French antinuclear network “Sortir du nucléaire” supports nuclear industry subcontractor and whistleblower Philippe Billard
Philippe Billard, trade unionist, subcontracts for the nuclear industry. He has already been exposed to radiation while working in nuclear power plants and will be heard by the industrial tribunal of Rouen on 1st June. As a spokesperson of the organisation “Santé / Sous-traitance” (“Health and Subcontracting”), he has undergone some retaliation measures after having denounced workers exposure to radiation. As a whistleblower, he’s now treated as persona non grata in nuclear power plants. His employer refuses to re-instate him at his previous job, in contradiction with the Labour Inspectorate’s recommendations.
The French antinuclear network “Sortir du nucléaire”, which gathers about 880 organisations, firmly condemns the nuclear industry as life-threatening and opaque, and considers Philippe Billard’s ousting as a means to put pressure on whistleblower workers. “Sortir du nucléaire” decided to bring its support to the workers who, just like Philippe Billard, suffer from the unbearable working conditions imposed by the nuclear industry and undergo irradiation without even receiving appropriate health care.
To protect its corporate image, EDF chose to give subcontractors the most dangerous tasks. These people working in the shadows have insecure jobs and are mostly temporary and/or nomad workers. Every year, 25,000 to 30,000 of them are made to carry out tasks where they are exposed to radiations. This system allows EDF to cover up a huge health scandal, since these subcontractors, who get 80% of the annual collective dose from the whole French nuclear park, are not taken into account in epidemiological surveys[1] !
EDF is shamelessly multiplying talks on transparency while hushing up workers whistle blowing about the imminent catastrophe. In the ageing French nuclear park, the accident risk is increasing, all the more since maintenance periods are shortened in order to save time and money. However, the official motto remains “Nothing to report”[2]. Short-term profits are more important than common safety and security.
The nuclear industry lets a permanent accident risk hang over populations and sacrifices workers’ health. It is high time to reduce our electricity consumption and to shift towards more sustainable ways of producing energy, which threaten neither the workers nor the people and create far more jobs[3], clean, safe and spread nationwide.
In support with Philippe Billard and all the workers suffering in the nuclear industry, the network “Sortir du nucléaire” calls to join the trade union gathering on June, the 1st at 8: 30 , in front of the tribunal (2, place de la Madeleine, Rouen, Normandy)
Further information (in French) on : http://groupes.sortirdunucleaire.org/blogs/sante-et-sous-traitance/
[1] Annie Thébaud-Mony, « L’industrie nucléaire organise le non-suivi médical des travailleurs les plus exposés », Imagine, May-June 2007
[2] See the movie « R.A.S. Nucléaire : Rien à signaler » by Alain de Halleux, 2009
[3] As an example, more than 300 000 jobs have been created in Germany in renewable energy and energy efficiency since the 2000 Renewable Energy Bill.
Réseau "Sortir du nucléaire" / French Nuclear Phaseout Network
Federation gathering 876 NGOs and organizations
http://www.sortirdunucleaire.org/
Tuesday, 1 June 2010
Saturday, 29 May 2010
JULY 10th NUCLEAR TRAINS TERRORIST DANGER DEMO
Trains carrying highly-radioactive used fuel rods pass though the Olympic site weekly between Stratford and Hackney Wick Stations.
A terrorist attack on these trains in the vicinity of the Olympic site which succeeded in breaking open the container of the rods drawn by the train would cause a terrorist spectacular, as it would result in the release of high-level radiation which would kill thousands of people in and around the Olympic site and for miles downwind, and require immediate mass evacuation of the area.
On July 10th 2010, the Nuclear Train Action Group is organising a major rally and march to demand this danger is ended. These trains must be cancelled or re-routed away from the Olympic site and all highly-populated areas such as East London.
DETAILS: Meet 2pm in Victoria Park, by Cadogan Gate Entrance, Cadogan Terrace E9 (near Hackney Wick station) for a rally chaired by CND Chair Kate Hudson and with eminent speakers.
2.45pm. 2-mile march from Victoria Park, passing Hackney Wick station at 3pm and then skirting the southern boundary of the Olympic site along the canal towpath and the Greenway to Stratford station. (Transport from Victoria Park to Stratford for those who aren’t able or don’t want to walk!)
4pm: Symbolic die-in in front of the Olympic Clock outside Stratford Station to represent the consequences of a terrorist attack on a nuclear train, followed by leafletting in Stratford Market and Shopping Centre to alert the public to this danger.
This demonstration is supported by the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND)
(*While the North London Line is closed for up-grading, nuclear trains are being diverted from Stratford up through South Tottenham. However they are still passing alongside the Olympic site, so the terrorist danger remains.)
Nuclear Trains Action Group, Mordechai Vanunu House, 162 Holloway Road, London N7 8DQ; tel 020-7607 2302; fax c/o 020-7700 2357
DEMONSTRATE AGAINST OLYMPIC TERRORIST DANGER!
A terrorist attack on these trains in the vicinity of the Olympic site which succeeded in breaking open the container of the rods drawn by the train would cause a terrorist spectacular, as it would result in the release of high-level radiation which would kill thousands of people in and around the Olympic site and for miles downwind, and require immediate mass evacuation of the area.
On July 10th 2010, the Nuclear Train Action Group is organising a major rally and march to demand this danger is ended. These trains must be cancelled or re-routed away from the Olympic site and all highly-populated areas such as East London.
DETAILS: Meet 2pm in Victoria Park, by Cadogan Gate Entrance, Cadogan Terrace E9 (near Hackney Wick station) for a rally chaired by CND Chair Kate Hudson and with eminent speakers.
2.45pm. 2-mile march from Victoria Park, passing Hackney Wick station at 3pm and then skirting the southern boundary of the Olympic site along the canal towpath and the Greenway to Stratford station. (Transport from Victoria Park to Stratford for those who aren’t able or don’t want to walk!)
4pm: Symbolic die-in in front of the Olympic Clock outside Stratford Station to represent the consequences of a terrorist attack on a nuclear train, followed by leafletting in Stratford Market and Shopping Centre to alert the public to this danger.
This demonstration is supported by the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND)
(*While the North London Line is closed for up-grading, nuclear trains are being diverted from Stratford up through South Tottenham. However they are still passing alongside the Olympic site, so the terrorist danger remains.)
Nuclear Trains Action Group, Mordechai Vanunu House, 162 Holloway Road, London N7 8DQ; tel 020-7607 2302; fax c/o 020-7700 2357
DEMONSTRATE AGAINST OLYMPIC TERRORIST DANGER!
Thursday, 27 May 2010
The bomb wasn’t banned by Olivier Zajec
The UN Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty hasn’t prevented India, Pakistan, Israel – and potentially Iran and North Korea – from acquiring nuclear capability. But imagine a world where it hadn’t been adopted by so many other states
The idea of a Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was first proposed in the 1950s when the US, Russia and Britain had nuclear weapons, and France and China were developing them. (France exploded its first nuclear bomb in 1960, China in 1964.) Since the US was in the lead, it had the greatest interest in limiting the arms race, so from the beginning of the 1950s it pushed for nuclear containment. President Dwight Eisenhower proposed to the UN General Assembly on 8 December 1953 that an agency be set up to control the use of nuclear material (1).
