TERRORIST DANGER!

The bomb wasn’t banned by Olivier Zajec

The UN Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty hasn’t prevented India, Pakistan, Israel – and potentially Iran and North Korea – from acquiring nuclear capability. But imagine a world where it hadn’t been adopted by so many other states

The idea of a Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was first proposed in the 1950s when the US, Russia and Britain had nuclear weapons, and France and China were developing them. (France exploded its first nuclear bomb in 1960, China in 1964.) Since the US was in the lead, it had the greatest interest in limiting the arms race, so from the beginning of the 1950s it pushed for nuclear containment. President Dwight Eisenhower proposed to the UN General Assembly on 8 December 1953 that an agency be set up to control the use of nuclear material (1).

For the sake of world peace and maintaining their status, the other nuclear powers, and those about to become so, assessed the situation: a mechanism that recognised their progress while halting the spread of a powerful weapon would be in their interest. The project had no shortage of allies of convenience.

Eisenhower’s idea gained ground, although for a long time it was hostage to the power struggle between the US and Russia. In October 1956, after many stormy debates, the UN created the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA. Article 3.5 of its charter defines its mission as “to establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities, and information made available by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose”. In return, Article 3.1 explains, the IAEA offers “to encourage and assist research on, and development and practical application of, atomic energy for peaceful uses throughout the world.”

Stick and carrot

The order of priorities is therefore the wrong way round in the text: in view of the balance of power at that time, paragraph 1 of Article 3 should follow on from paragraph 5, not the other way around. The IAEA’s primary role is to safeguard, and only then to assist. Article 3.5 also had an important implication: the agency could not be a guardian without legal power; if it was not to remain a weak, marginal, advisory body, it had to have powers of enforcement.

That power came with the NPT, signed on 1 July 1968 by 43 states, including North Korea. Ratified on 5 March 1970, for a period of 25 years, it has been one of the world’s most successful and universal treaties: only Israel, India and Pakistan have never signed it. Its introductory statement sets out the objective of universal access to atomic energy for civilian purposes but also (as is often forgotten) describes the ideal of a world without nuclear weapons. The signatories desired to “further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control”. When Barack Obama gave his speech last year in Prague about a “world without nuclear weapons”, he might as well have read out the NPT (2).Until that vision becomes reality, the NPT tries to contain nuclear weapons technology, through 10 articles, some flexible, some strict. Articles 8 and 10 say a signatory can propose amendments to the treaty, or withdraw “if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardised the supreme interests of its country”. But Articles 2 and 3, the heart of the text, deal with the undertaking by Non-Nuclear Weapons States (NNWS) not to acquire nuclear weapons, and describe the IAEA inspection regime they will undergo in exchange for civilian nuclear technology, guaranteed by Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) (3).

Therein lies the ambiguity of the Treaty: if NNWS are to be compensated for their sacrifice, NWS must gradually reduce their nuclear arsenals (4), while freely sharing their nuclear technology with NWS and adopting restrictive doctrines on its use, so that the NNWS will not feel threatened. While none of these three things has ever been done to the full satisfaction of NNWS, the NPT has, after many arguments (5), gained legitimacy, and in 1995 it was reaffirmed and extended indefinitely. An additional protocol in 1998 guaranteed complete freedom of movement for IAEA inspectors (6).

Three fundamental problems weaken the treaty: the increasing overlap between civilian and military nuclear technology; self-declaration of compliance (states tell the IAEA which facilities to visit, and may therefore hide some) and the lack of a clear definition of what constitutes evidence of non-compliance; and the fact that NNWS can, in the course of the long process of signature, ratification and application of the treaty (7), manoeuvre to become “threshold states” or even nuclear states.

Despite the treaty’s attempts to safeguard against proliferation, there have been many failures, but it is worth examining whether these can be attributed to the NPT. The worst may be India and Pakistan, which became nuclear powers in 1974 and 1985, and are not signatories to the NPT.

First the US (until 1965), then the Soviet Union, knowingly helped India develop weapons in the context of the cold war and geopolitical balance. This began before the NPT was ratified in 1970. By the time India detonated its first nuclear bomb in 1974, the die was already cast (8).

Several countries, including France, transferred civilian nuclear know-how to Pakistan in the belief it would sign the NPT. When it did not and those countries withdrew their help, China stepped in, until Pakistan achieved nuclear capability in 1985. China did not join the NPT until 1992.

Israel is the other major failure. Israel officially denies possessing nuclear weapons. The US knows everything there is to know about Israel’s supposed non-possession, but still backs it up.

Among the signatories, Taiwan, South Korea and Japan have all become “threshold states”. Technically Taiwan cannot violate the NPT since it is no longer recognised by the UN and so cannot be a signatory in its own right. The US blocked its plans to produce nuclear weapons anyway. South Korea and Japan (late signatories, in 1975 and 1976), both technologically advanced countries, are under the protection of the US nuclear umbrella.