For the sake of world peace and maintaining their status, the other nuclear powers, and those about to become so, assessed the situation: a mechanism that recognised their progress while halting the spread of a powerful weapon would be in their interest. The project had no shortage of allies of convenience.
Eisenhower’s idea gained ground, although for a long time it was hostage to the power struggle between the US and Russia. In October 1956, after many stormy debates, the UN created the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA. Article 3.5 of its charter defines its mission as “to establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities, and information made available by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose”. In return, Article 3.1 explains, the IAEA offers “to encourage and assist research on, and development and practical application of, atomic energy for peaceful uses throughout the world.”
Stick and carrot
The order of priorities is therefore the wrong way round in the text: in view of the balance of power at that time, paragraph 1 of Article 3 should follow on from paragraph 5, not the other way around. The IAEA’s primary role is to safeguard, and only then to assist. Article 3.5 also had an important implication: the agency could not be a guardian without legal power; if it was not to remain a weak, marginal, advisory body, it had to have powers of enforcement.
That power came with the NPT, signed on 1 July 1968 by 43 states, including North Korea. Ratified on 5 March 1970, for a period of 25 years, it has been one of the world’s most successful and universal treaties: only Israel, India and Pakistan have never signed it. Its introductory statement sets out the objective of universal access to atomic energy for civilian purposes but also (as is often forgotten) describes the ideal of a world without nuclear weapons. The signatories desired to “further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control”. When Barack Obama gave his speech last year in Prague about a “world without nuclear weapons”, he might as well have read out the NPT (2).Until that vision becomes reality, the NPT tries to contain nuclear weapons technology, through 10 articles, some flexible, some strict. Articles 8 and 10 say a signatory can propose amendments to the treaty, or withdraw “if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardised the supreme interests of its country”. But Articles 2 and 3, the heart of the text, deal with the undertaking by Non-Nuclear Weapons States (NNWS) not to acquire nuclear weapons, and describe the IAEA inspection regime they will undergo in exchange for civilian nuclear technology, guaranteed by Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) (3).
Therein lies the ambiguity of the Treaty: if NNWS are to be compensated for their sacrifice, NWS must gradually reduce their nuclear arsenals (4), while freely sharing their nuclear technology with NWS and adopting restrictive doctrines on its use, so that the NNWS will not feel threatened. While none of these three things has ever been done to the full satisfaction of NNWS, the NPT has, after many arguments (5), gained legitimacy, and in 1995 it was reaffirmed and extended indefinitely. An additional protocol in 1998 guaranteed complete freedom of movement for IAEA inspectors (6).
Three fundamental problems weaken the treaty: the increasing overlap between civilian and military nuclear technology; self-declaration of compliance (states tell the IAEA which facilities to visit, and may therefore hide some) and the lack of a clear definition of what constitutes evidence of non-compliance; and the fact that NNWS can, in the course of the long process of signature, ratification and application of the treaty (7), manoeuvre to become “threshold states” or even nuclear states.
Despite the treaty’s attempts to safeguard against proliferation, there have been many failures, but it is worth examining whether these can be attributed to the NPT. The worst may be India and Pakistan, which became nuclear powers in 1974 and 1985, and are not signatories to the NPT.
First the US (until 1965), then the Soviet Union, knowingly helped India develop weapons in the context of the cold war and geopolitical balance. This began before the NPT was ratified in 1970. By the time India detonated its first nuclear bomb in 1974, the die was already cast (8).
Several countries, including France, transferred civilian nuclear know-how to Pakistan in the belief it would sign the NPT. When it did not and those countries withdrew their help, China stepped in, until Pakistan achieved nuclear capability in 1985. China did not join the NPT until 1992.
Israel is the other major failure. Israel officially denies possessing nuclear weapons. The US knows everything there is to know about Israel’s supposed non-possession, but still backs it up.
Among the signatories, Taiwan, South Korea and Japan have all become “threshold states”. Technically Taiwan cannot violate the NPT since it is no longer recognised by the UN and so cannot be a signatory in its own right. The US blocked its plans to produce nuclear weapons anyway. South Korea and Japan (late signatories, in 1975 and 1976), both technologically advanced countries, are under the protection of the US nuclear umbrella.
Iran seems more straightforward: as a signatory to the treaty, it would be in violation if it were trying to produce nuclear weapons. No country, not even China or Russia, can claim to have enough influence over Iran to secure guarantees. North Korea is another serious case, since unlike Iran it has withdrawn from the Treaty (in 2003). North Korea’s progress towards nuclear armament has been slow, but has for a long time benefited from the benevolent attitude of China. Nonetheless, China appears to have stopped helping it directly since ratifying the NPT.
Things could be worse
The picture is not rosy. But it can be looked at another way: with the exception of North Korea, no state has withdrawn from the treaty. At present no non-nuclear signatory has the bomb. Since the birth of the NPT, the world has not known nuclear war, or an escalation comparable to the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. The number of denuclearised zones (provided for in Article 7 of the Treaty (9)) has increased: Antarctica in 1959 (before the NPT), South Pacific in 1985, Latin America in 1995. Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Belarus have dismantled their nuclear arsenals, as have South Africa and Sweden. Brazil and Argentina have given up their nuclear research programmes.
The NPT cannot take all the credit, but it did provide the legal and moral backdrop for the negotiations that led to these breakthroughs. The fact the treaty was extended indefinitely in 1995 shows the importance accorded to it. (It could have been extended for just another 25 years.)
How do we evaluate the effectiveness of the NPT? The world is far from the nuclear-free ideal, and non-proliferation remains largely dependent on dissuasion by NWS. But imagine what the world would be like without an NPT. It is easier to list what it has not managed to prevent than to imagine what it has managed to avoid. So while the controversy over Iran’s nuclear programme rages, let us concede to the treaty’s detractors that as a shield to protect us against the threat of proliferation, it is full of holes. But it is a shield, and what can be glimpsed through those holes prevents us from casting it aside.
May 2010
(1) Speech entitled “Atoms for Peace”.
(2) See Selig S Harrison, “article 1877”, Le Monde diplomatique, English edition, April 2010.
(3) Each state is expected to sign the guarantee agreement with the IAEA 180 days after joining the Treaty.
(4) Which they agree to do under article 6.
(5) The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), 118 countries, regularly calls for the NWS to share their civilian nuclear technology more openly, and for Israel to ratify the treaty.
(6) Around 60 of the 189 signatories applied the additional protocol.
(7) France only ratified the NPT in 1992.
(8) Much more serious is the nuclear cooperation agreement signed between Washington and Delhi in 2006, which appears to reward India for circumventing the NPT.
(9) “Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of states to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.”
Le Monde Diplomatique
http://mondediplo.com/2010/05/05npt
The idea of a Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was first proposed in the 1950s when the US, Russia and Britain had nuclear weapons, and France and China were developing them. (France exploded its first nuclear bomb in 1960, China in 1964.) Since the US was in the lead, it had the greatest interest in limiting the arms race, so from the beginning of the 1950s it pushed for nuclear containment. President Dwight Eisenhower proposed to the UN General Assembly on 8 December 1953 that an agency be set up to control the use of nuclear material (1).
For the sake of world peace and maintaining their status, the other nuclear powers, and those about to become so, assessed the situation: a mechanism that recognised their progress while halting the spread of a powerful weapon would be in their interest. The project had no shortage of allies of convenience.
Eisenhower’s idea gained ground, although for a long time it was hostage to the power struggle between the US and Russia. In October 1956, after many stormy debates, the UN created the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA. Article 3.5 of its charter defines its mission as “to establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities, and information made available by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose”. In return, Article 3.1 explains, the IAEA offers “to encourage and assist research on, and development and practical application of, atomic energy for peaceful uses throughout the world.”
Stick and carrot
The order of priorities is therefore the wrong way round in the text: in view of the balance of power at that time, paragraph 1 of Article 3 should follow on from paragraph 5, not the other way around. The IAEA’s primary role is to safeguard, and only then to assist. Article 3.5 also had an important implication: the agency could not be a guardian without legal power; if it was not to remain a weak, marginal, advisory body, it had to have powers of enforcement.
That power came with the NPT, signed on 1 July 1968 by 43 states, including North Korea. Ratified on 5 March 1970, for a period of 25 years, it has been one of the world’s most successful and universal treaties: only Israel, India and Pakistan have never signed it. Its introductory statement sets out the objective of universal access to atomic energy for civilian purposes but also (as is often forgotten) describes the ideal of a world without nuclear weapons. The signatories desired to “further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control”. When Barack Obama gave his speech last year in Prague about a “world without nuclear weapons”, he might as well have read out the NPT (2).Until that vision becomes reality, the NPT tries to contain nuclear weapons technology, through 10 articles, some flexible, some strict. Articles 8 and 10 say a signatory can propose amendments to the treaty, or withdraw “if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardised the supreme interests of its country”. But Articles 2 and 3, the heart of the text, deal with the undertaking by Non-Nuclear Weapons States (NNWS) not to acquire nuclear weapons, and describe the IAEA inspection regime they will undergo in exchange for civilian nuclear technology, guaranteed by Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) (3).
Therein lies the ambiguity of the Treaty: if NNWS are to be compensated for their sacrifice, NWS must gradually reduce their nuclear arsenals (4), while freely sharing their nuclear technology with NWS and adopting restrictive doctrines on its use, so that the NNWS will not feel threatened. While none of these three things has ever been done to the full satisfaction of NNWS, the NPT has, after many arguments (5), gained legitimacy, and in 1995 it was reaffirmed and extended indefinitely. An additional protocol in 1998 guaranteed complete freedom of movement for IAEA inspectors (6).
Three fundamental problems weaken the treaty: the increasing overlap between civilian and military nuclear technology; self-declaration of compliance (states tell the IAEA which facilities to visit, and may therefore hide some) and the lack of a clear definition of what constitutes evidence of non-compliance; and the fact that NNWS can, in the course of the long process of signature, ratification and application of the treaty (7), manoeuvre to become “threshold states” or even nuclear states.
Despite the treaty’s attempts to safeguard against proliferation, there have been many failures, but it is worth examining whether these can be attributed to the NPT. The worst may be India and Pakistan, which became nuclear powers in 1974 and 1985, and are not signatories to the NPT.
First the US (until 1965), then the Soviet Union, knowingly helped India develop weapons in the context of the cold war and geopolitical balance. This began before the NPT was ratified in 1970. By the time India detonated its first nuclear bomb in 1974, the die was already cast (8).
Several countries, including France, transferred civilian nuclear know-how to Pakistan in the belief it would sign the NPT. When it did not and those countries withdrew their help, China stepped in, until Pakistan achieved nuclear capability in 1985. China did not join the NPT until 1992.
Israel is the other major failure. Israel officially denies possessing nuclear weapons. The US knows everything there is to know about Israel’s supposed non-possession, but still backs it up.
Among the signatories, Taiwan, South Korea and Japan have all become “threshold states”. Technically Taiwan cannot violate the NPT since it is no longer recognised by the UN and so cannot be a signatory in its own right. The US blocked its plans to produce nuclear weapons anyway. South Korea and Japan (late signatories, in 1975 and 1976), both technologically advanced countries, are under the protection of the US nuclear umbrella.
Iran seems more straightforward: as a signatory to the treaty, it would be in violation if it were trying to produce nuclear weapons. No country, not even China or Russia, can claim to have enough influence over Iran to secure guarantees. North Korea is another serious case, since unlike Iran it has withdrawn from the Treaty (in 2003). North Korea’s progress towards nuclear armament has been slow, but has for a long time benefited from the benevolent attitude of China. Nonetheless, China appears to have stopped helping it directly since ratifying the NPT.
Things could be worse
The picture is not rosy. But it can be looked at another way: with the exception of North Korea, no state has withdrawn from the treaty. At present no non-nuclear signatory has the bomb. Since the birth of the NPT, the world has not known nuclear war, or an escalation comparable to the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. The number of denuclearised zones (provided for in Article 7 of the Treaty (9)) has increased: Antarctica in 1959 (before the NPT), South Pacific in 1985, Latin America in 1995. Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Belarus have dismantled their nuclear arsenals, as have South Africa and Sweden. Brazil and Argentina have given up their nuclear research programmes.
The NPT cannot take all the credit, but it did provide the legal and moral backdrop for the negotiations that led to these breakthroughs. The fact the treaty was extended indefinitely in 1995 shows the importance accorded to it. (It could have been extended for just another 25 years.)
How do we evaluate the effectiveness of the NPT? The world is far from the nuclear-free ideal, and non-proliferation remains largely dependent on dissuasion by NWS. But imagine what the world would be like without an NPT. It is easier to list what it has not managed to prevent than to imagine what it has managed to avoid. So while the controversy over Iran’s nuclear programme rages, let us concede to the treaty’s detractors that as a shield to protect us against the threat of proliferation, it is full of holes. But it is a shield, and what can be glimpsed through those holes prevents us from casting it aside.
May 2010
(1) Speech entitled “Atoms for Peace”.
(2) See Selig S Harrison, “article 1877”, Le Monde diplomatique, English edition, April 2010.
(3) Each state is expected to sign the guarantee agreement with the IAEA 180 days after joining the Treaty.
(4) Which they agree to do under article 6.
(5) The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), 118 countries, regularly calls for the NWS to share their civilian nuclear technology more openly, and for Israel to ratify the treaty.
(6) Around 60 of the 189 signatories applied the additional protocol.
(7) France only ratified the NPT in 1992.
(8) Much more serious is the nuclear cooperation agreement signed between Washington and Delhi in 2006, which appears to reward India for circumventing the NPT.
(9) “Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of states to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.”
Le Monde Diplomatique
http://mondediplo.com/2010/05/05npt
Thursday, 20 May 2010
Radioactive waste incineration!!!
Radioactive Waste Services
2nd Floor Apex House, London Road, Northfleet, DA11 9PD, UK -
0845 160 9292
0845 124 2020
UK's leading Low Level Waste and Very Low Level Waste incineration specialist, who say that they can incinerate all beta and gamma radionuclides from research; manufacturing; decommissioning; healthcare and many sealed sources:
Is this the solution to the long-term storage of Low Level and Very Low Level radioactive wastes?