Iran seems more straightforward: as a signatory to the treaty, it would be in violation if it were trying to produce nuclear weapons. No country, not even China or Russia, can claim to have enough influence over Iran to secure guarantees. North Korea is another serious case, since unlike Iran it has withdrawn from the Treaty (in 2003). North Korea’s progress towards nuclear armament has been slow, but has for a long time benefited from the benevolent attitude of China. Nonetheless, China appears to have stopped helping it directly since ratifying the NPT.

Things could be worse

The picture is not rosy. But it can be looked at another way: with the exception of North Korea, no state has withdrawn from the treaty. At present no non-nuclear signatory has the bomb. Since the birth of the NPT, the world has not known nuclear war, or an escalation comparable to the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. The number of denuclearised zones (provided for in Article 7 of the Treaty (9)) has increased: Antarctica in 1959 (before the NPT), South Pacific in 1985, Latin America in 1995. Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Belarus have dismantled their nuclear arsenals, as have South Africa and Sweden. Brazil and Argentina have given up their nuclear research programmes.

The NPT cannot take all the credit, but it did provide the legal and moral backdrop for the negotiations that led to these breakthroughs. The fact the treaty was extended indefinitely in 1995 shows the importance accorded to it. (It could have been extended for just another 25 years.)

How do we evaluate the effectiveness of the NPT? The world is far from the nuclear-free ideal, and non-proliferation remains largely dependent on dissuasion by NWS. But imagine what the world would be like without an NPT. It is easier to list what it has not managed to prevent than to imagine what it has managed to avoid. So while the controversy over Iran’s nuclear programme rages, let us concede to the treaty’s detractors that as a shield to protect us against the threat of proliferation, it is full of holes. But it is a shield, and what can be glimpsed through those holes prevents us from casting it aside.

May 2010



(1) Speech entitled “Atoms for Peace”.
(2) See Selig S Harrison, “article 1877”, Le Monde diplomatique, English edition, April 2010.
(3) Each state is expected to sign the guarantee agreement with the IAEA 180 days after joining the Treaty.
(4) Which they agree to do under article 6.
(5) The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), 118 countries, regularly calls for the NWS to share their civilian nuclear technology more openly, and for Israel to ratify the treaty.
(6) Around 60 of the 189 signatories applied the additional protocol.
(7) France only ratified the NPT in 1992.
(8) Much more serious is the nuclear cooperation agreement signed between Washington and Delhi in 2006, which appears to reward India for circumventing the NPT.
(9) “Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of states to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.”

Le Monde Diplomatique
http://mondediplo.com/2010/05/05npt

Radioactive waste incineration!!!

Radioactive Waste Services
2nd Floor Apex House, London Road, Northfleet, DA11 9PD, UK -
0845 160 9292
0845 124 2020

UK's leading Low Level Waste and Very Low Level Waste incineration specialist, who say that they can incinerate all beta and gamma radionuclides from research; manufacturing; decommissioning; healthcare and many sealed sources:

Is this the solution to the long-term storage of Low Level and Very Low Level radioactive wastes?

The UK new build programme is set to progress as planned

The UK new build programme is set to progress as planned, even though the minister now in charge is from an anti-nuclear party. Will this have any significant affect?


This year’s Nuclear Industry Forum will bring the sector together to discuss the new government and other industry issues.

Speakers include:

Keith Waller, Senior Advisor, Office for Nuclear Development, DECC
Alan Raymant, Chief Operating Officer, Horizon Nuclear Power
Alfio Vidal, Director of New Nuclear, UK, Iberdrola
Chris Bakken, Director for Operations, Safety & Licensing, EDF Energy
Greg Evans, Head of Nuclear, Centrica
Kevin Allars, Director of New Nuclear Build GDA, HSE Nuclear Directorate
Joe McHugh, Head of Radioactive Substances Regulation, Environment Agency
Prof. Steven Cowley, Chief Executive Officer, United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority
Robert Upton, Deputy Chair, Infrastructure Planning Commission
Duncan Burt, Customer Services Manager, Commercial - Transmission, National Grid

At the Nuclear New Build Webinar, which took place last week. A number of pertinent issues were tackled by our expert panel of:

Adrian Worker, Business Unit and Programme Director, AMEC
Steve Hornsby, Partner and Nuclear Industry Leader, IBM Global Business Services
Adrian Bull, Head of Stakeholder Relations, Westinghouse UK

Event information
Date: 15th & 16th June
Venue: One Whitehall Place, London

If you would like to inquire further about this event, or any of the other events in this sector, please do not hesitate to contact:

Telephone: +44 (0) 20 7760 8699
Email: conferences@marketforce.eu.com
Website: http://www.marketforce.eu.com/nuclear

David Saunders  Managing Director, Marketforce

Marketforce, the business media company, mobilises knowledge through the creation of strategic, senior-level conferences across the key industry sectors of Rail, Air Transport, Retail, Utilities, Financial Services, Media & Entertainment, Public Sector and Postal Services. With over 20 years experience in creating forward thinking programmes and interactive environments, Marketforce gives business communities the valued insight they need to drive industry forward. Forthcoming conferences include:

- Smart Metering Update
- Renewables 2010
- The Energy Forum
- Water 2010
- Nuclear New Build Forum

For further information on all events please visit www.marketforce.eu.com/calendar
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