2nd Floor Apex House, London Road, Northfleet, DA11 9PD, UK -
0845 160 9292
0845 124 2020
UK's leading Low Level Waste and Very Low Level Waste incineration specialist, who say that they can incinerate all beta and gamma radionuclides from research; manufacturing; decommissioning; healthcare and many sealed sources:
Is this the solution to the long-term storage of Low Level and Very Low Level radioactive wastes?
The UK new build programme is set to progress as planned
The UK new build programme is set to progress as planned, even though the minister now in charge is from an anti-nuclear party. Will this have any significant affect?
This year’s Nuclear Industry Forum will bring the sector together to discuss the new government and other industry issues.
Speakers include:
Keith Waller, Senior Advisor, Office for Nuclear Development, DECC
Alan Raymant, Chief Operating Officer, Horizon Nuclear Power
Alfio Vidal, Director of New Nuclear, UK, Iberdrola
Chris Bakken, Director for Operations, Safety & Licensing, EDF Energy
Greg Evans, Head of Nuclear, Centrica
Kevin Allars, Director of New Nuclear Build GDA, HSE Nuclear Directorate
Joe McHugh, Head of Radioactive Substances Regulation, Environment Agency
Prof. Steven Cowley, Chief Executive Officer, United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority
Robert Upton, Deputy Chair, Infrastructure Planning Commission
Duncan Burt, Customer Services Manager, Commercial - Transmission, National Grid
At the Nuclear New Build Webinar, which took place last week. A number of pertinent issues were tackled by our expert panel of:
Adrian Worker, Business Unit and Programme Director, AMEC
Steve Hornsby, Partner and Nuclear Industry Leader, IBM Global Business Services
Adrian Bull, Head of Stakeholder Relations, Westinghouse UK
Event information
Date: 15th & 16th June
Venue: One Whitehall Place, London
If you would like to inquire further about this event, or any of the other events in this sector, please do not hesitate to contact:
Telephone: +44 (0) 20 7760 8699
Email: conferences@marketforce.eu.com
Website: http://www.marketforce.eu.com/nuclear
David Saunders Managing Director, Marketforce
Marketforce, the business media company, mobilises knowledge through the creation of strategic, senior-level conferences across the key industry sectors of Rail, Air Transport, Retail, Utilities, Financial Services, Media & Entertainment, Public Sector and Postal Services. With over 20 years experience in creating forward thinking programmes and interactive environments, Marketforce gives business communities the valued insight they need to drive industry forward. Forthcoming conferences include:
- Smart Metering Update
- Renewables 2010
- The Energy Forum
- Water 2010
- Nuclear New Build Forum
For further information on all events please visit www.marketforce.eu.com/calendar
Follow on Twitter @ https://twitter.com/Marketforce09
Marketforce Business Media Ltd is registered in England, No: 2174487. Registered office: 3 Sutton Lane, London, EC1M 5PU
This year’s Nuclear Industry Forum will bring the sector together to discuss the new government and other industry issues.
Speakers include:
Keith Waller, Senior Advisor, Office for Nuclear Development, DECC
Alan Raymant, Chief Operating Officer, Horizon Nuclear Power
Alfio Vidal, Director of New Nuclear, UK, Iberdrola
Chris Bakken, Director for Operations, Safety & Licensing, EDF Energy
Greg Evans, Head of Nuclear, Centrica
Kevin Allars, Director of New Nuclear Build GDA, HSE Nuclear Directorate
Joe McHugh, Head of Radioactive Substances Regulation, Environment Agency
Prof. Steven Cowley, Chief Executive Officer, United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority
Robert Upton, Deputy Chair, Infrastructure Planning Commission
Duncan Burt, Customer Services Manager, Commercial - Transmission, National Grid
At the Nuclear New Build Webinar, which took place last week. A number of pertinent issues were tackled by our expert panel of:
Adrian Worker, Business Unit and Programme Director, AMEC
Steve Hornsby, Partner and Nuclear Industry Leader, IBM Global Business Services
Adrian Bull, Head of Stakeholder Relations, Westinghouse UK
Event information
Date: 15th & 16th June
Venue: One Whitehall Place, London
If you would like to inquire further about this event, or any of the other events in this sector, please do not hesitate to contact:
Telephone: +44 (0) 20 7760 8699
Email: conferences@marketforce.eu.com
Website: http://www.marketforce.eu.com/nuclear
David Saunders Managing Director, Marketforce
Marketforce, the business media company, mobilises knowledge through the creation of strategic, senior-level conferences across the key industry sectors of Rail, Air Transport, Retail, Utilities, Financial Services, Media & Entertainment, Public Sector and Postal Services. With over 20 years experience in creating forward thinking programmes and interactive environments, Marketforce gives business communities the valued insight they need to drive industry forward. Forthcoming conferences include:
- Smart Metering Update
- Renewables 2010
- The Energy Forum
- Water 2010
- Nuclear New Build Forum
For further information on all events please visit www.marketforce.eu.com/calendar
Follow on Twitter @ https://twitter.com/Marketforce09
Marketforce Business Media Ltd is registered in England, No: 2174487. Registered office: 3 Sutton Lane, London, EC1M 5PU
Wednesday, 19 May 2010
Le triangolazioni delle ecomafie tra rifiuti e armi (Radioactive waste, illegal arms and eco-mafia)
30 maggio 2006 - Pietro Orsatti
Di seguito alcuni brani degli atti ufficiali della Commissione Bicamerale d'inchiesta sulle Ecomafie. Si parla di traffici internazionali di rifiuti illeciti, di tringolazioni con il traffico illegali di armi, di intrecci fra affari (e a volte politica) e criminalità organizzata.
Extracts from the Inquest into the Ecomafia. International traffic in toxic and radioactive waste, illegal arms, finance, politics and organised crime.
"La Commissione monocamerale d'inchiesta sul ciclo dei rifiuti istituita nella precedente legislatura si era occupata del fenomeno dei traffici internazionali di rifiuti pericolosi, anche radioattivi.
"The last inquest into the cycle of waste discovered an international traffic in toxic and radioactive waste.
Evidenti segnali di allarme si coglievano in alcune vicende giudiziarie, da cui peraltro era emersa una chiara sovrapposizione tra queste attività illegali ed il traffico di armi.
And what was even more alarming was the connection between this toxic and radioactive waste traffic and illegal arms traffic.
In particolare, l'inchiesta condotta dalla procura di Lecce aveva individuato il cosiddetto "progetto Urano", finalizzato all'illecito smaltimento in alcune aree del Sahara di rifiuti industriali tossico-nocivi e radioattivi provenienti da Paesi europei.
During the inquest the "Urano Project" came to light. This was concerned with the illegal dumping of toxic and radioactive waste from various European countries in the Sahara.
Numerosi elementi indicavano il coinvolgimento nel suddetto traffico di soggetti istituzionali di governi europei ed extraeuropei,
It soon became clear that Institutions and governments from Europe and beyond were involved in this illegal traffic.
nonché « di esponenti della criminalità organizzata e di personaggi spregiudicati,
as well as members of organised crime
tra cui il noto Giorgio Comerio, faccendiere italiano al centro di una serie di vicende legate alla Somalia
including the infamous Giorgio Comerio, Italian businessman who was involved in various business deals in Somalia
ed all'illecita gestione degli aiuti del Fai (oggi direzione generale per la cooperazione e lo sviluppo).
as well as being involved in the illegal management of aid to FAI (cooperation and development organisation)
Il progetto (già citato dalla precedente Commissione dinchiesta) prevedeva il lancio dalle navi di penetratori (cilindri metallici a forma di siluro), caricati con scorie radioattive vetrificate o cementate e racchiuse in contenitori di acciaio inossidabile che si depositavano sino a 50-80 metri al di sotto del fondale marino;
Giorgio Comerio was involved in a project to dispose of radioactive waste. The waste was to be mixed with cement or vitrified, then enclosed in steel containers, then sunk 50-80 metres deep on the sea bed.
in alternativa, si affondava la nave con l'intero carico pericoloso, simulando un affondamento accidentale e lucrando,
But instead of this entire ships were sunk "accidentally", a much cheaper way of disposing of the radioactive waste.
così, anche il premio assicurativo, il che è stato confermato dalle indagini aventi ad oggetto alcuni naufragi assai sospetti di navi assicurate dalla Lloyds di Londra,
So that he was able to claim the insurance on the ships, the inquest discovered, since they were able to trace various suspicious looking shipwrecks logged by Lloyds of London.
verificatisi nel Tirreno e nello Ionio, di cui diremo oltre.
These ships were sunk in the Tirreno and Ionian sea and beyond.
Il progetto contemplava anche la vendita di alcuni ordigni bellici (le telemine) ai Paesi del Medio oriente,
Giorgio Comerio also sold arms to various Middle East countries
da nascondere in profondita` marine mediante navi Ro-Ro - le stesse navi utilizzate per affondare le scorie radioattive - e col sistema appena descritto"(Relazione finale XIII legislatura).
These arms were hidden in the ships that he used to transport the radioactive waste, which went first to the middle east to offload the arms, then back to the coast of Italy to be sunk.
Questo tipo di traffici è stato per decenni strettamente connesso all'area ligure,
For decades this kind of arms and radioactive waste traffic was connected with the Ligurian coastline.
come riportano gli atti di una delle missioni conoscitive della commissione alla fine degli anni '90.
An inquest held towards the end of the 90s reported details of this.
Un caso emblematico il caso della discarica di Pitelli a La Spezia.
An emblematic case occurred at the Pitelli dump at La Spezia.
"L'attività illecita consisteva nella sistematica falsificazione di documenti di accompagnamento (tesi a consentire l'ingresso in discarica di materiali non autorizzati)
"the case involved the systematic falsification of documents (the documents that permit vehicles to bring non-authorised materials into the dump.)
e nella falsificazione di dichiarazioni di avvenuto smaltimento di rifiuti;
Documents declaring that toxic waste had been correctly disposed of were also falsified.
nella commissione di truffe a danno di enti pubblici e privati, ai quali venivano fatturati costi di smalti mento non affrontati;
Both public and private organisations ended up having to pay for the disposal of toxic and radioactive waste that had not been correctly disposed of.
infine, nel sistematico illecito smaltimento di rifiuti tossico-nocivi provenienti dal territorio nazionale e dall'estero.
Toxic and radioactive waste from Italy and abroad had been systematically dumped completely illegally.
Tali condotte illecite, cominciate nel 1975 (quando cioè nasce la discarica), erano agevolate dalla notevole capacità penetrativa dei soggetti coinvolti, tra cui il Duvia, negli enti pubblici di varia natura
This illegal dumping, which began in 1975 (when the dump was opened) was facilitated by various people in public administrative positions, including the Duvia.
preposti al controllo e proseguivano anche durante il periodo in cui la discarica di Pitelli era sottoposta a sequestro giudiziario. (...)
Even when there was a legal charge on the Pitelli dump, illegal dumping of toxic materials continued.
A prescindere da ogni valutazione sui profili squisitamente penali, sono innegabili alla luce dei numerosi elementi acquisiti dalla Commissione (...) le illegalità commesse dai vari organi amministrativi competenti al controllo (...)".
Clearly the admistration responsible for control of these toxic materials was corrupt.
Ma per la Liguria non si parla solo del caso Pitelli,
In Liguria people are not just talking about the Pitelli case.
anzi: "le indagini che coinvolgono la città di La Spezia, in merito ai casi delle cosiddette "navi a perdere" e delle "navi dei veleni",
The inquest was also concerned with the toxic shipwrecks.
che proprio in quel porto sarebbero state caricate di rifiuti prima di essere le une affondate deliberatamente nel Mediterraneo
Many of the ships that ended up as shipwrecks in the Mediterranean set out from the Ligurian port of La Spezia
e le altre inviate nei Paesi in via di sviluppo per smaltimenti illeciti di rifiuti pericolosi.
Ships from La Spezia also took their toxic and radioactive waste to the third world.
Per quanto riguarda tali gravi fatti, anzi, si deve registrare il nuovo allarme che l'autorità giudiziaria ha ritenuto di esplicitare nel corso del recente convegno sul "Ciclo dei rifiuti in Italia" (...) a proposito della ripresa delle spedizioni di carichi illeciti verso l'Africa e l'America latina.
The inquest registered alarm when they discovered that some of this toxic and radioactive waste had gone to Africa and Latin America.
Si tratta di denunce di particolare gravità, sulle quali questa Commissione vigilerà con la massima attenzione".
The inquest declared that it would be watching the situation like a hawk.
Le segnalazioni di nuove spedizioni illecite di cui parlava la Commissione di Inchiesta, però, non avvenivano più da Spezia ma soprattutto da Genova
Now the inquest has discovered that new illegal traffic has been setting out from Genova, rather than La Spezia.
dopo che un noto armatore aveva trasferito il suo terminal dalla prima alla seconda città, armatore già conosciuto e coinvolto con sue navi direttamente nel caso delle navi dei veleni alla fine degli anni '80.
The inquest traced an arms dealer, known to them for his traffic in toxic waste, who transferred his activities from La Spezia to Genova
I traffici internazionali, sia di rifiuti che di armi o di triangolazioni fra scorie e forniture militari come ormai è dimostrato sia avvenuto a metà degli anni '90 in particolare in Somalia, sono proseguiti e proseguono tuttora,
International traffic in toxic and radioactive waste and illegal arms have continued ever since they were discovered in Somalia, and continue today.
garantiti anche da norme internazionali assolutamente incredibili come ad esempio quelle del "doppio registro", in cui scafo e contenuto possono battere due bandiere diverse a seconda delle convenienze degli armatori in relazione a sicurezza e carico.
This illicit traffic is facilitated by incredible international laws. For example a ship can sail under two different flags. The captain of the ship can choose which flag to fly according to which one matches the cargo he is carrying.
E allo stesso tempo le autorità marittime di controllo hanno sempre meno possibilità di incidere realmente nel fermare i traffici illegali,
Maritime authorities have less and less opportunities to stop this illegal traffic
sia per mancanza di personale che per direttive politiche.
They lack personnel and they lack political backing.
Ad esempio le Capitanerie di porto sono molto più impegnate a reprimere il fenomeno dell'immigrazione clandestina che quello dei traffici illeciti di scorie industriali.
The port authorities have to use a large proportion of their resources to stop illegal immigrants. So they do not have enough left to stop this illegal traffic in arms and toxic and radioactive waste.
Un esempio per tutti, la vicenda del mercantile albanese Korabi a metà degli anni '90. La nave parte da Spalato con un carico di materiali (rottami) ferrosi. Nello Ionio la Capitaneria di Reggio Calabria effettua un'ispezione.
The Albanian ship Korabi in the middle of the 90s set out from Spalata with a cargo of scrap iron. In the Ionian sea the port authorities of Reggio Calabria decided to carry out an inspection.
Non si sa per quale ragione gli ispettori utilizzano anche un contatore geiger – probabilmente grazie a qualche "soffiata" – e riscontrano radioattività nel carico.
Then, maybe because someone tipped them off, they decided to use a geiger counter. They discovered that the cargo was radioactive.
Non succede nulla, perché non si capisce, e la nave viene lasciata proseguire per Palermo dove è diretta.
Nothing was done to stop the boat, which continued on its journey to Palermo.
L'unica iniziativa dell'autorità calabrese è quella di informare dell'anomalia la Capitaneria siciliana che, dopo aver effettuato anche lei un'ispezione con tanto di contatore geiger, non autorizza la nave ad entrare in porto.
The Calabrian port authority informed the Sicilian port authority who went out with a geiger counter to inspect the ship. They too found that the cargo was radioactive, so they stopped the ship from entering the port.
Tre giorni dopo, al largo delle coste calabresi, la nave viene ispezionata dalla Capitaneria di Reggio e, sorpresa, non c'è più traccia di radioattività a bordo.
Three days later, off the coast of Calabria, the Reggio port authority inspected the ship again. This time, amazingly, they did not find any trace of radioactivity.
Quindi, o nelle due precedenti ispezioni le autorità italiane si sono sbagliate oppure il carico fra Palermo alla Calabria (e la nave ricordo avrebbe impiegato tre giorni per fare un tragitto di poche ore) è finito tranquillamente in mare.
Three days had passed between the ship setting out from Palermo and it reaching Reggio. This was a journey that should have taken a few hours. What had happened to the cargo during those three days?
Quello della Korabi non è un caso isolato.
And this is not an isolated case.
Si ipotizza (sempre la commissione bicamerale) che davanti a Capo Spartivento (la zona presenta una fossa marina fra le più profonde del Mediterraneo) fra gli anni '80 e '90 sarebbero state affondate almeno 40 navi cariche di scorie.
The inquest thinks that off the coast of Capo Spartivento (where there is a deep marine ditch) between the 80s and the 90s at least 40 ships full of toxic and radioactive waste were sunk.
Più che nave carrette, contenitori di scorie per lo smaltimento illecito. Una di queste, la Rigel, è stata anche individuata grazie a un'indagine promossa dalla stessa Commissione e dalla magistratura competente. La ricerca è stata possibile grazie alle coordinate esatte (riportate accanto alla dicitura "la nave è affondata") ritrovate in un'agenda del capitano di un'altra nave naufragata e arenata sempre coste calabre: la Rosso, già Jolly Rosso appartenente all'armatore Fratelli Messina è molto conosciuta negli anni '80 come una delle "navi dei veleni" insieme alla Zanoobia e alla Karin-B implicate in un traffico internazionali di rifiuti fra Africa, Libano e Genova.
Si è parlato per almeno due decenni del triangolo Genova, La Spezia e Livorno per il traffico illecito di scorie e armi. Con infiltrazioni della mafia – ricordo che secondo la stessa magistratura uno dei settori di maggior guadagno del latitante Provenzano fossero i rifiuti e il loro smaltimento illecito -, implicazioni a tutti i livelli di istituzioni e imprese. Ricordo ad esempio che a Spezia si è arrivati al coinvolgimento addirittura di alti ufficiali della Marina Militare (un ammiraglio) che a quanto pare avrebbe dato in uso come area di stoccaggio provvisorio dei rifiuti in transito strutture dell'Arsenale spezzino.
Da questo quadro non stupisce la definizione fatta alla fine degli anni '90 dai comitati locali e dalle associazioni ambientaliste (Wwf e Legambiente in prima fila) della Liguria come piattaforma di interscambio per i traffici illeciti internazionali.
E oggi? La situazione, anche se sempre meno adeguatamente monitorata, prosegue a destare preoccupazione. Come preoccupa l'opposizione inusuale da parte di alcuni settori militari al dragaggio del canale d'ingresso al porto di La Spezia, dragaggio che, sia per le attività commerciale che quelle militari nell'area dell'arsenale viene definito come indispensabile.
And today? The situation is not being properly monitored, but there is serious cause for concern. They have been dragging the canal at the entrance to the port of La Spezia.
Pietro Orsatti
Di seguito alcuni brani degli atti ufficiali della Commissione Bicamerale d'inchiesta sulle Ecomafie. Si parla di traffici internazionali di rifiuti illeciti, di tringolazioni con il traffico illegali di armi, di intrecci fra affari (e a volte politica) e criminalità organizzata.
Extracts from the Inquest into the Ecomafia. International traffic in toxic and radioactive waste, illegal arms, finance, politics and organised crime.
"La Commissione monocamerale d'inchiesta sul ciclo dei rifiuti istituita nella precedente legislatura si era occupata del fenomeno dei traffici internazionali di rifiuti pericolosi, anche radioattivi.
"The last inquest into the cycle of waste discovered an international traffic in toxic and radioactive waste.
Evidenti segnali di allarme si coglievano in alcune vicende giudiziarie, da cui peraltro era emersa una chiara sovrapposizione tra queste attività illegali ed il traffico di armi.
And what was even more alarming was the connection between this toxic and radioactive waste traffic and illegal arms traffic.
In particolare, l'inchiesta condotta dalla procura di Lecce aveva individuato il cosiddetto "progetto Urano", finalizzato all'illecito smaltimento in alcune aree del Sahara di rifiuti industriali tossico-nocivi e radioattivi provenienti da Paesi europei.
During the inquest the "Urano Project" came to light. This was concerned with the illegal dumping of toxic and radioactive waste from various European countries in the Sahara.
Numerosi elementi indicavano il coinvolgimento nel suddetto traffico di soggetti istituzionali di governi europei ed extraeuropei,
It soon became clear that Institutions and governments from Europe and beyond were involved in this illegal traffic.
nonché « di esponenti della criminalità organizzata e di personaggi spregiudicati,
as well as members of organised crime
tra cui il noto Giorgio Comerio, faccendiere italiano al centro di una serie di vicende legate alla Somalia
including the infamous Giorgio Comerio, Italian businessman who was involved in various business deals in Somalia
ed all'illecita gestione degli aiuti del Fai (oggi direzione generale per la cooperazione e lo sviluppo).
as well as being involved in the illegal management of aid to FAI (cooperation and development organisation)
Il progetto (già citato dalla precedente Commissione dinchiesta) prevedeva il lancio dalle navi di penetratori (cilindri metallici a forma di siluro), caricati con scorie radioattive vetrificate o cementate e racchiuse in contenitori di acciaio inossidabile che si depositavano sino a 50-80 metri al di sotto del fondale marino;
Giorgio Comerio was involved in a project to dispose of radioactive waste. The waste was to be mixed with cement or vitrified, then enclosed in steel containers, then sunk 50-80 metres deep on the sea bed.
in alternativa, si affondava la nave con l'intero carico pericoloso, simulando un affondamento accidentale e lucrando,
But instead of this entire ships were sunk "accidentally", a much cheaper way of disposing of the radioactive waste.
così, anche il premio assicurativo, il che è stato confermato dalle indagini aventi ad oggetto alcuni naufragi assai sospetti di navi assicurate dalla Lloyds di Londra,
So that he was able to claim the insurance on the ships, the inquest discovered, since they were able to trace various suspicious looking shipwrecks logged by Lloyds of London.
verificatisi nel Tirreno e nello Ionio, di cui diremo oltre.
These ships were sunk in the Tirreno and Ionian sea and beyond.
Il progetto contemplava anche la vendita di alcuni ordigni bellici (le telemine) ai Paesi del Medio oriente,
Giorgio Comerio also sold arms to various Middle East countries
da nascondere in profondita` marine mediante navi Ro-Ro - le stesse navi utilizzate per affondare le scorie radioattive - e col sistema appena descritto"(Relazione finale XIII legislatura).
These arms were hidden in the ships that he used to transport the radioactive waste, which went first to the middle east to offload the arms, then back to the coast of Italy to be sunk.
Questo tipo di traffici è stato per decenni strettamente connesso all'area ligure,
For decades this kind of arms and radioactive waste traffic was connected with the Ligurian coastline.
come riportano gli atti di una delle missioni conoscitive della commissione alla fine degli anni '90.
An inquest held towards the end of the 90s reported details of this.
Un caso emblematico il caso della discarica di Pitelli a La Spezia.
An emblematic case occurred at the Pitelli dump at La Spezia.
"L'attività illecita consisteva nella sistematica falsificazione di documenti di accompagnamento (tesi a consentire l'ingresso in discarica di materiali non autorizzati)
"the case involved the systematic falsification of documents (the documents that permit vehicles to bring non-authorised materials into the dump.)
e nella falsificazione di dichiarazioni di avvenuto smaltimento di rifiuti;
Documents declaring that toxic waste had been correctly disposed of were also falsified.
nella commissione di truffe a danno di enti pubblici e privati, ai quali venivano fatturati costi di smalti mento non affrontati;
Both public and private organisations ended up having to pay for the disposal of toxic and radioactive waste that had not been correctly disposed of.
infine, nel sistematico illecito smaltimento di rifiuti tossico-nocivi provenienti dal territorio nazionale e dall'estero.
Toxic and radioactive waste from Italy and abroad had been systematically dumped completely illegally.
Tali condotte illecite, cominciate nel 1975 (quando cioè nasce la discarica), erano agevolate dalla notevole capacità penetrativa dei soggetti coinvolti, tra cui il Duvia, negli enti pubblici di varia natura
This illegal dumping, which began in 1975 (when the dump was opened) was facilitated by various people in public administrative positions, including the Duvia.
preposti al controllo e proseguivano anche durante il periodo in cui la discarica di Pitelli era sottoposta a sequestro giudiziario. (...)
Even when there was a legal charge on the Pitelli dump, illegal dumping of toxic materials continued.
A prescindere da ogni valutazione sui profili squisitamente penali, sono innegabili alla luce dei numerosi elementi acquisiti dalla Commissione (...) le illegalità commesse dai vari organi amministrativi competenti al controllo (...)".
Clearly the admistration responsible for control of these toxic materials was corrupt.
Ma per la Liguria non si parla solo del caso Pitelli,
In Liguria people are not just talking about the Pitelli case.
anzi: "le indagini che coinvolgono la città di La Spezia, in merito ai casi delle cosiddette "navi a perdere" e delle "navi dei veleni",
The inquest was also concerned with the toxic shipwrecks.
che proprio in quel porto sarebbero state caricate di rifiuti prima di essere le une affondate deliberatamente nel Mediterraneo
Many of the ships that ended up as shipwrecks in the Mediterranean set out from the Ligurian port of La Spezia
e le altre inviate nei Paesi in via di sviluppo per smaltimenti illeciti di rifiuti pericolosi.
Ships from La Spezia also took their toxic and radioactive waste to the third world.
Per quanto riguarda tali gravi fatti, anzi, si deve registrare il nuovo allarme che l'autorità giudiziaria ha ritenuto di esplicitare nel corso del recente convegno sul "Ciclo dei rifiuti in Italia" (...) a proposito della ripresa delle spedizioni di carichi illeciti verso l'Africa e l'America latina.
The inquest registered alarm when they discovered that some of this toxic and radioactive waste had gone to Africa and Latin America.
Si tratta di denunce di particolare gravità, sulle quali questa Commissione vigilerà con la massima attenzione".
The inquest declared that it would be watching the situation like a hawk.
Le segnalazioni di nuove spedizioni illecite di cui parlava la Commissione di Inchiesta, però, non avvenivano più da Spezia ma soprattutto da Genova
Now the inquest has discovered that new illegal traffic has been setting out from Genova, rather than La Spezia.
dopo che un noto armatore aveva trasferito il suo terminal dalla prima alla seconda città, armatore già conosciuto e coinvolto con sue navi direttamente nel caso delle navi dei veleni alla fine degli anni '80.
The inquest traced an arms dealer, known to them for his traffic in toxic waste, who transferred his activities from La Spezia to Genova
I traffici internazionali, sia di rifiuti che di armi o di triangolazioni fra scorie e forniture militari come ormai è dimostrato sia avvenuto a metà degli anni '90 in particolare in Somalia, sono proseguiti e proseguono tuttora,
International traffic in toxic and radioactive waste and illegal arms have continued ever since they were discovered in Somalia, and continue today.
garantiti anche da norme internazionali assolutamente incredibili come ad esempio quelle del "doppio registro", in cui scafo e contenuto possono battere due bandiere diverse a seconda delle convenienze degli armatori in relazione a sicurezza e carico.
This illicit traffic is facilitated by incredible international laws. For example a ship can sail under two different flags. The captain of the ship can choose which flag to fly according to which one matches the cargo he is carrying.
E allo stesso tempo le autorità marittime di controllo hanno sempre meno possibilità di incidere realmente nel fermare i traffici illegali,
Maritime authorities have less and less opportunities to stop this illegal traffic
sia per mancanza di personale che per direttive politiche.
They lack personnel and they lack political backing.
Ad esempio le Capitanerie di porto sono molto più impegnate a reprimere il fenomeno dell'immigrazione clandestina che quello dei traffici illeciti di scorie industriali.
The port authorities have to use a large proportion of their resources to stop illegal immigrants. So they do not have enough left to stop this illegal traffic in arms and toxic and radioactive waste.
Un esempio per tutti, la vicenda del mercantile albanese Korabi a metà degli anni '90. La nave parte da Spalato con un carico di materiali (rottami) ferrosi. Nello Ionio la Capitaneria di Reggio Calabria effettua un'ispezione.
The Albanian ship Korabi in the middle of the 90s set out from Spalata with a cargo of scrap iron. In the Ionian sea the port authorities of Reggio Calabria decided to carry out an inspection.
Non si sa per quale ragione gli ispettori utilizzano anche un contatore geiger – probabilmente grazie a qualche "soffiata" – e riscontrano radioattività nel carico.
Then, maybe because someone tipped them off, they decided to use a geiger counter. They discovered that the cargo was radioactive.
Non succede nulla, perché non si capisce, e la nave viene lasciata proseguire per Palermo dove è diretta.
Nothing was done to stop the boat, which continued on its journey to Palermo.
L'unica iniziativa dell'autorità calabrese è quella di informare dell'anomalia la Capitaneria siciliana che, dopo aver effettuato anche lei un'ispezione con tanto di contatore geiger, non autorizza la nave ad entrare in porto.
The Calabrian port authority informed the Sicilian port authority who went out with a geiger counter to inspect the ship. They too found that the cargo was radioactive, so they stopped the ship from entering the port.
Tre giorni dopo, al largo delle coste calabresi, la nave viene ispezionata dalla Capitaneria di Reggio e, sorpresa, non c'è più traccia di radioattività a bordo.
Three days later, off the coast of Calabria, the Reggio port authority inspected the ship again. This time, amazingly, they did not find any trace of radioactivity.
Quindi, o nelle due precedenti ispezioni le autorità italiane si sono sbagliate oppure il carico fra Palermo alla Calabria (e la nave ricordo avrebbe impiegato tre giorni per fare un tragitto di poche ore) è finito tranquillamente in mare.
Three days had passed between the ship setting out from Palermo and it reaching Reggio. This was a journey that should have taken a few hours. What had happened to the cargo during those three days?
Quello della Korabi non è un caso isolato.
And this is not an isolated case.
Si ipotizza (sempre la commissione bicamerale) che davanti a Capo Spartivento (la zona presenta una fossa marina fra le più profonde del Mediterraneo) fra gli anni '80 e '90 sarebbero state affondate almeno 40 navi cariche di scorie.
The inquest thinks that off the coast of Capo Spartivento (where there is a deep marine ditch) between the 80s and the 90s at least 40 ships full of toxic and radioactive waste were sunk.
Più che nave carrette, contenitori di scorie per lo smaltimento illecito. Una di queste, la Rigel, è stata anche individuata grazie a un'indagine promossa dalla stessa Commissione e dalla magistratura competente. La ricerca è stata possibile grazie alle coordinate esatte (riportate accanto alla dicitura "la nave è affondata") ritrovate in un'agenda del capitano di un'altra nave naufragata e arenata sempre coste calabre: la Rosso, già Jolly Rosso appartenente all'armatore Fratelli Messina è molto conosciuta negli anni '80 come una delle "navi dei veleni" insieme alla Zanoobia e alla Karin-B implicate in un traffico internazionali di rifiuti fra Africa, Libano e Genova.
Si è parlato per almeno due decenni del triangolo Genova, La Spezia e Livorno per il traffico illecito di scorie e armi. Con infiltrazioni della mafia – ricordo che secondo la stessa magistratura uno dei settori di maggior guadagno del latitante Provenzano fossero i rifiuti e il loro smaltimento illecito -, implicazioni a tutti i livelli di istituzioni e imprese. Ricordo ad esempio che a Spezia si è arrivati al coinvolgimento addirittura di alti ufficiali della Marina Militare (un ammiraglio) che a quanto pare avrebbe dato in uso come area di stoccaggio provvisorio dei rifiuti in transito strutture dell'Arsenale spezzino.
Da questo quadro non stupisce la definizione fatta alla fine degli anni '90 dai comitati locali e dalle associazioni ambientaliste (Wwf e Legambiente in prima fila) della Liguria come piattaforma di interscambio per i traffici illeciti internazionali.
E oggi? La situazione, anche se sempre meno adeguatamente monitorata, prosegue a destare preoccupazione. Come preoccupa l'opposizione inusuale da parte di alcuni settori militari al dragaggio del canale d'ingresso al porto di La Spezia, dragaggio che, sia per le attività commerciale che quelle militari nell'area dell'arsenale viene definito come indispensabile.
And today? The situation is not being properly monitored, but there is serious cause for concern. They have been dragging the canal at the entrance to the port of La Spezia.
Pietro Orsatti
Tuesday, 18 May 2010 - CAMPAIGNERS from London and SE England Stop Nuclear Power protested outside the Financing Nuclear Power and Nuclear Interim Storage conferences in central London today. They invited delegates to invest in a green future instead of nuclear energy and demanded an end to nuclear waste production.
The first port of call for the three protesters, two of whom were dressed in white overalls, was the Financing Nuclear Power conference at the plush Crowne Plaza hotel near St James's Park. They held up a banner that read "Green Solutions Not Nuclear Greenwash" and leafleted delegates and passing members of the public outside the main entrance to the hotel for over an hour and a half, closely watched by hotel security staff throughout
The incoming Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government has said it will continue with the Labour government policy of allowing ten new nuclear power stations to be built in England and Wales. Ministers have said that no direct public subsidies will be offered for new nuclear build, although a carbon floor price is proposed. Nowhere in the world has a nuclear power station ever been built without public subsidy.
For five decades, the nuclear industry has failed to find a permanent solution for its radioactive waste, which remains dangerous for tens of thousands of years. [2] With current waste storage facilities at Sizewell B in Suffolk nearly full, plans are in place to build a new "temporary" store where waste from the reactor will be kept indefinitely in the absence of a permanent solution. This is before considering the waste from any new reactor(s), which would be more radioactive and remain too hot to transport for 160+ years.
Campaigner Daniel Viesnik, 35, from London, says: "Contrary to the nonsense that you hear from the nuclear spin doctors and their political mouthpieces, nuclear power is a dirty, dangerous and expensive technology that diverts essential investment from genuine green alternatives like energy efficiency and renewable and decentralised energy. It carries the risks of nuclear weapons proliferation, nuclear terrorism and a Chernobyl-type catastrophe [3,4]. Why waste money on nuclear white elephants and dump more nuclear waste on local communities when we could build a genuinely sustainable, nuclear-free, zero carbon future?"
Notes:
1. London and SE England Stop Nuclear Power is part of the Stop Nuclear Power Network, a UK-based non-hierarchical grassroots network of activists taking action against nuclear power and supporting sustainable alternatives.
http://stopnuclearpoweruk.net/
2. Nuclear Decommissioning Authority's Oxide Fuel Topic Strategy (2010) indicates that serious questions remain within the nuclear industry itself over whether any solution for permanent disposal of radioactive waste will ever be found.
http://www.nda.gov.uk/documents/upload/draft-oxide-fuel-topic-strategy-gate-0.pdf
3. EDF nuclear reactor carries 'Chernobyl-size' explosion risk - Guardian, 7 March 2010
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2010/mar/07/edf-nuclear-reactor-chernobyl-risk
4. Academics demand independent inquiry into new nuclear reactors – Guardian, 11 March 2010
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2010/mar/11/independent-inquiry-nuclear-power-stations
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